Narrative:

We were given a clearance out of FL290 to expedite descent to FL240. Our sink rate was 3800 FPM. At FL256 with a descent rate of 3800 FPM, we were told to maintain FL260. I read back the clearance, but told ATC that we were out of FL256 and descending, but cleared back to FL260. At FL246, we were able to make the xfer from descent to climb and were subsequently told to maintain FL250. We got an RA, but had visual contact with what I believe was the target in question. There were no further consequences and we were handed off to the next frequency. Clearly there was some confusion at ATC, not to mention high workload. The controller didn't seem to understand that you can't stop a 3800 FPM descent and convert it into climb mode without losing altitude in the process. We complied with all of our clrncs. We flew the aircraft within SOP's. We understand the high workload ATC environment. I don't know what else we could have done to preclude this from happening -- other than go from a 3800 FPM sink rate to zero by setting vertical speed to zero and 'sucking everyone into their seats or the floor.' the sequence of events that led to this eventuality didn't seem to warrant this action at the time. In retrospect, it may have been a more prudent choice. I pride myself in compliance and performance and will do everything I can to keep the skies safe. I am sensitive to the ATC workload and have no intentions to file a report which would lead to a violation against the controller who no doubt was intending to do a professional job. 'He got behind and it snowballed.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CREW HAD A CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT AFTER BEING CLRED FOR DSCNT IN ZOB CLASS A AIRSPACE.

Narrative: WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC OUT OF FL290 TO EXPEDITE DSCNT TO FL240. OUR SINK RATE WAS 3800 FPM. AT FL256 WITH A DSCNT RATE OF 3800 FPM, WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN FL260. I READ BACK THE CLRNC, BUT TOLD ATC THAT WE WERE OUT OF FL256 AND DSNDING, BUT CLRED BACK TO FL260. AT FL246, WE WERE ABLE TO MAKE THE XFER FROM DSCNT TO CLB AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD TO MAINTAIN FL250. WE GOT AN RA, BUT HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH WHAT I BELIEVE WAS THE TARGET IN QUESTION. THERE WERE NO FURTHER CONSEQUENCES AND WE WERE HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT FREQ. CLRLY THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AT ATC, NOT TO MENTION HIGH WORKLOAD. THE CTLR DIDN'T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT YOU CAN'T STOP A 3800 FPM DSCNT AND CONVERT IT INTO CLB MODE WITHOUT LOSING ALT IN THE PROCESS. WE COMPLIED WITH ALL OF OUR CLRNCS. WE FLEW THE ACFT WITHIN SOP'S. WE UNDERSTAND THE HIGH WORKLOAD ATC ENVIRONMENT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE WE COULD HAVE DONE TO PRECLUDE THIS FROM HAPPENING -- OTHER THAN GO FROM A 3800 FPM SINK RATE TO ZERO BY SETTING VERT SPD TO ZERO AND 'SUCKING EVERYONE INTO THEIR SEATS OR THE FLOOR.' THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THIS EVENTUALITY DIDN'T SEEM TO WARRANT THIS ACTION AT THE TIME. IN RETROSPECT, IT MAY HAVE BEEN A MORE PRUDENT CHOICE. I PRIDE MYSELF IN COMPLIANCE AND PERFORMANCE AND WILL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO KEEP THE SKIES SAFE. I AM SENSITIVE TO THE ATC WORKLOAD AND HAVE NO INTENTIONS TO FILE A RPT WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A VIOLATION AGAINST THE CTLR WHO NO DOUBT WAS INTENDING TO DO A PROFESSIONAL JOB. 'HE GOT BEHIND AND IT SNOWBALLED.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.