Narrative:

During a part 135 passenger flight, I (the copilot and PNF), was responsible for communications and navigation. Our transponder was intermittent upon takeoff from fwa. We were to pick up our passenger at rzt, which had no WX reporting and only a VOR approach to runway 23. Upon arriving at yellowbud VOR, we were to perform the VOR 23 on our own. The captain intercepted and made the course reversal and we descended to the straight-in minimums of 1220 ft. We saw we were still above the scattered to broken layer at this point. The captain at this time descended further, which I pointed out repeatedly. He finally leveled out at 1050 ft. I continued to inform him that he was almost 200 ft below MDA. Upon reaching the missed approach altitude, we saw the airport but were not in a position to land, as we were over the top of the runway. He began a circle to the right and I assumed we would just circle to runway 5, which I announced on CTAF. He instead elected to continue to circle to runway 23, which I announced when I realized it. We were once again not in a position to land as we overshot the final. He had descended at this point to approximately 800 ft. I once again pointed this out and called for the missed approach. He did perform a go around but instead of executing the missed approach, he circled south of the field at 1200 ft and attempted to land on runway 5. We, at this point, penetrated IMC and I called once again for the missed. He continued to descend to 1050 ft (circling was 1340 ft) and I once again pointed out the altitude deviation and pleaded for a missed approach. He had just started to add power when we broke out and were able to land on runway 5. I informed him on shutdown that I would finish the trip with him but would not fly with him again. He was angry and informed me that he was VFR and could do whatever he wanted. I strongly disagreed and this only reinforced my decision to not fly with him again. Our passenger arrived a short time later. We loaded them and departed. We performed in a professional manner for the remainder of the flight and the personal conflicts did not seem to be an issue. Our transponder became inoperative upon takeoff from rzt and we were asked to make position reports upon request. While intercepting and beginning the lvg 3 arrival (wilkesberry) into teb, we missed a crossing altitude of FL180 at lvg. I received and acknowledged the crossing clearance and believed that the captain understood the restr. The ground speed at this time was approximately 530 KTS and we were at FL330. I reset the altitude alerter to FL180 and pointed out wilkesberry as lvg on the GPS. He nodded his acknowledgement and began a slow descent. I then became involved in giving another position report to ZNY and the top of descent checklist. I was asked to report reaching the 30 NM DME off of lvg and recall at the present time we were 34 DME from lvg. The captain at this point began to ask me about the next heading to turn to after lvg and asked for the arrival depiction. At this time, ZNY called back, asked our position, and I reported at 24 DME from lvg and apologized for missing the 30 NM call. He asked me to switch to a new frequency. I reported on at FL280 to cross lvg at FL180 and at this time the controller had me verify FL280, which I did. He had me switch back to the previous controller and I at once realized why -- we were 12 NM from lvg traveling at 9 NM per min and still had 10000 ft to lose. I reported to the old controller our new position -- 10.5 DME at this point -- and told him we were at FL280 and we were unable to meet the crossing restr. I then tried to ensure that the captain understood what was going on, but he was still focusing on our next heading on the published arrival, which was programmed into both GPS units. The controller then told me that crossing mugsy intersection at 6000 ft was a must, which we were able to do using descent rates of 5000-6000 FPM. The primary difficulty during this flight was not a lack of understanding controller instruction or knowing where we were. The primary problem was trying to ensure that the captain understood and was complying with the instructions in a high workload, non radar environment. I did not realize that the captain still did not understand the crossing restr until it was too late. The captlater informed me that he was not aware of the crossing restr. I at no time had that impression because all of his questions were related to the next heading and he had started a descent. I learned a valuable lesson in CRM and that a copilot should continually maintain the same situational awareness as he would if he was the PF. Another problem was the captain's poor understanding of english. In my opinion, fluency in english would have either resolved this problem or greatly reduced the time to sort out the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LJ24 CREW FAILED TO MEET A XING RESTR DSNDING INTO TEB.

