Narrative:

At 160 NM from miami international we got the ATIS which was winds at 290 degrees 5 KTS, 1/4 mi visibility W1 19/19 altimeter 29.99. ILS to runway 27R (minimum are 4000 ft RVR). I asked ZMA for RVR reports. They said touchdown rur was 5000 ft we briefed the ILS to runway 27R with the first officer flying an autoplt coupled approach. Mistake #1: the captain should have flown the approach because of the WX. Indefinite 100 ft. Upon switching to mia approach, we were told to expect runway 27R. A couple of mins later approach said they were closing runway 27R to expect the ILS to runway 27L. As PNF, I briefed the ILS to runway 27L (minimums) ((5000 ft RVR). We intercepted the runway 27L localizer about 15 mi out. Shortly approach said the runway 27L touchdown RVR was down to 3500 ft (below minimums) and gave us a heading to intercept runway 27R localizer. I rebriefed the important points for the ILS to runway 27R and we intercepted the localizer for runway 27R. Runway 27R was reopened and we were cleared the approach to runway 27R. The runway 27R touchdown RVR was OTS, mid was 5000 ft RVR, rollout was 6000 ft RVR. The coupled approach was right on the localizer and GS all the way down to minimums of 208 ft MSL. I called the approach lights in sight 12 O'clock position. The first officer called going visual. We both had the threshold and runway in sight. The GS warning sounded and I called for power. The first officer added power and we landed in the first 100-200 ft of the runway. Mia airport maintenance reported that we broke the glass lens on one of the threshold lights. Lessons learned: 1) I, the captain, should have flown the approach. 2) the RVR reports of 5000-6000 ft lulled us into thinking this would be an easy enough approach. No actual approachs are easy. 3) my scan was slow getting from outside to see the approach lights or runway to back inside to see how the electronic GS was done. I did not catch the duck under. 4) when the GS warning sounded I should have executed a missed approach at that point, because we were under the electronic GS. Supplemental information from acn 530956: WX ATIS was 300 degrees at 4 KTS, 1/4 mi visibility in fog indefinite 100 ft 19/19 altimeter 29.92, NOTAMS runway 27R MALS OTS. Told that runway 27R had equipment problems runway 27L ILS approach to mia was briefed. After being vectored and cleared for ILS runway 27L approach, we heard the RVR go below minimums (td 3000 ft mid 5000 ft rollout 6000 ft). We told approach control and were then vectored to the runway 27R ILS. Told the RVR was mid 5000 ft and rollout 6000 ft. Touchdown RVR was OTS. We rebriefed the approach and flew an autoplt approach. At minimums (200 ft AGL) we called runway in sight. It was somewhat confusing due to the fact that the MALS were notamed OTS but appeared on. I set up a visual glide path referencing the runway end and center lights. I drifted low on glide path and the captain called for power. Power was added and a landing was made on the runway centerline short of the normal 1000-3000 ft landing zone. Later we were informed by an airport maintenance personnel that we might have struck a runway end light during landing. However, there was no indication of damage to the aircraft. In retrospect, the proper decision at minimums was to go missed approach. The visibility at minimums was lower than required for the approach even though we saw the runway. One of the keys we should have picked up on was that the parallel runway 27L td RVR was 3000 ft. Another factor was the runway being 200 ft wide, with minimum visual cues. At minimums we appeared higher than normal. Bottom line: when in doubt, go around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9-33 CREW HIT A RWY END LIGHT WHILE MAKING AN APCH TO MINIMUMS AT MIA.

