Narrative:

Filed and cleared from sju to ewr via vermo 4 departure (VERMO4.vermo) kraft. A300 flight plan route SID requires first level off at 5000 ft. After takeoff, runway 08 sju, given left turn 020 degrees (SID). Further clearance to turn 340 degrees, intercept SID, climb/maintenance 10000 ft. During climb, contacted sju center. We were asked what our cruise mach would be at FL340. Replied mach 0.80 which was acknowledged by center. After approximately 5 mins at 10000 ft and 320 KTS, I was wondering if we were going to get a climb clearance when center called and asked if we were climbing. We replied we were only cleared to 10000 ft. ATC rather tartly informed us that we had been cleared to FL340 and that we must climb to cross 170 degrees (DME inferred but not stated) at FL340. We acknowledged and began climb, and setting FMC up to insure that we would make the crossing restriction. Very shortly later, center asked if we were going to kraft. We replied we were cleared to vermo then kraft. Controller very strongly informed us that we were going to have to 'listen up, and get things right!' the controller further informed us that he definitely remembered clearing us both to FL340 and direct to kraft. The first officer had been handling the radios up to this point, while I flew. He was a bit taken back by this chastisement. I was a bit more concerned and replied to the controller that I took notes on clearance changes and had no notes indicating that we had been cleared direct kraft. Further, that to my knowledge, we had not acknowledged any such clearance. If he (the controller) wanted us to go to kraft we would do so, but he must first clear us to do so. The controller lost his cool, and, I hope, misunderstood what I had said. He said that if we refused to acknowledge his clearance we would have to go to vermo. My reply was that we would go where ever he cleared us to go, but we were only following what we had been cleared to do. Very tersely told us to go to vermo, and then kraft. We accepted the clearance to kraft via vermo, and no more was said until frequency change which was normal procedure. It was noticed by us during the time that we were on this sector, that this controller was having difficulty communicating (give and take) with several other aircraft on the same frequency. To my knowledge, we did not miss any transmissions from this controller nor, to my knowledge, did we acknowledge and fail to execute any clrncs from this controller. I found in listening to this controller, that there appeared to be an assumption inferred that all of us were 'old hands,' familiar with his area, and that we should know, anticipate, and comprehend any instructions he thought he had given, whether they had actually been transmitted on the radio or not. Unfortunately, this is not the case for me. In 27 years of airline flying, this was only the second occasion for me to fly this particular route. I have found a marked increase in the number of incidents of controllers giving multiple (3,4, and sometimes even more) instructions in the same transmission. I do not have benefit of either a stenographer, or instant reply to record, relay, and confirm this volume of commands from any ATC facility. In highly congested, intense traffic sits, these multiple commands can be, and often are, covered by other transmissions, pieces are missed or misunderstood, or they create confusion on the part of the flying crew. This seems to be in direct contradiction to past terps policies concerning issuance of ATC instructions. While I cannot say that this was a factor in this incident, I am concerned that it could have contributed in a misunderstanding or missed communication between pilot and controller.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSU ARTCC CTLR AND B737-800 CREW AT 10000 FT HAVE DISPUTE ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT A CLRNC TO CLB TO FL340 WAS ISSUED.