Narrative: DURING A PART 135 PAX FLT, I (THE COPLT AND PNF), WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMS AND NAV. OUR XPONDER WAS INTERMITTENT UPON TKOF FROM FWA. WE WERE TO PICK UP OUR PAX AT RZT, WHICH HAD NO WX RPTING AND ONLY A VOR APCH TO RWY 23. UPON ARRIVING AT YELLOWBUD VOR, WE WERE TO PERFORM THE VOR 23 ON OUR OWN. THE CAPT INTERCEPTED AND MADE THE COURSE REVERSAL AND WE DSNDED TO THE STRAIGHT-IN MINIMUMS OF 1220 FT. WE SAW WE WERE STILL ABOVE THE SCATTERED TO BROKEN LAYER AT THIS POINT. THE CAPT AT THIS TIME DSNDED FURTHER, WHICH I POINTED OUT REPEATEDLY. HE FINALLY LEVELED OUT AT 1050 FT. I CONTINUED TO INFORM HIM THAT HE WAS ALMOST 200 FT BELOW MDA. UPON REACHING THE MISSED APCH ALT, WE SAW THE ARPT BUT WERE NOT IN A POS TO LAND, AS WE WERE OVER THE TOP OF THE RWY. HE BEGAN A CIRCLE TO THE R AND I ASSUMED WE WOULD JUST CIRCLE TO RWY 5, WHICH I ANNOUNCED ON CTAF. HE INSTEAD ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO CIRCLE TO RWY 23, WHICH I ANNOUNCED WHEN I REALIZED IT. WE WERE ONCE AGAIN NOT IN A POS TO LAND AS WE OVERSHOT THE FINAL. HE HAD DSNDED AT THIS POINT TO APPROX 800 FT. I ONCE AGAIN POINTED THIS OUT AND CALLED FOR THE MISSED APCH. HE DID PERFORM A GAR BUT INSTEAD OF EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH, HE CIRCLED S OF THE FIELD AT 1200 FT AND ATTEMPTED TO LAND ON RWY 5. WE, AT THIS POINT, PENETRATED IMC AND I CALLED ONCE AGAIN FOR THE MISSED. HE CONTINUED TO DSND TO 1050 FT (CIRCLING WAS 1340 FT) AND I ONCE AGAIN POINTED OUT THE ALTDEV AND PLEADED FOR A MISSED APCH. HE HAD JUST STARTED TO ADD PWR WHEN WE BROKE OUT AND WERE ABLE TO LAND ON RWY 5. I INFORMED HIM ON SHUTDOWN THAT I WOULD FINISH THE TRIP WITH HIM BUT WOULD NOT FLY WITH HIM AGAIN. HE WAS ANGRY AND INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS VFR AND COULD DO WHATEVER HE WANTED. I STRONGLY DISAGREED AND THIS ONLY REINFORCED MY DECISION TO NOT FLY WITH HIM AGAIN. OUR PAX ARRIVED A SHORT TIME LATER. WE LOADED THEM AND DEPARTED. WE PERFORMED IN A PROFESSIONAL MANNER FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT AND THE PERSONAL CONFLICTS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AN ISSUE. OUR XPONDER BECAME INOP UPON TKOF FROM RZT AND WE WERE ASKED TO MAKE POS RPTS UPON REQUEST. WHILE INTERCEPTING AND BEGINNING THE LVG 3 ARR (WILKESBERRY) INTO TEB, WE MISSED A XING ALT OF FL180 AT LVG. I RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE XING CLRNC AND BELIEVED THAT THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD THE RESTR. THE GND SPD AT THIS TIME WAS APPROX 530 KTS AND WE WERE AT FL330. I RESET THE ALT ALERTER TO FL180 AND POINTED OUT WILKESBERRY AS LVG ON THE GPS. HE NODDED HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND BEGAN A SLOW DSCNT. I THEN BECAME INVOLVED IN GIVING ANOTHER POS RPT TO ZNY AND THE TOP OF DSCNT CHKLIST. I WAS ASKED TO RPT REACHING THE 30 NM DME OFF OF LVG AND RECALL AT THE PRESENT TIME WE WERE 34 DME FROM LVG. THE CAPT AT THIS POINT BEGAN TO ASK ME ABOUT THE NEXT HDG TO TURN TO AFTER LVG AND ASKED FOR THE ARR DEPICTION. AT THIS TIME, ZNY CALLED BACK, ASKED OUR POS, AND I RPTED AT 24 DME FROM LVG AND APOLOGIZED FOR MISSING THE 30 NM CALL. HE ASKED ME TO SWITCH TO A NEW FREQ. I RPTED ON AT FL280 TO CROSS LVG AT FL180 AND AT THIS TIME THE CTLR HAD ME VERIFY FL280, WHICH I DID. HE HAD ME SWITCH BACK TO THE PREVIOUS CTLR AND I AT ONCE REALIZED WHY -- WE WERE 12 NM FROM LVG TRAVELING AT 9 NM PER MIN AND STILL HAD 10000 FT TO LOSE. I RPTED TO THE OLD CTLR OUR NEW POS -- 10.5 DME AT THIS POINT -- AND TOLD HIM WE WERE AT FL280 AND WE WERE UNABLE TO MEET THE XING RESTR. I THEN TRIED TO ENSURE THAT THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS GOING ON, BUT HE WAS STILL FOCUSING ON OUR NEXT HDG ON THE PUBLISHED ARR, WHICH WAS PROGRAMMED INTO BOTH GPS UNITS. THE CTLR THEN TOLD ME THAT XING MUGSY INTXN AT 6000 FT WAS A MUST, WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO DO USING DSCNT RATES OF 5000-6000 FPM. THE PRIMARY DIFFICULTY DURING THIS FLT WAS NOT A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING CTLR INSTRUCTION OR KNOWING WHERE WE WERE. THE PRIMARY PROB WAS TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD AND WAS COMPLYING WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN A HIGH WORKLOAD, NON RADAR ENVIRONMENT. I DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE CAPT STILL DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE XING RESTR UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. THE CAPTLATER INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE XING RESTR. I AT NO TIME HAD THAT IMPRESSION BECAUSE ALL OF HIS QUESTIONS WERE RELATED TO THE NEXT HDG AND HE HAD STARTED A DSCNT. I LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON IN CRM AND THAT A COPLT SHOULD CONTINUALLY MAINTAIN THE SAME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS HE WOULD IF HE WAS THE PF. ANOTHER PROB WAS THE CAPT'S POOR UNDERSTANDING OF ENGLISH. IN MY OPINION, FLUENCY IN ENGLISH WOULD HAVE EITHER RESOLVED THIS PROB OR GREATLY REDUCED THE TIME TO SORT OUT THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.