Narrative: AT 160 NM FROM MIAMI INTL WE GOT THE ATIS WHICH WAS WINDS AT 290 DEGS 5 KTS, 1/4 MI VISIBILITY W1 19/19 ALTIMETER 29.99. ILS TO RWY 27R (MINIMUM ARE 4000 FT RVR). I ASKED ZMA FOR RVR RPTS. THEY SAID TOUCHDOWN RUR WAS 5000 FT WE BRIEFED THE ILS TO RWY 27R WITH THE FO FLYING AN AUTOPLT COUPLED APCH. MISTAKE #1: THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE FLOWN THE APCH BECAUSE OF THE WX. INDEFINITE 100 FT. UPON SWITCHING TO MIA APCH, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 27R. A COUPLE OF MINS LATER APCH SAID THEY WERE CLOSING RWY 27R TO EXPECT THE ILS TO RWY 27L. AS PNF, I BRIEFED THE ILS TO RWY 27L (MINIMUMS) ((5000 FT RVR). WE INTERCEPTED THE RWY 27L LOC ABOUT 15 MI OUT. SHORTLY APCH SAID THE RWY 27L TOUCHDOWN RVR WAS DOWN TO 3500 FT (BELOW MINIMUMS) AND GAVE US A HDG TO INTERCEPT RWY 27R LOC. I REBRIEFED THE IMPORTANT POINTS FOR THE ILS TO RWY 27R AND WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC FOR RWY 27R. RWY 27R WAS REOPENED AND WE WERE CLRED THE APCH TO RWY 27R. THE RWY 27R TOUCHDOWN RVR WAS OTS, MID WAS 5000 FT RVR, ROLLOUT WAS 6000 FT RVR. THE COUPLED APCH WAS RIGHT ON THE LOC AND GS ALL THE WAY DOWN TO MINIMUMS OF 208 FT MSL. I CALLED THE APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT 12 O'CLOCK POS. THE FO CALLED GOING VISUAL. WE BOTH HAD THE THRESHOLD AND RWY IN SIGHT. THE GS WARNING SOUNDED AND I CALLED FOR PWR. THE FO ADDED PWR AND WE LANDED IN THE FIRST 100-200 FT OF THE RWY. MIA ARPT MAINT RPTED THAT WE BROKE THE GLASS LENS ON ONE OF THE THRESHOLD LIGHTS. LESSONS LEARNED: 1) I, THE CAPT, SHOULD HAVE FLOWN THE APCH. 2) THE RVR RPTS OF 5000-6000 FT LULLED US INTO THINKING THIS WOULD BE AN EASY ENOUGH APCH. NO ACTUAL APCHS ARE EASY. 3) MY SCAN WAS SLOW GETTING FROM OUTSIDE TO SEE THE APCH LIGHTS OR RWY TO BACK INSIDE TO SEE HOW THE ELECTRONIC GS WAS DONE. I DID NOT CATCH THE DUCK UNDER. 4) WHEN THE GS WARNING SOUNDED I SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH AT THAT POINT, BECAUSE WE WERE UNDER THE ELECTRONIC GS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 530956: WX ATIS WAS 300 DEGS AT 4 KTS, 1/4 MI VISIBILITY IN FOG INDEFINITE 100 FT 19/19 ALTIMETER 29.92, NOTAMS RWY 27R MALS OTS. TOLD THAT RWY 27R HAD EQUIP PROBS RWY 27L ILS APCH TO MIA WAS BRIEFED. AFTER BEING VECTORED AND CLRED FOR ILS RWY 27L APCH, WE HEARD THE RVR GO BELOW MINIMUMS (TD 3000 FT MID 5000 FT ROLLOUT 6000 FT). WE TOLD APCH CTL AND WERE THEN VECTORED TO THE RWY 27R ILS. TOLD THE RVR WAS MID 5000 FT AND ROLLOUT 6000 FT. TOUCHDOWN RVR WAS OTS. WE REBRIEFED THE APCH AND FLEW AN AUTOPLT APCH. AT MINIMUMS (200 FT AGL) WE CALLED RWY IN SIGHT. IT WAS SOMEWHAT CONFUSING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE MALS WERE NOTAMED OTS BUT APPEARED ON. I SET UP A VISUAL GLIDE PATH REFING THE RWY END AND CTR LIGHTS. I DRIFTED LOW ON GLIDE PATH AND THE CAPT CALLED FOR PWR. PWR WAS ADDED AND A LNDG WAS MADE ON THE RWY CTRLINE SHORT OF THE NORMAL 1000-3000 FT LNDG ZONE. LATER WE WERE INFORMED BY AN ARPT MAINT PERSONNEL THAT WE MIGHT HAVE STRUCK A RWY END LIGHT DURING LNDG. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. IN RETROSPECT, THE PROPER DECISION AT MINIMUMS WAS TO GO MISSED APCH. THE VISIBILITY AT MINIMUMS WAS LOWER THAN REQUIRED FOR THE APCH EVEN THOUGH WE SAW THE RWY. ONE OF THE KEYS WE SHOULD HAVE PICKED UP ON WAS THAT THE PARALLEL RWY 27L TD RVR WAS 3000 FT. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE RWY BEING 200 FT WIDE, WITH MINIMUM VISUAL CUES. AT MINIMUMS WE APPEARED HIGHER THAN NORMAL. BOTTOM LINE: WHEN IN DOUBT, GO AROUND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.