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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 537950 |
Time | |
Date | 200202 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : clt.airport |
State Reference | NC |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A321 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll ground : taxi ground : position and hold |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : clt.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : holding |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 220 flight time total : 17500 flight time type : 1680 |
ASRS Report | 537950 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Just prior to the last leg of a 3-DAY trip from clt, the captain I was flying with lost his cell phone. He was very upset because it was apparent it fell out of his pocket where he was sitting and in just 3 seconds time, someone took it and would not answer it to return it. He finally abandoned the fact he would have to take care of the matter at our destination after our flight. He was extremely distraction taxiing from the gate to the runway and continually remorseful about his phone. I, therefore, had to be extremely vigilant of our movement taxiing from the gate to the runway. All checklists were completed and approaching the end of the runway. I took care of a couple of things in the cockpit and made my passenger PA about our takeoff. As I finished, the tower cleared us into position and hold for takeoff. I acknowledged and the captain made a left turn at an intersection for runway 18R. I saw there was an airplane at the end of the runway and the captain made this early turn for the runway intersection. I was confused, so I asked the tower if they wanted us to use the intersection. I thought I missed something while I was making my cabin announcement. They said they thought we were #1 for takeoff, and I answered, 'no, we weren't.' the tower asked if we were ready and I said yes, but we would need to use the full length of the runway. They cleared us into position and hold. The captain made a turn onto the runway but did not taxi to use the full length. I told him we needed the full length. He said it's long enough. I said I know it's long enough but the paperwork is for full length, and those were the numbers I inserted into the mcdu. He said we were fine and let's just go. I said I don't like this and we should use the full length. The tower then asked again if we were ready. I took a second or two to think about the situation, and then said we were ready. We were cleared for takeoff and I took control of the aircraft and we took off uneventfully. In those 2 seconds of thinking of what to do, many factors went through my head. First, I knew it would be safe because of the relatively light fuel and passenger load. Second, we were only a few hundred ft short of the end of a very long runway and it would not be a factor. Third, the WX was cavu and I was very comfortable with the aircraft and fact that there would be no performance problem with the takeoff. After our takeoff and upon completion of the after takeoff checklist, I noticed the captain turned off the APU bleed. Apparently, he chose to use full power for our takeoff which increased our performance and safety margin. While en route, I pulled out the performance figures and confirmed it was a legal takeoff. I was very frustrated with the captain because he put me in this situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A321 FO IS UPSET WITH HIS CAPT WHEN THE PIC PERFORMS AN INTXN TKOF AGAINST THE FO'S WISHES.
Narrative: JUST PRIOR TO THE LAST LEG OF A 3-DAY TRIP FROM CLT, THE CAPT I WAS FLYING WITH LOST HIS CELL PHONE. HE WAS VERY UPSET BECAUSE IT WAS APPARENT IT FELL OUT OF HIS POCKET WHERE HE WAS SITTING AND IN JUST 3 SECONDS TIME, SOMEONE TOOK IT AND WOULD NOT ANSWER IT TO RETURN IT. HE FINALLY ABANDONED THE FACT HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE CARE OF THE MATTER AT OUR DEST AFTER OUR FLT. HE WAS EXTREMELY DISTR TAXIING FROM THE GATE TO THE RWY AND CONTINUALLY REMORSEFUL ABOUT HIS PHONE. I, THEREFORE, HAD TO BE EXTREMELY VIGILANT OF OUR MOVEMENT TAXIING FROM THE GATE TO THE RWY. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND APCHING THE END OF THE RWY. I TOOK CARE OF A COUPLE OF THINGS IN THE COCKPIT AND MADE MY PAX PA ABOUT OUR TKOF. AS I FINISHED, THE TWR CLRED US INTO POS AND HOLD FOR TKOF. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND THE CAPT MADE A L TURN AT AN INTXN FOR RWY 18R. I SAW THERE WAS AN AIRPLANE AT THE END OF THE RWY AND THE CAPT MADE THIS EARLY TURN FOR THE RWY INTXN. I WAS CONFUSED, SO I ASKED THE TWR IF THEY WANTED US TO USE THE INTXN. I THOUGHT I MISSED SOMETHING WHILE I WAS MAKING MY CABIN ANNOUNCEMENT. THEY SAID THEY THOUGHT WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF, AND I ANSWERED, 'NO, WE WEREN'T.' THE TWR ASKED IF WE WERE READY AND I SAID YES, BUT WE WOULD NEED TO USE THE FULL LENGTH OF THE RWY. THEY CLRED US INTO POS AND HOLD. THE CAPT MADE A TURN ONTO THE RWY BUT DID NOT TAXI TO USE THE FULL LENGTH. I TOLD HIM WE NEEDED THE FULL LENGTH. HE SAID IT'S LONG ENOUGH. I SAID I KNOW IT'S LONG ENOUGH BUT THE PAPERWORK IS FOR FULL LENGTH, AND THOSE WERE THE NUMBERS I INSERTED INTO THE MCDU. HE SAID WE WERE FINE AND LET'S JUST GO. I SAID I DON'T LIKE THIS AND WE SHOULD USE THE FULL LENGTH. THE TWR THEN ASKED AGAIN IF WE WERE READY. I TOOK A SECOND OR TWO TO THINK ABOUT THE SIT, AND THEN SAID WE WERE READY. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND WE TOOK OFF UNEVENTFULLY. IN THOSE 2 SECONDS OF THINKING OF WHAT TO DO, MANY FACTORS WENT THROUGH MY HEAD. FIRST, I KNEW IT WOULD BE SAFE BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVELY LIGHT FUEL AND PAX LOAD. SECOND, WE WERE ONLY A FEW HUNDRED FT SHORT OF THE END OF A VERY LONG RWY AND IT WOULD NOT BE A FACTOR. THIRD, THE WX WAS CAVU AND I WAS VERY COMFORTABLE WITH THE ACFT AND FACT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PERFORMANCE PROB WITH THE TKOF. AFTER OUR TKOF AND UPON COMPLETION OF THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST, I NOTICED THE CAPT TURNED OFF THE APU BLEED. APPARENTLY, HE CHOSE TO USE FULL PWR FOR OUR TKOF WHICH INCREASED OUR PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY MARGIN. WHILE ENRTE, I PULLED OUT THE PERFORMANCE FIGURES AND CONFIRMED IT WAS A LEGAL TKOF. I WAS VERY FRUSTRATED WITH THE CAPT BECAUSE HE PUT ME IN THIS SIT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.