Narrative:

Flight departed gate 10 mins late due to 'selectees' being screened. Captain performed the takeoff, since I had accumulated less than 100 hours, and then turned over the aircraft to me, as the PF, after flap retraction during climb out. The remainder of the en route, descent, and approach was relatively textbook. During the approach, we were on a right downwind for runway 16L, 4000 ft, 230 KTS, on autoplt. All callouts were made, as required. The main gear touched down within 300-500 ft of the touchdown marker. It was a smooth landing -- reverse thrust was applied immediately. The speed brake deployed automatically, and wheel brakes were applied at 80 KTS. At approximately 30 KTS, the aircraft was turned over to the captain, not in reverse thrust as he joined me on the brakes. In my opinion it was safe to exit on the high speed taxiway at 'TA' (approximately 5000 ft down the runway). Additionally, I felt the aircraft could have been brought to a complete stop, straight ahead, and made a 90 degree turn to the right, and still could have made the 'TA' taxiway. Once again, this is my opinion. The captain stated that we should just go to the end, approximately another 200 ft, which would be taxiway 'tb' -- a taxiway that is almost perpendicular to the runway ('almost' because there is a run-up area, allowing an angle favoring the exit of the runway). I felt it was in excess, especially since there was no one behind us on approach. Upon later speaking with the flight attendants, they stated that they thought we were 'going around.' also, I felt that excessive braking would be required to slow the aircraft to taxi speed, again. As we approached taxiway 'tb,' I anticipated maximum braking. As brakes were applied, a turn was made to exit the runway. At this point, I felt it would have been safer to stop straight-ahead onto the overrun. I believed the aircraft would exit the pavement on the turn, but might stay on if we proceeded straight ahead. I guess our speed to be approximately 20 KTS in the turn. WX conditions at the time included: light winds, 500 ft overcast, 2 mi visibility, light rain and mist. Runway was wet. We (the aircraft) came to a rest in a u-shaped grassy, muddy area between the end of the runway and the 'tb' taxi/run-up ramp area. There were no injuries. The aircraft was deplaned in an orderly fashion after having coordinated with operations for airstairs and busses. Supplemental information from acn 534303: we were tempted to take the high speed turnoff, but with the wet conditions, I decided to be conservative and take it all the way to the end of the runway. With so much runway left, I pushed up the power slightly to keep us moving down the runway. As we were approaching the end, I slowed the airplane to make the turn onto taxiway tb. While in the turn, the airplane began to slide. Despite my efforts to turn the plane, the airplane continued to slide off the taxiway into the grass and mud. I estimate the speed in the turn was between 15-20 KTS. There were no injuries and the airplane came to rest about 30 ft off the pavement. I learned since the incident that other airplanes have slipped/slid at the same intersection, so there may be a very slippery point on the pavement that should be looked at and/or advised the pilots through NOTAM or company information sheet. Another factor was the experience of the first officer -- brand new, right out of training with less than 100 hours. He said later that he was 'a little' uncomfortable with the speed at which we entered the turn, but he never spoke up. CRM at that time was less than adequate. A more experienced first officer probably would have spoken up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NA B737 PIC EXPERIENCES A RWY TXWY EXCURSION DURING A TOO HIGH A SPD TURNOFF AT TXWY TB AT ZZZ, CA.

