Narrative:

This was a brief, high workload flight with clouds en route and moderate turbulence. I was captain and chose to be the PNF based on expected workload. Prior to departure we reviewed the route and possible approachs. Upon reaching altitude we were handed off to approach control and given a lower altitude. At that point I fell behind since I was in the middle of obtaining ATIS and working through the cruise checklist. Soon we encountered moderate turbulence, borderline severe. While preparing to brief an ILS approach, we broke out of the clouds and I called the airport in sight. Approach cleared us as follows: cleared for the visual approach, maintain 3000 ft till 7 DME, remain on or west of localizer. The controller wanted to keep us clear of traffic both low, and east of the field. After my readback, I returned to the checklist for the descent phase. We were bounced around by the winds and I had a difficult time reaching switches. I heard a call from another aircraft stating he had traffic in sight. That prompted me to look around and evaluate our status. I found the first officer had descended below our assigned altitude prior to 7 DME. I immediately told him to climb while I set climb power. At the same time, approach asked what our altitude was. I responded with 2300 ft and climbing. I also informed him we were experiencing moderate turbulence and getting bounced around pretty bad. We promptly climbed to 3000 ft. I visually acquired the other aircraft and verified 1000 ft separation on TCASII. (TCASII never sounded off, so to my knowledge there was no conflict.) while initiating the landing checklist and configuring the aircraft, I was handed off to tower who let me know we were drifting right off course and had traffic to the east. I told him we were correcting as the first officer steered left. I also confirmed traffic in sight. Winds were gusting to 34 KTS at the airport as we landed. This was an extremely busy flight where events overlapped. Given the turbulence, short duration, and high workload, situational awareness broke down. The altitude deviation could have been avoided through positive interaction with my crew member. I should have perceived the degree of difficulty he was having in the strong winds. In the future I will ask for vectors if the workload becomes so great that it diverts my attention. I will also communicate more with the first officer under stressful conditions. WX conditions have a direct impact on our ability to process information and carry out our required tasks in a timely manner. The use of turbulence should be encouraged during simulator training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON A SHORT FLT IN WX WITH TURB A FACTOR AN ALT AND TRACK EXCURSION OCCUR WHEN THE PF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH A VISUAL APCH CLRNC.

Narrative: THIS WAS A BRIEF, HIGH WORKLOAD FLT WITH CLOUDS ENRTE AND MODERATE TURB. I WAS CAPT AND CHOSE TO BE THE PNF BASED ON EXPECTED WORKLOAD. PRIOR TO DEP WE REVIEWED THE RTE AND POSSIBLE APCHS. UPON REACHING ALT WE WERE HANDED OFF TO APCH CTL AND GIVEN A LOWER ALT. AT THAT POINT I FELL BEHIND SINCE I WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF OBTAINING ATIS AND WORKING THROUGH THE CRUISE CHKLIST. SOON WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE TURB, BORDERLINE SEVERE. WHILE PREPARING TO BRIEF AN ILS APCH, WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND I CALLED THE ARPT IN SIGHT. APCH CLRED US AS FOLLOWS: CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH, MAINTAIN 3000 FT TILL 7 DME, REMAIN ON OR W OF LOC. THE CTLR WANTED TO KEEP US CLR OF TFC BOTH LOW, AND E OF THE FIELD. AFTER MY READBACK, I RETURNED TO THE CHKLIST FOR THE DSCNT PHASE. WE WERE BOUNCED AROUND BY THE WINDS AND I HAD A DIFFICULT TIME REACHING SWITCHES. I HEARD A CALL FROM ANOTHER ACFT STATING HE HAD TFC IN SIGHT. THAT PROMPTED ME TO LOOK AROUND AND EVALUATE OUR STATUS. I FOUND THE FO HAD DSNDED BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT PRIOR TO 7 DME. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD HIM TO CLB WHILE I SET CLB PWR. AT THE SAME TIME, APCH ASKED WHAT OUR ALT WAS. I RESPONDED WITH 2300 FT AND CLBING. I ALSO INFORMED HIM WE WERE EXPERIENCING MODERATE TURB AND GETTING BOUNCED AROUND PRETTY BAD. WE PROMPTLY CLBED TO 3000 FT. I VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE OTHER ACFT AND VERIFIED 1000 FT SEPARATION ON TCASII. (TCASII NEVER SOUNDED OFF, SO TO MY KNOWLEDGE THERE WAS NO CONFLICT.) WHILE INITIATING THE LNDG CHKLIST AND CONFIGURING THE ACFT, I WAS HANDED OFF TO TWR WHO LET ME KNOW WE WERE DRIFTING R OFF COURSE AND HAD TFC TO THE E. I TOLD HIM WE WERE CORRECTING AS THE FO STEERED L. I ALSO CONFIRMED TFC IN SIGHT. WINDS WERE GUSTING TO 34 KTS AT THE ARPT AS WE LANDED. THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY BUSY FLT WHERE EVENTS OVERLAPPED. GIVEN THE TURB, SHORT DURATION, AND HIGH WORKLOAD, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BROKE DOWN. THE ALTDEV COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED THROUGH POSITIVE INTERACTION WITH MY CREW MEMBER. I SHOULD HAVE PERCEIVED THE DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY HE WAS HAVING IN THE STRONG WINDS. IN THE FUTURE I WILL ASK FOR VECTORS IF THE WORKLOAD BECOMES SO GREAT THAT IT DIVERTS MY ATTN. I WILL ALSO COMMUNICATE MORE WITH THE FO UNDER STRESSFUL CONDITIONS. WX CONDITIONS HAVE A DIRECT IMPACT ON OUR ABILITY TO PROCESS INFO AND CARRY OUT OUR REQUIRED TASKS IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE USE OF TURB SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED DURING SIMULATOR TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.