Narrative:

On sep/sat/02, I flew for the first time since the attacks on the wtc and pentagon. The tensions of my fellow workers and passenger were high. I was the captain from den to oma. My first officer was a woman who had only 40 hours in type, and the captain who flew in with her on the inbound flight told me that her cockpit abilities were limited and poor. With this in mind, and with WX en route and in oma, I elected to fly. When I asked my first officer about her flying background, she told me that she had worked at ZZZ airline for 15 yrs. This level of experience was belied by her performance of even rudimentary tasks during preflight, like obtaining a clearance. En route, her radio xmissions were consistently inaccurate or missed altogether. I found myself in a position worse than if I was single-plting this airplane, and I am an experienced cfii mei who is used to compensating for a student's inadequacies. On approach, I had to talk her through tuning the radios, setting up speed cards, etc. While she was performing these duties, she would miss all radio calls, which I had to make. She also failed to comply with some of my instructions on setting up the autoplt/flight director such that I was required to disconnect the autoplt and hand-fly the approach. This greatly increased my workload, as I was now raw data and having to re-establish myself on the approach. At the OM, we were stabilized on the approach in heavy rain and IMC. I called for flaps 30 degrees, landing checklist below the line, and had to repeat myself when I got no response, as if she was frozen up on me. I finally got a challenge and gave the response to the checklist. We continued the approach, and at 1000 ft above minimums she did not make the required callout. I made the callout and told her to keep up with me. I felt that I had no help on this approach, and in retrospect, I could have initiated a go around, climbed to safety, got things sorted out with her, and attempted another approach. Doing this, however, would have forced me to have either diverted to my alternate, which was not much better WX-wise, or have burned up so much fuel I would be allowed only 1 more approach with very little fuel options. I elected to remain on the approach, and I broke out at about 600 ft with the runway in sight. As I called out 'landing,' I realized that although we had not been switched over from the approach control facility, my first officer had not contacted the tower. I told her to immediately contact the tower, but she fumbled for a frequency, said 'but we weren't switched over' and did not successfully switch over until I was over the numbers. I saw that I had a clear runway, that it was safe and I felt that it was in the best interest of safety to land. I did so normally, and tower simply instructed us to taxi to parking. I debriefed her extensively as to her duties during an approach as the PNF, and how she had relinquished them all to me. I have trained pilots at all levels of experience, but never have I felt so hung out to dry as flying with this person. It was as if I had a person in the cockpit who did not just do nothing, but seemed to be doing everything to increase my workload. I have notified our flight operations department about this individual, and review of her training and background was promised.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CAPT, NOTING THE TENSION CAUSED BY RECENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY, RELATES AN INCIDENT ILLUSTRATING THAT HIS COPLT WAS MORE OF A HINDRANCE TO A SAFE OP THAN A HELP. HE AND ANOTHER CAPT ATTRIBUTE THE PROB TO A POSSIBLE LACK OF QUALIFICATION AS WELL.

