Narrative:

We were cleared to civet at FL180 by ZLA. Approaching civet, I requested lower to meet STAR crossing restrs. Center delayed our request and handoff to approach such that it was difficult to comply with the crossing restr of below 17000 ft at civet. Upon check-in with socal approach, I reported 'level FL180.' socal cleared us to descend via civet 4. Captain set 8000 ft in the MCP window and selected VNAV for the descent. Captain complained about being rushed to meet the altitudes on the arrival. In an apparent effort to catch up, the captain selected vertical speed with a high rate of descent and extended the speed brakes. He did not select 12000 ft in the MCP altitude window to ensure meeting the next crossing restr at bremr. I did not question these actions, but rather busied myself with identing the ilax localizer for both left and right ILS receivers. I, too, felt rushed to be ready for the approach. I reported 'tuned and idented both sides,' and returned my attention to the FMS map display. I saw our altitude descending through 12000 ft and saw we were approximately 6 NM from bremr. I immediately called out, 'you're supposed to be at 12000 ft at bremr.' the captain responded by reducing the descent rate in the vertical speed window, rather than making an aggressive corrective response. I neglected to assume aircraft control or to provide a corrective input to the MCP. We stopped our descent at approximately 10500 ft and 1.5 NM east of bremr. Just then, socal stated, I hope you are leveling because that intersection has a crossing altitude.' I responded, 'roger, we're leveling.' socal then cleared us, 'after fuelr, cleared ILS runway 25L approach.' we completed a normal approach and landing. Mitigating factors: although the captain briefed the approach and we had completed descent and approach checklists prior to commencing the STAR, we did not discuss a plan of action for meeting the STAR restrs. Consequently, I was not as vigilant regarding the STAR altitudes as I should have been. Another factor may have been fatigue. We were returning to lax at XA00 after a 3 day trip of purely east coast flying. Although I didn't feel fatigued, my actions in the cockpit may have been less sharp than necessary to prevent this altitude deviation. Finally, this was my first trip following the sep/tue attacks, and I had not flown for nearly 6 weeks. As a result, I suppose I was distraction from my primary duty to 'aviate, navigation, communicate.' a specific recency issue follows: rather than using the STAR to identify the ilax signal, I looked at the approach plate instead. This simple mistake divided my attention from the STAR long enough for the altitude deviation to occur. What caused this to happen? The straws that broke the camel's back were the captain's decision to use vertical speed mode with a high rate of descent while failing to select an appropriate altitude in the MCP window to ensure leveloff. Nevertheless, as the PNF, I failed to challenge this or to closely monitor the descent. I did not announce 'out of 13000 ft for 12000 ft.' this final omission would have clued both crew members in to slow the descent and prevent the altitude bust. How to prevent this from happening in the future: brief the arrival and fly it as a crew. Discuss when navaids will be idented, which descent mode will used, altitude callouts required and criteria for deciding when to change MCP modes. Finally, as PNF, I will take a more proactive role in ensuring all ATC clrncs are met, just as I would as the PF.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MULTIPLE FACTORS ARE CITED AS THE REASON FOR AN ALT OVERSHOOT AND A XING RESTR MISSED DURING AN ARR AT LAX USING THE CIVET ARR WITH A 'VIA' CLRNC.