Narrative:

Flight to tus from san. First officer's leg. We received the ATIS indicating WX of 700 ft and 2 mi, light winds with approachs to localizer back course runway 27, which we briefed and planned for, noting that the missed approach distances had changed from 1.3 to 1.8 DME. By the time we reached the final approach course, we were told that some airplanes had made a missed approach and we were instructed to enter a holding pattern awaiting further developments. I called dispatch to coordinate fuel requirements and alternate planning, briefed the flight attendants as well as the passenger on the situation. Shortly thereafter we were vectored for a downwind for runway 9 and were again put in a holding pattern. I inquired about the WX and was told that it was still 700 ft and 2 mi and asked if I would like to try the approach, which I agreed to. We briefed and flew the approach and broke out at published minimums and landed uneventfully. While preparing for the next leg, upon listening to the ATIS, the first officer noted that NOTAMS indicated that the minimums for the ILS runway 9 had changed (503 ft versus 350 ft) and he brought it to my attention. I assumed that those same NOTAMS had been on the previous ATIS and that, because of being preoccupied with the approach to runway 27, I had failed to note them. In essence, I had written down the ATIS and failed to note the change for the other runway. Because I didn't write them down, the first officer was unaware of the change (and I wasn't either) and we briefed and flew a successful approach and landing (unfortunately to the wrong minimums). Habit patterns: we fly the approach to runway 27 probably 95% of the time. In this case, we briefed and were planning the approach to runway 27 when, in the middle of the arrival, they changed the runway around. I was involved in communications and planning with dispatch 2 or 3 times because of changing situation, PA's and conversations with passenger and flight attendants, briefing another approach. I asked approach again what the WX was and he said it was the same so I did not get the ATIS again. Because we were primed to fly the localizer/back course approach to runway 27, I did not pay enough attention to the NOTAMS regarding runway 9. And, when the runway did change, I did not get the new ATIS. Had I done so, I most probably would have picked up no the NOTAMS regarding the minimums change. Complacency is another possible factor. I have flown into san on the localizer/back course runway 27 so many times and feel so confident that when the WX was low enough to cause a change in approachs I did not 'key up to the next higher level of awareness' (for lack of a better phrase) as I should have. To prevent such a recurrence, it is imperative to pay attention to all the NOTAMS that are both written on the release package as well as those on the ATIS, regardless of whether they apply to your planned runway or not. Complacency can get one into a lot of trouble and it is also imperative to fight that in all phases of flight. Additionally, in a situation of apparent changing WX conditions and runway changes, get the ATIS again! Supplemental information from acn 528316: while holding, san changed to runway 9. ATC then vectored us for the runway 9 ILS approach. The captain requested a WX update and ATC responded with 700 ft and 2 mi and light winds. We had briefed the approach and set 350 ft minimums from the approach plate. We shot the approach as briefed with 350 ft minimums. The approach was uneventful with the captain calling the lights and field at minimums and for me to make the landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC OF A B737-300 PERFORMS AN APCH TO MINIMUMS LOWER THAN AUTH BY THE NOTAM REVISION AT SAN, CA.

