Narrative:

The purpose of this report is to highlight stl as an airport with high midair collision potential. Our arrival routing brought us in from the northeast and north of the airport. Vectors were from the lda runway 12L. Just prior to the incident, we were at 4500 ft MSL, heading 210 degrees, at 170 KIAS. WX was 3500 ft scattered, visibility 15 SM, and hazy. Our position was approximately 12 NM nnw of the airport. We were instructed to descend to 2500 ft MSL and report the airport in sight. At approximately 3500 ft MSL, in a gradual descent, the following sequence of events rapidly evolved. The captain, PF, reported to the first officer that he had the field in sight and that they were being vectored through final approach. The captain told the first officer to report the field in sight, but due to continuos radio traffic, first officer was unable to do so immediately. Immediately thereafter, TCASII alerted traffic at 12 O'clock position, 1 NM, 800 ft below. A B717 on final for runway 12R was visually acquired and a leveloff at 3500 ft MSL was accomplished. First officer finally got a clear frequency and informed the approach that we were overshooting and had the runway in sight. The controller then said to turn left to 090 degrees and intercept the lda runway 12L final. First officer replied to instructions and informed controller that traffic on final in front of us was in sight. Controller then said that the sighed aircraft was on final for the right and intercept the lda runway 12L. First officer reconfirmed heading was to intercept runway 12L and that the traffic ahead was going to runway 12R. The controller concurred, said thanks, and said to contact tower on 120.05. We did so and made an uneventful approach/landing. These are my concerns, the runways at stl are very close to each other. Aircraft are vectored to the 2 runways from different directions, sometimes on collision courses without the benefit of altitude separation. If overshoots occur, which happened to us, the results could be catastrophic. In our case, the controller gave us a 90 degree intercept to the lda with no clearance to intercept. Even if he had, we would have overshot badly because of the angle of intercept. We should have been given a 45 degree intercept as a minimum due to the closeness of the runways. Had I made a rapid descent to 2500 ft MSL, we would surely have had a dangerous situation. Even so, we estimate that we came within 1/2 mi of the B717 with a vertical separation of maybe 500 ft. I would remind the reader of this report that we were IFR until landing since we vectored back to the lda after the overshoot and cleared to fly the lda. At no time, did the controller ever call out the traffic to runway 12R until I had deconflicted the situation and the first officer had told the controller of the overshoot. This is the third time I have encountered dangerous vectoring going into stl. Somebody needs to take a long, hard look at that whole ATC operation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter agreed that there is no easy solution for frequency. He said his primary concern was that vertical or horizontal separation was not provided to protect an overshoot. Reporter believes stl should review their side-by-side procedures that involve combinations of lda's and visuals, and IFR approachs maintaining visual from visual approachs. He said many other pilots share the same concerns about stl. Reporter said he was informed at an as soon as possible meeting that the incident was reviewed with the controller.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 FLC ON VECTOR TO RWY 12L AT STL OVERSHOOT THE ARREST DSCNT TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH A B717 ON APCH TO RWY 12L.

