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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 526949 |
Time | |
Date | 200110 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ont.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl single value : 15000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zla.artcc artcc : zbw.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other vortac |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | arrival star : ziggy 3 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 526949 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : undershoot altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera other controllerb other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance Chart Or Publication Cabin Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance Aircraft Airspace Structure |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Situations | |
Chart | star : ziggy 3 |
Narrative:
During our descent into ont on the ziggy 3 arrival, we were issued a clearance by ZLA to cross majek intersection at 14000 ft. After crossing mpd, I mentally recalculated my descent profile and realized that at our current rate of descent, we would have no problem making the crossing restr at majek. At that moment, I became distraction by a call from the flight attendants on the interphone. Even though the interphone conversation lasted less than 2 mins, it was long enough for me to neglect the descent rate, and the aircraft shallowed out at approximately 1000 FPM rate of descent. After finishing the interphone conversation, my (full) attention returned to flying the airplane. At that point, we were 5 mi from majek and still had approximately 3000 ft to go to make the restr. I increased the rate of descent and ATC called clearance to cross hitop intersection at 13000 ft and 250 KIAS and asked if we would be able to make that. I replied that we would. (We actually crossed majek at roughly 15000 ft and approximately 280 KIAS.) shortly after crossing hitop, we were switched to approach control. The approach controller asked us how we interpreted the approach plate language at majek -- specifically if we thought the speed restr was worded ambiguously. I replied with an apology and stated that we have always understood the STAR to require a speed of 250 KIAS at majek, and that it was simply my fault for not making it. He went on to say that there seems to have been a lot of confusion recently over how the crossing restr at majek is to be interpreted. Since the verbiage on the STAR begins with 'expect clearance,' apparently some interpretation that to include the airspeed of 250 KIAS as something to comply with [only] if the clearance is issued. I suggested that if the airspeed restr was listed first, followed by 'expect clearance,' the confusion might be eliminated. As for my deviation, I can only redouble my efforts to fly the airplane first and not allow distrs to take priority or to xfer aircraft to the first officer momentarily. In this particular case, this was not feasible as the first officer was 'off frequency' at the time attempting to contact ont operations to give them our in-range call. One further distraction that may have contributed to this situation was that in this particular -200 series aircraft that we were operating, the volume control on the audio select panel was horrendous. Each radio or setting that was selected by the rotary selector known on the audio select panel had a different volume level. When using VHF 1, for example, we had to turn the volume almost full down, yet when we used the interphone system we had to turn the volume full up and even then the flight attendant was barely audible. This, of course, meant that more attention had to be given to the audio select panel than usual, and so less than my full attention was available for flying the plane. My impression, based on the radio conversations with both ZLA and ont approach control was that they were more concerned about the airspeed deviation, as they perceive a trend in that area.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-200 PIC FAILS TO MAKE THE ALT AND SPD RESTR AT MAJEK INTXN AND IS QUERIED ABOUT THIS BY APCH CTLR AT LAX, CA.
Narrative: DURING OUR DSCNT INTO ONT ON THE ZIGGY 3 ARR, WE WERE ISSUED A CLRNC BY ZLA TO CROSS MAJEK INTXN AT 14000 FT. AFTER XING MPD, I MENTALLY RECALCULATED MY DSCNT PROFILE AND REALIZED THAT AT OUR CURRENT RATE OF DSCNT, WE WOULD HAVE NO PROB MAKING THE XING RESTR AT MAJEK. AT THAT MOMENT, I BECAME DISTR BY A CALL FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS ON THE INTERPHONE. EVEN THOUGH THE INTERPHONE CONVERSATION LASTED LESS THAN 2 MINS, IT WAS LONG ENOUGH FOR ME TO NEGLECT THE DSCNT RATE, AND THE ACFT SHALLOWED OUT AT APPROX 1000 FPM RATE OF DSCNT. AFTER FINISHING THE INTERPHONE CONVERSATION, MY (FULL) ATTN RETURNED TO FLYING THE AIRPLANE. AT THAT POINT, WE WERE 5 MI FROM MAJEK AND STILL HAD APPROX 3000 FT TO GO TO MAKE THE RESTR. I INCREASED THE RATE OF DSCNT AND ATC CALLED CLRNC TO CROSS HITOP INTXN AT 13000 FT AND 250 KIAS AND ASKED IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THAT. I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD. (WE ACTUALLY CROSSED MAJEK AT ROUGHLY 15000 FT AND APPROX 280 KIAS.) SHORTLY AFTER XING HITOP, WE WERE SWITCHED TO APCH CTL. THE APCH CTLR ASKED US HOW WE INTERPED THE APCH PLATE LANGUAGE AT MAJEK -- SPECIFICALLY IF WE THOUGHT THE SPD RESTR WAS WORDED AMBIGUOUSLY. I REPLIED WITH AN APOLOGY AND STATED THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THE STAR TO REQUIRE A SPD OF 250 KIAS AT MAJEK, AND THAT IT WAS SIMPLY MY FAULT FOR NOT MAKING IT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A LOT OF CONFUSION RECENTLY OVER HOW THE XING RESTR AT MAJEK IS TO BE INTERPED. SINCE THE VERBIAGE ON THE STAR BEGINS WITH 'EXPECT CLRNC,' APPARENTLY SOME INTERP THAT TO INCLUDE THE AIRSPD OF 250 KIAS AS SOMETHING TO COMPLY WITH [ONLY] IF THE CLRNC IS ISSUED. I SUGGESTED THAT IF THE AIRSPD RESTR WAS LISTED FIRST, FOLLOWED BY 'EXPECT CLRNC,' THE CONFUSION MIGHT BE ELIMINATED. AS FOR MY DEV, I CAN ONLY REDOUBLE MY EFFORTS TO FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST AND NOT ALLOW DISTRS TO TAKE PRIORITY OR TO XFER ACFT TO THE FO MOMENTARILY. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THIS WAS NOT FEASIBLE AS THE FO WAS 'OFF FREQ' AT THE TIME ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT ONT OPS TO GIVE THEM OUR IN-RANGE CALL. ONE FURTHER DISTR THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT WAS THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR -200 SERIES ACFT THAT WE WERE OPERATING, THE VOLUME CTL ON THE AUDIO SELECT PANEL WAS HORRENDOUS. EACH RADIO OR SETTING THAT WAS SELECTED BY THE ROTARY SELECTOR KNOWN ON THE AUDIO SELECT PANEL HAD A DIFFERENT VOLUME LEVEL. WHEN USING VHF 1, FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAD TO TURN THE VOLUME ALMOST FULL DOWN, YET WHEN WE USED THE INTERPHONE SYS WE HAD TO TURN THE VOLUME FULL UP AND EVEN THEN THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS BARELY AUDIBLE. THIS, OF COURSE, MEANT THAT MORE ATTN HAD TO BE GIVEN TO THE AUDIO SELECT PANEL THAN USUAL, AND SO LESS THAN MY FULL ATTN WAS AVAILABLE FOR FLYING THE PLANE. MY IMPRESSION, BASED ON THE RADIO CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH ZLA AND ONT APCH CTL WAS THAT THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE AIRSPD DEV, AS THEY PERCEIVE A TREND IN THAT AREA.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.