Narrative:

After pushing back and completing the after start checklist, the first officer called ground for taxi. We were given taxi clearance to runway 13 via taxiway G, taxiway B, hold short of runway 22 and issued a change in the departure transition. Our acknowledgement was followed by instructions to follow a B757 and we would be number three for takeoff. During taxi, we were discussing the new departure transition. Shortly after making the turn onto taxiway B we were told to cross runway 22, number three for takeoff behind B757 hold short of the white concrete, monitor tower on the other side. Crossing runway 22 we switched to tower, we were still setting up and discussing the departure takeoff runway 13. I called for the before takeoff, all the way through, the first officer completed the first item (cabin attendant announcement), at which time he noticed and brought to my attention that certain checklist items had not yet been completed and there were still questions regarding the departure transition. In the mean time we were approaching the hold short line and eventually crossed on to runway. We elected not to take off with these items in question and advised tower we needed to taxi off the runway and sequence back for takeoff, they asked if we needed any assistance, we told them 'no.' we proceeded off the runway, contacted ground. At this point, we both slowed everything down from the rushed scenario we had earlier. We completed the taxi checklist, before takeoff checklist, discussed and familiarized ourselves with the new transition and departed lga without incident. Contributing factors: first, and most importantly, both the first officer and I allowed ourselves to get caught up in rushing to meet ATC's needs. We must keep in mind we have other issues at hand that are more important, i.e., checklists. Second, when we found we had questions concerning the new departure procedure, it should have raised many flags telling us to slow everything down, including not accepting the takeoff clearance. Supplemental information from acn 529559: we pushed from the gate, completed the after start checklist, and I (first officer) called ground for taxi clearance. Ground called for us to taxi to runway 13 via taxiway G, taxiway B, to hold short of runway 22, and gave us a departure transition change. After we acknowledged, ground called for us to follow a B757 and advised that we were number three for takeoff. The captain and I discussed the new departure transition during taxi and, shortly after we made the turn onto taxiway B, ground called for us to cross runway 22, repeated that we were number three for takeoff behind a B757. Told us to hold short of the white concrete, and to monitor tower on the other side of runway 22. We were still setting up and discussing the departure transition when we tuned to tower after crossing runway 22. Tower immediately advised that we were number one for takeoff and cleared us for takeoff on runway 13. The captain called for the complete before takeoff checklist but after I made the cabin attendant announcement, which is the first item, I realized that we had not completed the taxi checklist. I immediately informed the captain, however, by this time we had reached runway 13. The captain immediately informed tower that we needed to leave the runway to reestablish our takeoff sequence, and responded that we did not require assistance when tower asked. We taxied off the runway, contacted ground, completed taxi and before takeoff checklists, and departed lga uneventfully. I have concluded, after reviewing the sequence of events that we missed items on the taxi checklist because both ground and tower called for numerous clearance and takeoff sequence changes on very short notice. This created a workload that disrupted our preflight time management. Fortunately, we recognized that if we did not take immediate action to reduce our workload, safety could be compromised. I believe this experience illustrates how important it is to educate controllers about how potentially disruptive many last min changes can be during critical preflight procedures. I recognize there is no such thing as a sterile cockpit on the ground but, at airports with very short taxi times and high workloads, I suggest that ATC try to limit last min changes that could seriously interrupt the flight crewsouth checklist sequence and, perhaps, compromise safety. Furthermore, I believe it is equally important to educate flight crew's how to recognize when to advise ATC if they need more time to complete cockpit procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD83 CREW REFUSED TO BE RUSHED INTO TKOF BEFORE THEY WERE READY AT LGA.