Narrative: ON SEP/SAT/02, I FLEW FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ATTACKS ON THE WTC AND PENTAGON. THE TENSIONS OF MY FELLOW WORKERS AND PAX WERE HIGH. I WAS THE CAPT FROM DEN TO OMA. MY FO WAS A WOMAN WHO HAD ONLY 40 HRS IN TYPE, AND THE CAPT WHO FLEW IN WITH HER ON THE INBOUND FLT TOLD ME THAT HER COCKPIT ABILITIES WERE LIMITED AND POOR. WITH THIS IN MIND, AND WITH WX ENRTE AND IN OMA, I ELECTED TO FLY. WHEN I ASKED MY FO ABOUT HER FLYING BACKGROUND, SHE TOLD ME THAT SHE HAD WORKED AT ZZZ AIRLINE FOR 15 YRS. THIS LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE WAS BELIED BY HER PERFORMANCE OF EVEN RUDIMENTARY TASKS DURING PREFLT, LIKE OBTAINING A CLRNC. ENRTE, HER RADIO XMISSIONS WERE CONSISTENTLY INACCURATE OR MISSED ALTOGETHER. I FOUND MYSELF IN A POS WORSE THAN IF I WAS SINGLE-PLTING THIS AIRPLANE, AND I AM AN EXPERIENCED CFII MEI WHO IS USED TO COMPENSATING FOR A STUDENT'S INADEQUACIES. ON APCH, I HAD TO TALK HER THROUGH TUNING THE RADIOS, SETTING UP SPD CARDS, ETC. WHILE SHE WAS PERFORMING THESE DUTIES, SHE WOULD MISS ALL RADIO CALLS, WHICH I HAD TO MAKE. SHE ALSO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SOME OF MY INSTRUCTIONS ON SETTING UP THE AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR SUCH THAT I WAS REQUIRED TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT AND HAND-FLY THE APCH. THIS GREATLY INCREASED MY WORKLOAD, AS I WAS NOW RAW DATA AND HAVING TO RE-ESTABLISH MYSELF ON THE APCH. AT THE OM, WE WERE STABILIZED ON THE APCH IN HVY RAIN AND IMC. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS, LNDG CHKLIST BELOW THE LINE, AND HAD TO REPEAT MYSELF WHEN I GOT NO RESPONSE, AS IF SHE WAS FROZEN UP ON ME. I FINALLY GOT A CHALLENGE AND GAVE THE RESPONSE TO THE CHKLIST. WE CONTINUED THE APCH, AND AT 1000 FT ABOVE MINIMUMS SHE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED CALLOUT. I MADE THE CALLOUT AND TOLD HER TO KEEP UP WITH ME. I FELT THAT I HAD NO HELP ON THIS APCH, AND IN RETROSPECT, I COULD HAVE INITIATED A GAR, CLBED TO SAFETY, GOT THINGS SORTED OUT WITH HER, AND ATTEMPTED ANOTHER APCH. DOING THIS, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE FORCED ME TO HAVE EITHER DIVERTED TO MY ALTERNATE, WHICH WAS NOT MUCH BETTER WX-WISE, OR HAVE BURNED UP SO MUCH FUEL I WOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY 1 MORE APCH WITH VERY LITTLE FUEL OPTIONS. I ELECTED TO REMAIN ON THE APCH, AND I BROKE OUT AT ABOUT 600 FT WITH THE RWY IN SIGHT. AS I CALLED OUT 'LNDG,' I REALIZED THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD NOT BEEN SWITCHED OVER FROM THE APCH CTL FACILITY, MY FO HAD NOT CONTACTED THE TWR. I TOLD HER TO IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE TWR, BUT SHE FUMBLED FOR A FREQ, SAID 'BUT WE WEREN'T SWITCHED OVER' AND DID NOT SUCCESSFULLY SWITCH OVER UNTIL I WAS OVER THE NUMBERS. I SAW THAT I HAD A CLR RWY, THAT IT WAS SAFE AND I FELT THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY TO LAND. I DID SO NORMALLY, AND TWR SIMPLY INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO PARKING. I DEBRIEFED HER EXTENSIVELY AS TO HER DUTIES DURING AN APCH AS THE PNF, AND HOW SHE HAD RELINQUISHED THEM ALL TO ME. I HAVE TRAINED PLTS AT ALL LEVELS OF EXPERIENCE, BUT NEVER HAVE I FELT SO HUNG OUT TO DRY AS FLYING WITH THIS PERSON. IT WAS AS IF I HAD A PERSON IN THE COCKPIT WHO DID NOT JUST DO NOTHING, BUT SEEMED TO BE DOING EVERYTHING TO INCREASE MY WORKLOAD. I HAVE NOTIFIED OUR FLT OPS DEPT ABOUT THIS INDIVIDUAL, AND REVIEW OF HER TRAINING AND BACKGROUND WAS PROMISED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.