Narrative:

WX at time of incident: wind 210 degrees at 10 KTS, gusting to 25 KTS. Visibility variable 1/2 - 3/4 mi, blowing snow and mist. After pushback and after deicing the aircraft, we received a taxi clearance to taxi the aircraft to runway 24L via taxiway K, hold short of runway 24R at taxiway C. We entered taxiway K directly abeam gate X and while taxiing east on the taxiway, both the first officer and I observed a box plow that had started its run from the xa gate area, moving south toward taxiway K at a high rate of speed. Neither I nor the first officer were sure of the plow operator's intentions, so I began to slow the aircraft so as to avoid a potential problem. However, within just a few seconds, we both realized the plow operator did not see us and was continuing its approach to taxiway K, still proceeding at a high rate of speed as though the intention was to go through the taxiway and push the snow to the south side of the taxiway area. At that point, I applied maximum braking and turned the aircraft approximately 25 degrees to the right to avoid a collision and slid to a stop within just a few ft of the south edge of the taxiway. Operator also applied maximum braking and slid to a stop approximately 15 ft from the left side of the forward aircraft fuselage, abeam the L-1 door and just outboard of the #1 engine inlet. Once we realized that both the aircraft and the plow had stopped and no collision had taken place, we contacted ground control and informed them of the near collision. After clearing the area and making sure we had enough room to turn the aircraft to the left and back toward the center of taxiway K, we asked for clearance to continue our taxi up to the holding point short of runway 24R. The plow operator backed the plow up and returned to the gate area. After our return to anchorage, later in the day, I contacted the plow operator's supervisor mr X and discussed with him the events that had taken place earlier that morning. He explained that this plow operator is not one of his regular, full-time employees, but is rather a part-time worker who is periodically called in during peak workload times. In addition to the events just described and while taxiing out for departure as flight abcd, we were proceeding north on taxiway right for a departure off runway 14 when another incident occurred. Just no F taxiway M, 2 road graders were on the taxiway and began turning sbound to get back to a road that travels in a southeasterly direction from the taxiway. Though they were still approximately 150-200 yards ahead of us, ground control had not notified us that the graders were cleared to be on the taxiway, and I'm not at all sure they did have a clearance to proceed onto the taxiway. We did have to slow the aircraft somewhat in order to give them time to clear. I would not categorize this as a 'near miss,' but the fact remains, they were somewhere they probably should not have been. I once again contacted ground control and informed them that this was the second time today that we had an uncomfortable experience with snow removal equipment. Their reply (once again) was that they would contact the state operator and inform them of the problem. Snow removal at a major airport is a very difficult job and requires a tremendous amount of coordination between the workers and ground and/or tower control, but it seems that in this case those communications had broken down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 IS ALMOST HIT BY A BOX PLOW DURING ITS TXWY INCURSION WHILE REMOVING SNOW AT A HIGH SPD FROM THE RAMP AREA AT ANC, AK.

Narrative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

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.