Narrative:

Private/instrument certified pilot was flying the aircraft from the left seat. A school check instructor was observing and evaluating the flight from the right seat. The incident occurred while doing touch-and-goes in a closed traffic pattern. On downwind, the pilot was instructed to extend to follow traffic on final. After turning final behind the other traffic, and at approximately 600 ft AGL, the pilot was then cleared to land on runway 14R and to hold short of runway 22R for landing traffic. The pilot acknowledged these instructions and accepted the hold short order. The check pilot requested the pilot execute a soft field landing, and upon receipt of the lahso instruction, advised the pilot not to 'land too long on the runway.' the approach was conducted slightly fast and slightly above a normal approach path. The pilot commenced the flare approximately 400 ft beyond the runway aim point markings. After flaring, the aircraft entered an extended floating condition with the pilot 'holding off' the aircraft as airspeed bled off. The expectation of the check pilot was that the pilot would land the aircraft and apply braking to comply with lahso instruction, as sufficient runway was available for a properly executed landing. However, as the aircraft continued to float down the runway, it became apparent that a hold short would not be possible. The pilot did not take appropriate action, and the check pilot ordered a go around to be conducted at approximately 1000 ft from the intersection. The aircraft briefly touched down and then began climbing. It crossed the hold short lines for runway 22R while airborne, and continued on the upwind. The tower acknowledged over the radio that the aircraft was executing a go around. The beech 18, meanwhile, was turning off at a taxiway, and had not entered the runway 22R/14L intersection. The tower later called our chief pilot and informed him that a lahso violation had occurred. Such a landing presents a difficult situation. The point at which a successful lahso could have been conducted was beyond the point at which a go around needed to be initiated to clear the runway intersection with sufficient altitude. By the time the aircraft had passed the point where touchdown needed to have been accomplished to comply with the hold short, it was too late to gain altitude to adequately clear the intersection. In addition, I believe another contributing factor was the pilot's workload when the lahso was issued. The aircraft was on final, being confined for landing, and the pilot was most likely nervous for being on a stage check.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA34 PLT, WHILE BEING OBSERVED BY A CHK INSTRUCTOR, FAILED TO COMPLY WITH A LAHSO CLRNC.

Narrative: PVT/INST CERTIFIED PLT WAS FLYING THE ACFT FROM THE L SEAT. A SCHOOL CHK INSTRUCTOR WAS OBSERVING AND EVALUATING THE FLT FROM THE R SEAT. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE DOING TOUCH-AND-GOES IN A CLOSED TFC PATTERN. ON DOWNWIND, THE PLT WAS INSTRUCTED TO EXTEND TO FOLLOW TFC ON FINAL. AFTER TURNING FINAL BEHIND THE OTHER TFC, AND AT APPROX 600 FT AGL, THE PLT WAS THEN CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 14R AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22R FOR LNDG TFC. THE PLT ACKNOWLEDGED THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND ACCEPTED THE HOLD SHORT ORDER. THE CHK PLT REQUESTED THE PLT EXECUTE A SOFT FIELD LNDG, AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE LAHSO INSTRUCTION, ADVISED THE PLT NOT TO 'LAND TOO LONG ON THE RWY.' THE APCH WAS CONDUCTED SLIGHTLY FAST AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE A NORMAL APCH PATH. THE PLT COMMENCED THE FLARE APPROX 400 FT BEYOND THE RWY AIM POINT MARKINGS. AFTER FLARING, THE ACFT ENTERED AN EXTENDED FLOATING CONDITION WITH THE PLT 'HOLDING OFF' THE ACFT AS AIRSPD BLED OFF. THE EXPECTATION OF THE CHK PLT WAS THAT THE PLT WOULD LAND THE ACFT AND APPLY BRAKING TO COMPLY WITH LAHSO INSTRUCTION, AS SUFFICIENT RWY WAS AVAILABLE FOR A PROPERLY EXECUTED LNDG. HOWEVER, AS THE ACFT CONTINUED TO FLOAT DOWN THE RWY, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT A HOLD SHORT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. THE PLT DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION, AND THE CHK PLT ORDERED A GAR TO BE CONDUCTED AT APPROX 1000 FT FROM THE INTXN. THE ACFT BRIEFLY TOUCHED DOWN AND THEN BEGAN CLBING. IT CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINES FOR RWY 22R WHILE AIRBORNE, AND CONTINUED ON THE UPWIND. THE TWR ACKNOWLEDGED OVER THE RADIO THAT THE ACFT WAS EXECUTING A GAR. THE BEECH 18, MEANWHILE, WAS TURNING OFF AT A TXWY, AND HAD NOT ENTERED THE RWY 22R/14L INTXN. THE TWR LATER CALLED OUR CHIEF PLT AND INFORMED HIM THAT A LAHSO VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED. SUCH A LNDG PRESENTS A DIFFICULT SIT. THE POINT AT WHICH A SUCCESSFUL LAHSO COULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WAS BEYOND THE POINT AT WHICH A GAR NEEDED TO BE INITIATED TO CLR THE RWY INTXN WITH SUFFICIENT ALT. BY THE TIME THE ACFT HAD PASSED THE POINT WHERE TOUCHDOWN NEEDED TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO COMPLY WITH THE HOLD SHORT, IT WAS TOO LATE TO GAIN ALT TO ADEQUATELY CLR THE INTXN. IN ADDITION, I BELIEVE ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE PLT'S WORKLOAD WHEN THE LAHSO WAS ISSUED. THE ACFT WAS ON FINAL, BEING CONFINED FOR LNDG, AND THE PLT WAS MOST LIKELY NERVOUS FOR BEING ON A STAGE CHK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.