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO CIVET AT FL180 BY ZLA. APCHING CIVET, I REQUESTED LOWER TO MEET STAR XING RESTRS. CTR DELAYED OUR REQUEST AND HDOF TO APCH SUCH THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO COMPLY WITH THE XING RESTR OF BELOW 17000 FT AT CIVET. UPON CHK-IN WITH SOCAL APCH, I RPTED 'LEVEL FL180.' SOCAL CLRED US TO DSND VIA CIVET 4. CAPT SET 8000 FT IN THE MCP WINDOW AND SELECTED VNAV FOR THE DSCNT. CAPT COMPLAINED ABOUT BEING RUSHED TO MEET THE ALTS ON THE ARR. IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO CATCH UP, THE CAPT SELECTED VERT SPD WITH A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT AND EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES. HE DID NOT SELECT 12000 FT IN THE MCP ALT WINDOW TO ENSURE MEETING THE NEXT XING RESTR AT BREMR. I DID NOT QUESTION THESE ACTIONS, BUT RATHER BUSIED MYSELF WITH IDENTING THE ILAX LOC FOR BOTH L AND R ILS RECEIVERS. I, TOO, FELT RUSHED TO BE READY FOR THE APCH. I RPTED 'TUNED AND IDENTED BOTH SIDES,' AND RETURNED MY ATTN TO THE FMS MAP DISPLAY. I SAW OUR ALT DSNDING THROUGH 12000 FT AND SAW WE WERE APPROX 6 NM FROM BREMR. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED OUT, 'YOU'RE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 12000 FT AT BREMR.' THE CAPT RESPONDED BY REDUCING THE DSCNT RATE IN THE VERT SPD WINDOW, RATHER THAN MAKING AN AGGRESSIVE CORRECTIVE RESPONSE. I NEGLECTED TO ASSUME ACFT CTL OR TO PROVIDE A CORRECTIVE INPUT TO THE MCP. WE STOPPED OUR DSCNT AT APPROX 10500 FT AND 1.5 NM E OF BREMR. JUST THEN, SOCAL STATED, I HOPE YOU ARE LEVELING BECAUSE THAT INTXN HAS A XING ALT.' I RESPONDED, 'ROGER, WE'RE LEVELING.' SOCAL THEN CLRED US, 'AFTER FUELR, CLRED ILS RWY 25L APCH.' WE COMPLETED A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. MITIGATING FACTORS: ALTHOUGH THE CAPT BRIEFED THE APCH AND WE HAD COMPLETED DSCNT AND APCH CHKLISTS PRIOR TO COMMENCING THE STAR, WE DID NOT DISCUSS A PLAN OF ACTION FOR MEETING THE STAR RESTRS. CONSEQUENTLY, I WAS NOT AS VIGILANT REGARDING THE STAR ALTS AS I SHOULD HAVE BEEN. ANOTHER FACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN FATIGUE. WE WERE RETURNING TO LAX AT XA00 AFTER A 3 DAY TRIP OF PURELY EAST COAST FLYING. ALTHOUGH I DIDN'T FEEL FATIGUED, MY ACTIONS IN THE COCKPIT MAY HAVE BEEN LESS SHARP THAN NECESSARY TO PREVENT THIS ALTDEV. FINALLY, THIS WAS MY FIRST TRIP FOLLOWING THE SEP/TUE ATTACKS, AND I HAD NOT FLOWN FOR NEARLY 6 WKS. AS A RESULT, I SUPPOSE I WAS DISTR FROM MY PRIMARY DUTY TO 'AVIATE, NAV, COMMUNICATE.' A SPECIFIC RECENCY ISSUE FOLLOWS: RATHER THAN USING THE STAR TO IDENT THE ILAX SIGNAL, I LOOKED AT THE APCH PLATE INSTEAD. THIS SIMPLE MISTAKE DIVIDED MY ATTN FROM THE STAR LONG ENOUGH FOR THE ALTDEV TO OCCUR. WHAT CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN? THE STRAWS THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK WERE THE CAPT'S DECISION TO USE VERT SPD MODE WITH A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT WHILE FAILING TO SELECT AN APPROPRIATE ALT IN THE MCP WINDOW TO ENSURE LEVELOFF. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE PNF, I FAILED TO CHALLENGE THIS OR TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE DSCNT. I DID NOT ANNOUNCE 'OUT OF 13000 FT FOR 12000 FT.' THIS FINAL OMISSION WOULD HAVE CLUED BOTH CREW MEMBERS IN TO SLOW THE DSCNT AND PREVENT THE ALT BUST. HOW TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE: BRIEF THE ARR AND FLY IT AS A CREW. DISCUSS WHEN NAVAIDS WILL BE IDENTED, WHICH DSCNT MODE WILL USED, ALT CALLOUTS REQUIRED AND CRITERIA FOR DECIDING WHEN TO CHANGE MCP MODES. FINALLY, AS PNF, I WILL TAKE A MORE PROACTIVE ROLE IN ENSURING ALL ATC CLRNCS ARE MET, JUST AS I WOULD AS THE PF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.