Narrative:

We were planning a visual approach at lewiston, but had loaded the VOR runway 8 approach in the FMS's for a landing on either runway 11 or runway 8. This leg is normally 8-10 mins in length and by using runway 26 would shave roughly 2 mins off the en route time. (The PNF is very busy during this leg with checklists, obtaining WX, reporting on, off and arrival times to 2 different stations.) after departing pullman and crossing the pullman VOR, we checked on with ZSE and were cleared to 6000 ft. A few mins later center informed me that the winds were now favoring runways 26 or 29. I requested the ILS runway 26 and was cleared as requested via the 10 DME arc. We were at 13 DME when I received this clearance. I quickly turned east on the arc, held the DME on the mqg VOR, dialed in the localizer frequency for the ILS and began descending to 5300 ft when something seemed out of place. At first I thought I had turned the wrong direction on the arc. My poor first officer was just finishing company radio communications when I told her what I thought I had done. I told her how we had been cleared and she was suddenly thrust into trying to set up the approach and help me figure out where we were on the arc. I then realized what was out of place. By holding the DME on the VOR and switching frequencys, I had inadvertently removed the RMI needle from the HSI which I needed to conduct the arc. With the FMS setup for the VOR approach I had no useful secondary information to help keep me established on the arc. When I discovered this we were now close to the 13 or 14 DME arc. Center called and stated the same. We advised center we were having trouble intercepting the arc, at which time we were cleared back to 6000 ft and given vectors to reintercept the arc and landed in lewiston without further incident. After reviewing this event, several things became clear. First, by getting behind and trying to 'save' a few mins, I caused myself and my crew to become overly rushed. By choosing to depart directly to the pullman VOR versus departing using the departure procedure, the few mins that were saved in reality made matters worse. This decision also put my first officer in a time crunch, which kept her out of the approach process en route to lewiston. Second, I was not adequately prepared for the approach into lewiston. I should have planned better than to depart on that short of a flight without better preparation and planning for contingencies. Third, both the first officer and I were a lot more tired than I realized which also contributed to how decisions were being made at the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DH8D CREW, ON APCH TO LWS, BECAME DISORIENTED, REQUIRING VECTORS AND ALT ASSIGNMENT FROM ATC.

Narrative: WE WERE PLANNING A VISUAL APCH AT LEWISTON, BUT HAD LOADED THE VOR RWY 8 APCH IN THE FMS'S FOR A LNDG ON EITHER RWY 11 OR RWY 8. THIS LEG IS NORMALLY 8-10 MINS IN LENGTH AND BY USING RWY 26 WOULD SHAVE ROUGHLY 2 MINS OFF THE ENRTE TIME. (THE PNF IS VERY BUSY DURING THIS LEG WITH CHKLISTS, OBTAINING WX, RPTING ON, OFF AND ARR TIMES TO 2 DIFFERENT STATIONS.) AFTER DEPARTING PULLMAN AND XING THE PULLMAN VOR, WE CHKED ON WITH ZSE AND WERE CLRED TO 6000 FT. A FEW MINS LATER CTR INFORMED ME THAT THE WINDS WERE NOW FAVORING RWYS 26 OR 29. I REQUESTED THE ILS RWY 26 AND WAS CLRED AS REQUESTED VIA THE 10 DME ARC. WE WERE AT 13 DME WHEN I RECEIVED THIS CLRNC. I QUICKLY TURNED E ON THE ARC, HELD THE DME ON THE MQG VOR, DIALED IN THE LOC FREQ FOR THE ILS AND BEGAN DSNDING TO 5300 FT WHEN SOMETHING SEEMED OUT OF PLACE. AT FIRST I THOUGHT I HAD TURNED THE WRONG DIRECTION ON THE ARC. MY POOR FO WAS JUST FINISHING COMPANY RADIO COMS WHEN I TOLD HER WHAT I THOUGHT I HAD DONE. I TOLD HER HOW WE HAD BEEN CLRED AND SHE WAS SUDDENLY THRUST INTO TRYING TO SET UP THE APCH AND HELP ME FIGURE OUT WHERE WE WERE ON THE ARC. I THEN REALIZED WHAT WAS OUT OF PLACE. BY HOLDING THE DME ON THE VOR AND SWITCHING FREQS, I HAD INADVERTENTLY REMOVED THE RMI NEEDLE FROM THE HSI WHICH I NEEDED TO CONDUCT THE ARC. WITH THE FMS SETUP FOR THE VOR APCH I HAD NO USEFUL SECONDARY INFO TO HELP KEEP ME ESTABLISHED ON THE ARC. WHEN I DISCOVERED THIS WE WERE NOW CLOSE TO THE 13 OR 14 DME ARC. CTR CALLED AND STATED THE SAME. WE ADVISED CTR WE WERE HAVING TROUBLE INTERCEPTING THE ARC, AT WHICH TIME WE WERE CLRED BACK TO 6000 FT AND GIVEN VECTORS TO REINTERCEPT THE ARC AND LANDED IN LEWISTON WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AFTER REVIEWING THIS EVENT, SEVERAL THINGS BECAME CLR. FIRST, BY GETTING BEHIND AND TRYING TO 'SAVE' A FEW MINS, I CAUSED MYSELF AND MY CREW TO BECOME OVERLY RUSHED. BY CHOOSING TO DEPART DIRECTLY TO THE PULLMAN VOR VERSUS DEPARTING USING THE DEP PROC, THE FEW MINS THAT WERE SAVED IN REALITY MADE MATTERS WORSE. THIS DECISION ALSO PUT MY FO IN A TIME CRUNCH, WHICH KEPT HER OUT OF THE APCH PROCESS ENRTE TO LEWISTON. SECOND, I WAS NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARED FOR THE APCH INTO LEWISTON. I SHOULD HAVE PLANNED BETTER THAN TO DEPART ON THAT SHORT OF A FLT WITHOUT BETTER PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCIES. THIRD, BOTH THE FO AND I WERE A LOT MORE TIRED THAN I REALIZED WHICH ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO HOW DECISIONS WERE BEING MADE AT THE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.