37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 536301 |
Time | |
Date | 200201 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : efo.airport |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi ground : takeoff roll ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 3500 |
ASRS Report | 536031 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : flaps/stab/trim/spoiler warning other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff flight crew : overcame equipment problem |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Forgot to lower flaps until receiving the takeoff warning sounds and lights during takeoff. We repositioned back to the end of the runway and continued. So, what went wrong with something as critical as setting takeoff flaps? A simple break in the routine and insidious complacency. The captain always called for takeoff flaps immediately after blockout. He called for the takeoff briefing on the parallel taxiway followed immediately by the before takeoff checklist. In this case, doing the takeoff briefing in the chocks broke the chain and led to errors of substitution and omission. We normally checked the flaps, speed brakes and trim several times during taxi. But, this one time -- while tired and running late with a short taxi at a familiar airport, a clearance change, and the distraction of a fighter takeoff -- we let our guard down.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B757 CREW, STARTING THEIR TKOF ROLL AT EFD, RECEIVED AN AURAL 'TKOF' WARNING BECAUSE THE FLAPS WERE STILL UP.
Narrative: FORGOT TO LOWER FLAPS UNTIL RECEIVING THE TKOF WARNING SOUNDS AND LIGHTS DURING TKOF. WE REPOSITIONED BACK TO THE END OF THE RWY AND CONTINUED. SO, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH SOMETHING AS CRITICAL AS SETTING TKOF FLAPS? A SIMPLE BREAK IN THE ROUTINE AND INSIDIOUS COMPLACENCY. THE CAPT ALWAYS CALLED FOR TKOF FLAPS IMMEDIATELY AFTER BLOCKOUT. HE CALLED FOR THE TKOF BRIEFING ON THE PARALLEL TXWY FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. IN THIS CASE, DOING THE TKOF BRIEFING IN THE CHOCKS BROKE THE CHAIN AND LED TO ERRORS OF SUBSTITUTION AND OMISSION. WE NORMALLY CHKED THE FLAPS, SPD BRAKES AND TRIM SEVERAL TIMES DURING TAXI. BUT, THIS ONE TIME -- WHILE TIRED AND RUNNING LATE WITH A SHORT TAXI AT A FAMILIAR ARPT, A CLRNC CHANGE, AND THE DISTR OF A FIGHTER TKOF -- WE LET OUR GUARD DOWN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.