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHING BACK AND COMPLETING THE AFTER START CHECKLIST, THE FIRST OFFICER CALLED GND FOR TAXI. WE WERE GIVEN TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 13 VIA TXWY G, TXWY B, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22 AND ISSUED A CHANGE IN THE DEP TRANSITION. OUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS FOLLOWED BY INSTRUCTIONS TO FOLLOW A B757 AND WE WOULD BE NUMBER THREE FOR TKOF. DURING TAXI, WE WERE DISCUSSING THE NEW DEP TRANSITION. SHORTLY AFTER MAKING THE TURN ONTO TXWY B WE WERE TOLD TO CROSS RWY 22, NUMBER THREE FOR TKOF BEHIND B757 HOLD SHORT OF THE WHITE CONCRETE, MONITOR TWR ON THE OTHER SIDE. CROSSING RWY 22 WE SWITCHED TO TWR, WE WERE STILL SETTING UP AND DISCUSSING THE DEP TKOF RWY 13. I CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF, ALL THE WAY THROUGH, THE FIRST OFFICER COMPLETED THE FIRST ITEM (CAB ANNOUNCEMENT), AT WHICH TIME HE NOTICED AND BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION THAT CERTAIN CHECKLIST ITEMS HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED AND THERE WERE STILL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DEP TRANSITION. IN THE MEAN TIME WE WERE APCHING THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND EVENTUALLY CROSSED ON TO RWY. WE ELECTED NOT TO TAKE OFF WITH THESE ITEMS IN QUESTION AND ADVISED TWR WE NEEDED TO TAXI OFF THE RWY AND SEQUENCE BACK FOR TKOF, THEY ASKED IF WE NEEDED ANY ASSISTANCE, WE TOLD THEM 'NO.' WE PROCEEDED OFF THE RWY, CONTACTED GND. AT THIS POINT, WE BOTH SLOWED EVERYTHING DOWN FROM THE RUSHED SCENARIO WE HAD EARLIER. WE COMPLETED THE TAXI CHECKLIST, BEFORE TKOF CHECKLIST, DISCUSSED AND FAMILIARIZED OURSELVES WITH THE NEW TRANSITION AND DEPARTED LGA WITHOUT INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FIRST, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, BOTH THE FIRST OFFICER AND I ALLOWED OURSELVES TO GET CAUGHT UP IN RUSHING TO MEET ATC'S NEEDS. WE MUST KEEP IN MIND WE HAVE OTHER ISSUES AT HAND THAT ARE MORE IMPORTANT, I.E., CHECKLISTS. SECOND, WHEN WE FOUND WE HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE NEW DEP PROC, IT SHOULD HAVE RAISED MANY FLAGS TELLING US TO SLOW EVERYTHING DOWN, INCLUDING NOT ACCEPTING THE TKOF CLRNC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 529559: WE PUSHED FROM THE GATE, COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHECKLIST, AND I (FO) CALLED GND FOR TAXI CLRNC. GND CALLED FOR US TO TAXI TO RWY 13 VIA TXWY G, TXWY B, TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22, AND GAVE US A DEP TRANSITION CHANGE. AFTER WE ACKNOWLEDGED, GND CALLED FOR US TO FOLLOW A B757 AND ADVISED THAT WE WERE NUMBER THREE FOR TKOF. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE NEW DEP TRANSITION DURING TAXI AND, SHORTLY AFTER WE MADE THE TURN ONTO TXWY B, GND CALLED FOR US TO CROSS RWY 22, REPEATED THAT WE WERE NUMBER THREE FOR TKOF BEHIND A B757. TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF THE WHITE CONCRETE, AND TO MONITOR TWR ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RWY 22. WE WERE STILL SETTING UP AND DISCUSSING THE DEP TRANSITION WHEN WE TUNED TO TWR AFTER CROSSING RWY 22. TWR IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THAT WE WERE NUMBER ONE FOR TKOF AND CLRED US FOR TKOF ON RWY 13. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE COMPLETE BEFORE TKOF CHECKLIST BUT AFTER I MADE THE CAB ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH IS THE FIRST ITEM, I REALIZED THAT WE HAD NOT COMPLETED THE TAXI CHECKLIST. I IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THE CAPT, HOWEVER, BY THIS TIME WE HAD REACHED RWY 13. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY INFORMED TWR THAT WE NEEDED TO LEAVE THE RWY TO REESTABLISH OUR TKOF SEQUENCE, AND RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT REQUIRE ASSISTANCE WHEN TWR ASKED. WE TAXIED OFF THE RWY, CONTACTED GND, COMPLETED TAXI AND BEFORE TKOF CHECKLISTS, AND DEPARTED LGA UNEVENTFULLY. I HAVE CONCLUDED, AFTER REVIEWING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT WE MISSED ITEMS ON THE TAXI CHECKLIST BECAUSE BOTH GND AND TWR CALLED FOR NUMEROUS CLRNC AND TKOF SEQUENCE CHANGES ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. THIS CREATED A WORKLOAD THAT DISRUPTED OUR PREFLT TIME MGMNT. FORTUNATELY, WE RECOGNIZED THAT IF WE DID NOT TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO REDUCE OUR WORKLOAD, SAFETY COULD BE COMPROMISED. I BELIEVE THIS EXPERIENCE ILLUSTRATES HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO EDUCATE CTLRS ABOUT HOW POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE MANY LAST MIN CHANGES CAN BE DURING CRITICAL PREFLT PROCS. I RECOGNIZE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A STERILE COCKPIT ON THE GND BUT, AT ARPTS WITH VERY SHORT TAXI TIMES AND HIGH WORKLOADS, I SUGGEST THAT ATC TRY TO LIMIT LAST MIN CHANGES THAT COULD SERIOUSLY INTERRUPT THE FLCS CHECKLIST SEQUENCE AND, PERHAPS, COMPROMISE SAFETY. FURTHERMORE, I BELIEVE IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO EDUCATE FLC'S HOW TO RECOGNIZE WHEN TO ADVISE ATC IF THEY NEED MORE TIME TO COMPLETE COCKPIT PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.