Narrative: THE PURPOSE OF THIS RPT IS TO HIGHLIGHT STL AS AN ARPT WITH HIGH MIDAIR COLLISION POTENTIAL. OUR ARR ROUTING BROUGHT US IN FROM THE NE AND N OF THE ARPT. VECTORS WERE FROM THE LDA RWY 12L. JUST PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT, WE WERE AT 4500 FT MSL, HEADING 210 DEGS, AT 170 KIAS. WX WAS 3500 FT SCATTERED, VISIBILITY 15 SM, AND HAZY. OUR POS WAS APPROX 12 NM NNW OF THE ARPT. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 2500 FT MSL AND RPT THE ARPT IN SIGHT. AT APPROX 3500 FT MSL, IN A GRADUAL DSCNT, THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RAPIDLY EVOLVED. THE CAPT, PF, RPTED TO THE FO THAT HE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND THAT THEY WERE BEING VECTORED THROUGH FINAL APCH. THE CAPT TOLD THE FO TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT, BUT DUE TO CONTINUOS RADIO TFC, FO WAS UNABLE TO DO SO IMMEDIATELY. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, TCASII ALERTED TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK POS, 1 NM, 800 FT BELOW. A B717 ON FINAL FOR RWY 12R WAS VISUALLY ACQUIRED AND A LEVELOFF AT 3500 FT MSL WAS ACCOMPLISHED. FO FINALLY GOT A CLR FREQ AND INFORMED THE APCH THAT WE WERE OVERSHOOTING AND HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. THE CTLR THEN SAID TO TURN L TO 090 DEGS AND INTERCEPT THE LDA RWY 12L FINAL. FO REPLIED TO INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMED CTLR THAT TFC ON FINAL IN FRONT OF US WAS IN SIGHT. CTLR THEN SAID THAT THE SIGHED ACFT WAS ON FINAL FOR THE R AND INTERCEPT THE LDA RWY 12L. FO RECONFIRMED HEADING WAS TO INTERCEPT RWY 12L AND THAT THE TFC AHEAD WAS GOING TO RWY 12R. THE CTLR CONCURRED, SAID THANKS, AND SAID TO CONTACT TWR ON 120.05. WE DID SO AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL APCH/LNDG. THESE ARE MY CONCERNS, THE RWYS AT STL ARE VERY CLOSE TO EACH OTHER. ACFT ARE VECTORED TO THE 2 RWYS FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS, SOMETIMES ON COLLISION COURSES WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF ALT SEPARATION. IF OVERSHOOTS OCCUR, WHICH HAPPENED TO US, THE RESULTS COULD BE CATASTROPHIC. IN OUR CASE, THE CTLR GAVE US A 90 DEG INTERCEPT TO THE LDA WITH NO CLRNC TO INTERCEPT. EVEN IF HE HAD, WE WOULD HAVE OVERSHOT BADLY BECAUSE OF THE ANGLE OF INTERCEPT. WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A 45 DEG INTERCEPT AS A MINIMUM DUE TO THE CLOSENESS OF THE RWYS. HAD I MADE A RAPID DSCNT TO 2500 FT MSL, WE WOULD SURELY HAVE HAD A DANGEROUS SIT. EVEN SO, WE ESTIMATE THAT WE CAME WITHIN 1/2 MI OF THE B717 WITH A VERT SEPARATION OF MAYBE 500 FT. I WOULD REMIND THE READER OF THIS RPT THAT WE WERE IFR UNTIL LNDG SINCE WE VECTORED BACK TO THE LDA AFTER THE OVERSHOOT AND CLRED TO FLY THE LDA. AT NO TIME, DID THE CTLR EVER CALL OUT THE TFC TO RWY 12R UNTIL I HAD DECONFLICTED THE SIT AND THE FO HAD TOLD THE CTLR OF THE OVERSHOOT. THIS IS THE THIRD TIME I HAVE ENCOUNTERED DANGEROUS VECTORING GOING INTO STL. SOMEBODY NEEDS TO TAKE A LONG, HARD LOOK AT THAT WHOLE ATC OP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR AGREED THAT THERE IS NO EASY SOLUTION FOR FREQ. HE SAID HIS PRIMARY CONCERN WAS THAT VERT OR HORIZ SEPARATION WAS NOT PROVIDED TO PROTECT AN OVERSHOOT. RPTR BELIEVES STL SHOULD REVIEW THEIR SIDE-BY-SIDE PROCS THAT INVOLVE COMBINATIONS OF LDA'S AND VISUALS, AND IFR APCHS MAINTAINING VISUAL FROM VISUAL APCHS. HE SAID MANY OTHER PLTS SHARE THE SAME CONCERNS ABOUT STL. RPTR SAID HE WAS INFORMED AT AN ASAP MEETING THAT THE INCIDENT WAS REVIEWED WITH THE CTLR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.