Narrative:

Departing orf for lga, the before start checklist was completed 'to the line,' meaning only fuel and crew briefing needed to be reviewed. We had not yet been fueled, so we stopped there. There was some discussion with the ground agent working the flight over how many bags could be carried. I drafted the weight and balance to determine what we could carry. They loaded the aircraft appropriately, we gave them the paperwork, shut the door and proceeded to taxi out and take off. The after takeoff checklist was completed and the captain switched to company frequency to call out and off times and fuel at takeoff. He then realized that we had not been fueled and did not have nearly enough to safely fly the leg. We made an immediate return to orf and landed normally in VMC. The captain notified the company of the incident, and we took on fuel and flew the leg without further incident. I feel that the critical juncture was the weight and balance issues distracting us from our duties. This interrupted the routine, which we absentmindedly picked up at engine start without finishing the before start checklist. The pressure of meeting the schedule may have contributed, but the core of it is human error on the part of myself and the captain. To prevent this specific problem from ever occurring to me again, I won't fill in the fuel portion of the weight and balance form until that fuel is in fact in the tanks. The only other human factors consideration that I can identify in the situation is fatigue, which is a constant concern. In the month of december, I had several trips with early reports, some with returns to base as late as midnight. Switching from an early to late schedule, even on the same trip has been very tiring. On the day in question. I had to wake up at XB30 a.M. The following morning, for example, I had to wake up at XA00 a.M. I live in-base.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC8 FLC DEPARTS WITHOUT OBTAINING ANY FUEL, BEING DISTR WITH ACFT GROSS WTS AND BAGGAGE WTS AT ORF, VA.

Narrative: DEPARTING ORF FOR LGA, THE BEFORE START CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED 'TO THE LINE,' MEANING ONLY FUEL AND CREW BRIEFING NEEDED TO BE REVIEWED. WE HAD NOT YET BEEN FUELED, SO WE STOPPED THERE. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION WITH THE GND AGENT WORKING THE FLT OVER HOW MANY BAGS COULD BE CARRIED. I DRAFTED THE WT AND BAL TO DETERMINE WHAT WE COULD CARRY. THEY LOADED THE ACFT APPROPRIATELY, WE GAVE THEM THE PAPERWORK, SHUT THE DOOR AND PROCEEDED TO TAXI OUT AND TAKE OFF. THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND THE CAPT SWITCHED TO COMPANY FREQ TO CALL OUT AND OFF TIMES AND FUEL AT TKOF. HE THEN REALIZED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN FUELED AND DID NOT HAVE NEARLY ENOUGH TO SAFELY FLY THE LEG. WE MADE AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO ORF AND LANDED NORMALLY IN VMC. THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE COMPANY OF THE INCIDENT, AND WE TOOK ON FUEL AND FLEW THE LEG WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I FEEL THAT THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE WAS THE WT AND BAL ISSUES DISTRACTING US FROM OUR DUTIES. THIS INTERRUPTED THE ROUTINE, WHICH WE ABSENTMINDEDLY PICKED UP AT ENG START WITHOUT FINISHING THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. THE PRESSURE OF MEETING THE SCHEDULE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED, BUT THE CORE OF IT IS HUMAN ERROR ON THE PART OF MYSELF AND THE CAPT. TO PREVENT THIS SPECIFIC PROB FROM EVER OCCURRING TO ME AGAIN, I WON'T FILL IN THE FUEL PORTION OF THE WT AND BAL FORM UNTIL THAT FUEL IS IN FACT IN THE TANKS. THE ONLY OTHER HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATION THAT I CAN IDENT IN THE SIT IS FATIGUE, WHICH IS A CONSTANT CONCERN. IN THE MONTH OF DECEMBER, I HAD SEVERAL TRIPS WITH EARLY RPTS, SOME WITH RETURNS TO BASE AS LATE AS MIDNIGHT. SWITCHING FROM AN EARLY TO LATE SCHEDULE, EVEN ON THE SAME TRIP HAS BEEN VERY TIRING. ON THE DAY IN QUESTION. I HAD TO WAKE UP AT XB30 A.M. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, FOR EXAMPLE, I HAD TO WAKE UP AT XA00 A.M. I LIVE IN-BASE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.