Narrative: FLT DEPARTED GATE 10 MINS LATE DUE TO 'SELECTEES' BEING SCREENED. CAPT PERFORMED THE TKOF, SINCE I HAD ACCUMULATED LESS THAN 100 HRS, AND THEN TURNED OVER THE ACFT TO ME, AS THE PF, AFTER FLAP RETRACTION DURING CLBOUT. THE REMAINDER OF THE ENRTE, DSCNT, AND APCH WAS RELATIVELY TEXTBOOK. DURING THE APCH, WE WERE ON A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16L, 4000 FT, 230 KTS, ON AUTOPLT. ALL CALLOUTS WERE MADE, AS REQUIRED. THE MAIN GEAR TOUCHED DOWN WITHIN 300-500 FT OF THE TOUCHDOWN MARKER. IT WAS A SMOOTH LNDG -- REVERSE THRUST WAS APPLIED IMMEDIATELY. THE SPD BRAKE DEPLOYED AUTOMATICALLY, AND WHEEL BRAKES WERE APPLIED AT 80 KTS. AT APPROX 30 KTS, THE ACFT WAS TURNED OVER TO THE CAPT, NOT IN REVERSE THRUST AS HE JOINED ME ON THE BRAKES. IN MY OPINION IT WAS SAFE TO EXIT ON THE HIGH SPD TXWY AT 'TA' (APPROX 5000 FT DOWN THE RWY). ADDITIONALLY, I FELT THE ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO A COMPLETE STOP, STRAIGHT AHEAD, AND MADE A 90 DEG TURN TO THE R, AND STILL COULD HAVE MADE THE 'TA' TXWY. ONCE AGAIN, THIS IS MY OPINION. THE CAPT STATED THAT WE SHOULD JUST GO TO THE END, APPROX ANOTHER 200 FT, WHICH WOULD BE TXWY 'TB' -- A TXWY THAT IS ALMOST PERPENDICULAR TO THE RWY ('ALMOST' BECAUSE THERE IS A RUN-UP AREA, ALLOWING AN ANGLE FAVORING THE EXIT OF THE RWY). I FELT IT WAS IN EXCESS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE WAS NO ONE BEHIND US ON APCH. UPON LATER SPEAKING WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS, THEY STATED THAT THEY THOUGHT WE WERE 'GOING AROUND.' ALSO, I FELT THAT EXCESSIVE BRAKING WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SLOW THE ACFT TO TAXI SPD, AGAIN. AS WE APCHED TXWY 'TB,' I ANTICIPATED MAX BRAKING. AS BRAKES WERE APPLIED, A TURN WAS MADE TO EXIT THE RWY. AT THIS POINT, I FELT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SAFER TO STOP STRAIGHT-AHEAD ONTO THE OVERRUN. I BELIEVED THE ACFT WOULD EXIT THE PAVEMENT ON THE TURN, BUT MIGHT STAY ON IF WE PROCEEDED STRAIGHT AHEAD. I GUESS OUR SPD TO BE APPROX 20 KTS IN THE TURN. WX CONDITIONS AT THE TIME INCLUDED: LIGHT WINDS, 500 FT OVCST, 2 MI VISIBILITY, LIGHT RAIN AND MIST. RWY WAS WET. WE (THE ACFT) CAME TO A REST IN A U-SHAPED GRASSY, MUDDY AREA BTWN THE END OF THE RWY AND THE 'TB' TAXI/RUN-UP RAMP AREA. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE ACFT WAS DEPLANED IN AN ORDERLY FASHION AFTER HAVING COORDINATED WITH OPS FOR AIRSTAIRS AND BUSSES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 534303: WE WERE TEMPTED TO TAKE THE HIGH SPD TURNOFF, BUT WITH THE WET CONDITIONS, I DECIDED TO BE CONSERVATIVE AND TAKE IT ALL THE WAY TO THE END OF THE RWY. WITH SO MUCH RWY LEFT, I PUSHED UP THE PWR SLIGHTLY TO KEEP US MOVING DOWN THE RWY. AS WE WERE APCHING THE END, I SLOWED THE AIRPLANE TO MAKE THE TURN ONTO TXWY TB. WHILE IN THE TURN, THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO SLIDE. DESPITE MY EFFORTS TO TURN THE PLANE, THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED TO SLIDE OFF THE TXWY INTO THE GRASS AND MUD. I ESTIMATE THE SPD IN THE TURN WAS BTWN 15-20 KTS. THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND THE AIRPLANE CAME TO REST ABOUT 30 FT OFF THE PAVEMENT. I LEARNED SINCE THE INCIDENT THAT OTHER AIRPLANES HAVE SLIPPED/SLID AT THE SAME INTXN, SO THERE MAY BE A VERY SLIPPERY POINT ON THE PAVEMENT THAT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AND/OR ADVISED THE PLTS THROUGH NOTAM OR COMPANY INFO SHEET. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE EXPERIENCE OF THE FO -- BRAND NEW, RIGHT OUT OF TRAINING WITH LESS THAN 100 HRS. HE SAID LATER THAT HE WAS 'A LITTLE' UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SPD AT WHICH WE ENTERED THE TURN, BUT HE NEVER SPOKE UP. CRM AT THAT TIME WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE. A MORE EXPERIENCED FO PROBABLY WOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.