Narrative: FLT TO TUS FROM SAN. FO'S LEG. WE RECEIVED THE ATIS INDICATING WX OF 700 FT AND 2 MI, LIGHT WINDS WITH APCHS TO LOC BACK COURSE RWY 27, WHICH WE BRIEFED AND PLANNED FOR, NOTING THAT THE MISSED APCH DISTANCES HAD CHANGED FROM 1.3 TO 1.8 DME. BY THE TIME WE REACHED THE FINAL APCH COURSE, WE WERE TOLD THAT SOME AIRPLANES HAD MADE A MISSED APCH AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO ENTER A HOLDING PATTERN AWAITING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. I CALLED DISPATCH TO COORDINATE FUEL REQUIREMENTS AND ALTERNATE PLANNING, BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AS WELL AS THE PAX ON THE SIT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE VECTORED FOR A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 9 AND WERE AGAIN PUT IN A HOLDING PATTERN. I INQUIRED ABOUT THE WX AND WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS STILL 700 FT AND 2 MI AND ASKED IF I WOULD LIKE TO TRY THE APCH, WHICH I AGREED TO. WE BRIEFED AND FLEW THE APCH AND BROKE OUT AT PUBLISHED MINIMUMS AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. WHILE PREPARING FOR THE NEXT LEG, UPON LISTENING TO THE ATIS, THE FO NOTED THAT NOTAMS INDICATED THAT THE MINIMUMS FOR THE ILS RWY 9 HAD CHANGED (503 FT VERSUS 350 FT) AND HE BROUGHT IT TO MY ATTN. I ASSUMED THAT THOSE SAME NOTAMS HAD BEEN ON THE PREVIOUS ATIS AND THAT, BECAUSE OF BEING PREOCCUPIED WITH THE APCH TO RWY 27, I HAD FAILED TO NOTE THEM. IN ESSENCE, I HAD WRITTEN DOWN THE ATIS AND FAILED TO NOTE THE CHANGE FOR THE OTHER RWY. BECAUSE I DIDN'T WRITE THEM DOWN, THE FO WAS UNAWARE OF THE CHANGE (AND I WASN'T EITHER) AND WE BRIEFED AND FLEW A SUCCESSFUL APCH AND LNDG (UNFORTUNATELY TO THE WRONG MINIMUMS). HABIT PATTERNS: WE FLY THE APCH TO RWY 27 PROBABLY 95% OF THE TIME. IN THIS CASE, WE BRIEFED AND WERE PLANNING THE APCH TO RWY 27 WHEN, IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ARR, THEY CHANGED THE RWY AROUND. I WAS INVOLVED IN COMS AND PLANNING WITH DISPATCH 2 OR 3 TIMES BECAUSE OF CHANGING SIT, PA'S AND CONVERSATIONS WITH PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS, BRIEFING ANOTHER APCH. I ASKED APCH AGAIN WHAT THE WX WAS AND HE SAID IT WAS THE SAME SO I DID NOT GET THE ATIS AGAIN. BECAUSE WE WERE PRIMED TO FLY THE LOC/BACK COURSE APCH TO RWY 27, I DID NOT PAY ENOUGH ATTN TO THE NOTAMS REGARDING RWY 9. AND, WHEN THE RWY DID CHANGE, I DID NOT GET THE NEW ATIS. HAD I DONE SO, I MOST PROBABLY WOULD HAVE PICKED UP NO THE NOTAMS REGARDING THE MINIMUMS CHANGE. COMPLACENCY IS ANOTHER POSSIBLE FACTOR. I HAVE FLOWN INTO SAN ON THE LOC/BACK COURSE RWY 27 SO MANY TIMES AND FEEL SO CONFIDENT THAT WHEN THE WX WAS LOW ENOUGH TO CAUSE A CHANGE IN APCHS I DID NOT 'KEY UP TO THE NEXT HIGHER LEVEL OF AWARENESS' (FOR LACK OF A BETTER PHRASE) AS I SHOULD HAVE. TO PREVENT SUCH A RECURRENCE, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO PAY ATTN TO ALL THE NOTAMS THAT ARE BOTH WRITTEN ON THE RELEASE PACKAGE AS WELL AS THOSE ON THE ATIS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY APPLY TO YOUR PLANNED RWY OR NOT. COMPLACENCY CAN GET ONE INTO A LOT OF TROUBLE AND IT IS ALSO IMPERATIVE TO FIGHT THAT IN ALL PHASES OF FLT. ADDITIONALLY, IN A SIT OF APPARENT CHANGING WX CONDITIONS AND RWY CHANGES, GET THE ATIS AGAIN! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 528316: WHILE HOLDING, SAN CHANGED TO RWY 9. ATC THEN VECTORED US FOR THE RWY 9 ILS APCH. THE CAPT REQUESTED A WX UPDATE AND ATC RESPONDED WITH 700 FT AND 2 MI AND LIGHT WINDS. WE HAD BRIEFED THE APCH AND SET 350 FT MINIMUMS FROM THE APCH PLATE. WE SHOT THE APCH AS BRIEFED WITH 350 FT MINIMUMS. THE APCH WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH THE CAPT CALLING THE LIGHTS AND FIELD AT MINIMUMS AND FOR ME TO MAKE THE LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.