Narrative: FILED AND CLRED FROM SJU TO EWR VIA VERMO 4 DEP (VERMO4.VERMO) KRAFT. A300 FLT PLAN RTE SID REQUIRES FIRST LEVEL OFF AT 5000 FT. AFTER TKOF, RWY 08 SJU, GIVEN LEFT TURN 020 DEGS (SID). FURTHER CLRNC TO TURN 340 DEGS, INTERCEPT SID, CLB/MAINT 10000 FT. DURING CLB, CONTACTED SJU CENTER. WE WERE ASKED WHAT OUR CRUISE MACH WOULD BE AT FL340. REPLIED MACH 0.80 WHICH WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY CTR. AFTER APPROX 5 MINS AT 10000 FT AND 320 KTS, I WAS WONDERING IF WE WERE GOING TO GET A CLB CLRNC WHEN CTR CALLED AND ASKED IF WE WERE CLBING. WE REPLIED WE WERE ONLY CLRED TO 10000 FT. ATC RATHER TARTLY INFORMED US THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO FL340 AND THAT WE MUST CLB TO CROSS 170 DEGS (DME INFERRED BUT NOT STATED) AT FL340. WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND BEGAN CLB, AND SETTING FMC UP TO INSURE THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE CROSSING RESTRICTION. VERY SHORTLY LATER, CTR ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO KRAFT. WE REPLIED WE WERE CLRED TO VERMO THEN KRAFT. CTLR VERY STRONGLY INFORMED US THAT WE WERE GOING TO HAVE TO 'LISTEN UP, AND GET THINGS RIGHT!' THE CTLR FURTHER INFORMED US THAT HE DEFINITELY REMEMBERED CLRING US BOTH TO FL340 AND DIRECT TO KRAFT. THE FIRST OFFICER HAD BEEN HANDLING THE RADIOS UP TO THIS POINT, WHILE I FLEW. HE WAS A BIT TAKEN BACK BY THIS CHASTISEMENT. I WAS A BIT MORE CONCERNED AND REPLIED TO THE CTLR THAT I TOOK NOTES ON CLRNC CHANGES AND HAD NO NOTES INDICATING THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT KRAFT. FURTHER, THAT TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WE HAD NOT ACKNOWLEDGED ANY SUCH CLRNC. IF HE (THE CTLR) WANTED US TO GO TO KRAFT WE WOULD DO SO, BUT HE MUST FIRST CLR US TO DO SO. THE CTLR LOST HIS COOL, AND, I HOPE, MISUNDERSTOOD WHAT I HAD SAID. HE SAID THAT IF WE REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE HIS CLRNC WE WOULD HAVE TO GO TO VERMO. MY REPLY WAS THAT WE WOULD GO WHERE EVER HE CLRED US TO GO, BUT WE WERE ONLY FOLLOWING WHAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO DO. VERY TERSELY TOLD US TO GO TO VERMO, AND THEN KRAFT. WE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC TO KRAFT VIA VERMO, AND NO MORE WAS SAID UNTIL FREQ CHANGE WHICH WAS NORMAL PROC. IT WAS NOTICED BY US DURING THE TIME THAT WE WERE ON THIS SECTOR, THAT THIS CTLR WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY COMMUNICATING (GIVE AND TAKE) WITH SEVERAL OTHER ACFT ON THE SAME FREQ. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WE DID NOT MISS ANY TRANSMISSIONS FROM THIS CTLR NOR, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, DID WE ACKNOWLEDGE AND FAIL TO EXECUTE ANY CLRNCS FROM THIS CTLR. I FOUND IN LISTENING TO THIS CTLR, THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE AN ASSUMPTION INFERRED THAT ALL OF US WERE 'OLD HANDS,' FAMILIAR WITH HIS AREA, AND THAT WE SHOULD KNOW, ANTICIPATE, AND COMPREHEND ANY INSTRUCTIONS HE THOUGHT HE HAD GIVEN, WHETHER THEY HAD ACTUALLY BEEN TRANSMITTED ON THE RADIO OR NOT. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS IS NOT THE CASE FOR ME. IN 27 YEARS OF AIRLINE FLYING, THIS WAS ONLY THE SECOND OCCASION FOR ME TO FLY THIS PARTICULAR RTE. I HAVE FOUND A MARKED INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF CTLRS GIVING MULTIPLE (3,4, AND SOMETIMES EVEN MORE) INSTRUCTIONS IN THE SAME TRANSMISSION. I DO NOT HAVE BENEFIT OF EITHER A STENOGRAPHER, OR INSTANT REPLY TO RECORD, RELAY, AND CONFIRM THIS VOLUME OF COMMANDS FROM ANY ATC FAC. IN HIGHLY CONGESTED, INTENSE TFC SITS, THESE MULTIPLE COMMANDS CAN BE, AND OFTEN ARE, COVERED BY OTHER TRANSMISSIONS, PIECES ARE MISSED OR MISUNDERSTOOD, OR THEY CREATE CONFUSION ON THE PART OF THE FLYING CREW. THIS SEEMS TO BE IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO PAST TERPS POLICIES CONCERNING ISSUANCE OF ATC INSTRUCTIONS. WHILE I CANNOT SAY THAT THIS WAS A FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT, I AM CONCERNED THAT IT COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED IN A MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISSED COM BETWEEN PLT AND CTLR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.