Narrative:

We were flying an A-300 from mia-jfk, flight YYY. We were using runways 27L, 27R and 30. Our scheduled departure time was XA30. When we arrived at the runway we decided to use maximum power, due to a few knots of tailwind. Upon taking the runway for departure, the winds shifted and we had a headwind, but decided to remain at maximum power because we were heavy. It had rained a little earlier and we had it already set up. It was my takeoff and, upon rolling down the runway for departure out of mia, we heard the tower tell air carrier Y to go around and to turn left to heading 180. I assumed the missed approach was to runway 27L, however, it was actually on the intersecting runway 30. When we broke ground and were climbing through 200 ft, captain X focused on air carrier Y climbing right toward us. Captain told me to turn and keep turning. I started a turn north with a 35-40 degree bank and I climbed. The tower was quiet for a moment and then gave us, we think, a clearance to 360 degree heading. We think that was for us but they didn't use our correct call sign. Then the tower said 'well, we gave air carrier Y a turn to 180 degree, contact departure. There was significant WX in the area and we started getting vectors around other traffic and WX. I believe three important factors enabled us to execute a successful near miss. First, captain X's situational awareness and head's up skill enabled us to view a hazard early enough to avoid an accident. Second, the fact that I was flying enabled the captain to view the DC9 off his side of the aircraft. And finally, the fact that captain X elected to continue a maximum power takeoff gave us the power when we needed it. I believe there are at least three specific chains of events that enabled this incident to come about. First, the fact that we conduct apches to intersecting runways causes possible severe risks. We have lost sight of the whole approach, landing and missed approach airspace. We certainly give room for apches and landing distances, but missed approach procedures are severely compromised. Secondly, air carrier Y was flying the published missed approach and I'm guessing, but the language issue has to be considered. I'm sure we got their attention as they got ours. And finally, we were not given any information from the tower as we were taking off, on climb out or at anytime. I would love to say that this situation is unique and would never happen again, but unfortunately I cannot. If safety is truly our main objective, then serious thought needs to be given in using conflicting runways or land and hold short procedures. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback revealed that the go around from runway 30 was the result of a preceding aircraft not clearing the runway in time for a landing by the following aircraft. The go around was issued with a change to the published missed approach instruction. It was not executed in a timely manner. It is possible that the delay was due to a language problem. The miss distance was estimated by the reporter, after consultation with the captain since the report was made, at 200 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC AT MIA, FL BTWN AN ACR ON GAR FROM RWY 30 AND A DEPARTURE FROM RWY 27R.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING AN A-300 FROM MIA-JFK, FLT YYY. WE WERE USING RWYS 27L, 27R AND 30. OUR SCHEDULED DEPARTURE TIME WAS XA30. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE RWY WE DECIDED TO USE MAX POWER, DUE TO A FEW KNOTS OF TAILWIND. UPON TAKING THE RWY FOR DEPARTURE, THE WINDS SHIFTED AND WE HAD A HEADWIND, BUT DECIDED TO REMAIN AT MAX POWER BECAUSE WE WERE HEAVY. IT HAD RAINED A LITTLE EARLIER AND WE HAD IT ALREADY SET UP. IT WAS MY TKOF AND, UPON ROLLING DOWN THE RWY FOR DEPARTURE OUT OF MIA, WE HEARD THE TWR TELL ACR Y TO GAR AND TO TURN LEFT TO HEADING 180. I ASSUMED THE MISSED APCH WAS TO RWY 27L, HOWEVER, IT WAS ACTUALLY ON THE INTERSECTING RWY 30. WHEN WE BROKE GND AND WERE CLBING THROUGH 200 FT, CAPT X FOCUSED ON ACR Y CLIMBING RIGHT TOWARD US. CAPT TOLD ME TO TURN AND KEEP TURNING. I STARTED A TURN N WITH A 35-40 DEG BANK AND I CLIMBED. THE TWR WAS QUIET FOR A MOMENT AND THEN GAVE US, WE THINK, A CLRNC TO 360 DEG HEADING. WE THINK THAT WAS FOR US BUT THEY DIDN'T USE OUR CORRECT CALL SIGN. THEN THE TWR SAID 'WELL, WE GAVE ACR Y A TURN TO 180 DEG, CONTACT DEPARTURE. THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT WX IN THE AREA AND WE STARTED GETTING VECTORS AROUND OTHER TFC AND WX. I BELIEVE THREE IMPORTANT FACTORS ENABLED US TO EXECUTE A SUCCESSFUL NEAR MISS. FIRST, CAPT X'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND HEAD'S UP SKILL ENABLED US TO VIEW A HAZARD EARLY ENOUGH TO AVOID AN ACCIDENT. SECOND, THE FACT THAT I WAS FLYING ENABLED THE CAPT TO VIEW THE DC9 OFF HIS SIDE OF THE ACFT. AND FINALLY, THE FACT THAT CAPT X ELECTED TO CONTINUE A MAX POWER TKOF GAVE US THE POWER WHEN WE NEEDED IT. I BELIEVE THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE SPECIFIC CHAINS OF EVENTS THAT ENABLED THIS INCIDENT TO COME ABOUT. FIRST, THE FACT THAT WE CONDUCT APCHES TO INTERSECTING RWYS CAUSES POSSIBLE SEVERE RISKS. WE HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THE WHOLE APCH, LANDING AND MISSED APCH AIRSPACE. WE CERTAINLY GIVE ROOM FOR APCHES AND LANDING DISTANCES, BUT MISSED APCH PROCS ARE SEVERELY COMPROMISED. SECONDLY, ACR Y WAS FLYING THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH AND I'M GUESSING, BUT THE LANGUAGE ISSUE HAS TO BE CONSIDERED. I'M SURE WE GOT THEIR ATTENTION AS THEY GOT OURS. AND FINALLY, WE WERE NOT GIVEN ANY INFO FROM THE TWR AS WE WERE TAKING OFF, ON CLB OUT OR AT ANYTIME. I WOULD LOVE TO SAY THAT THIS SIT IS UNIQUE AND WOULD NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN, BUT UNFORTUNATELY I CANNOT. IF SAFETY IS TRULY OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE, THEN SERIOUS THOUGHT NEEDS TO BE GIVEN IN USING CONFLICTING RWYS OR LAND AND HOLD SHORT PROCS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK REVEALED THAT THE GAR FROM RWY 30 WAS THE RESULT OF A PRECEDING ACFT NOT CLEARING THE RWY IN TIME FOR A LNDG BY THE FOLLOWING ACFT. THE GAR WAS ISSUED WITH A CHANGE TO THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH INSTRUCTION. IT WAS NOT EXECUTED IN A TIMELY MANNER. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DELAY WAS DUE TO A LANGUAGE PROB. THE MISS DISTANCE WAS ESTIMATED BY THE RPTR, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE CAPT SINCE THE RPT WAS MADE, AT 200 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.