Narrative:

Summary: aircraft dispatched with a flight crew placard of MEL item when flight crew placard was not permitted. It was the first flight of the day. Crew reported to an unpwred aircraft. Preflight inspection of the aircraft logbook showed 5 outstanding maintenance carry over MEL items: 1) right air conditioning pack inoperative. 2) left main fuel tank quantity inoperative. 3) master caution for engine cowl anti-ice over pressure/over temperature warning light inoperative. 4) right generator CSD oil temperature in/rise gauge inoperative. 5) right engine electric control of start valve inoperative. The 5TH item was the most significant, since it required the right engine to be started manually by a mechanic at the engine. The previous flight the night before was canceled due to the start valve failure to open electrically or manually. The valve was replaced, but only functioned by manual operation by a mechanic at the engine. The remainder of preflight operations was normal. The captain requested and received additional fuel from the dispatcher to enable longer ground operation time in hln due to the extensive deicing requirements caused by heavy snow conditions at the field. The captain reviewed the MEL start procedure with the contract service mechanic., with boarding complete, the aircraft was dispatched. The right engine was manually started. The after start checklist and deice confign checklist were completed, and the aircraft then began initial deicing procedure on the right side of the aircraft. The left engine was started normally, followed by the delayed start checklist. The left generator would not power its bus and the left constant speed drive low pressure light was illuminated. There was no copper shear wire on either of the constant speed drive disconnect switch guards. The crew suspected that the constant speed drive disconnect switch had been inadvertently activated the previous night. Referring to the maintenance manual, dispatcher approval was required for MEL xxxxx left generator inoperative. No direct radio communications with the dispatcher was available at helena, so the captain called the dispatcher on his cell phone. The ZZZ B737 maintenance coordinator joined the call and the situation was reviewed. The flight was rereleased and the logbook entries were made for a flight crew placard along with the maintenance control number. Deicing was completed and the aircraft departed for slc. En route to slc, the captain referred to the maintenance manual to review any restrs due to the ZZZ1 MEL items. It was then that the captain determined that MEL xxxxx 'could not be flight crew placarded.' upon arrival at slc, the captain notified the dispatcher, slc maintenance and the ZZZ2 chief pilot of the error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW DEPARTED A CONTRACT MAINT STATION WITH A FLC DEFERRED ITEM WHICH WAS NOT PERMITTED TO BE DEFERRED BY THE FLC.

Narrative: SUMMARY: ACFT DISPATCHED WITH A FLC PLACARD OF MEL ITEM WHEN FLC PLACARD WAS NOT PERMITTED. IT WAS THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY. CREW RPTED TO AN UNPWRED ACFT. PREFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT LOGBOOK SHOWED 5 OUTSTANDING MAINT CARRY OVER MEL ITEMS: 1) R AIR CONDITIONING PACK INOP. 2) L MAIN FUEL TANK QUANTITY INOP. 3) MASTER CAUTION FOR ENG COWL ANTI-ICE OVER PRESSURE/OVER TEMP WARNING LIGHT INOP. 4) R GENERATOR CSD OIL TEMP IN/RISE GAUGE INOP. 5) R ENG ELECTRIC CTL OF START VALVE INOP. THE 5TH ITEM WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT, SINCE IT REQUIRED THE R ENG TO BE STARTED MANUALLY BY A MECH AT THE ENG. THE PREVIOUS FLT THE NIGHT BEFORE WAS CANCELED DUE TO THE START VALVE FAILURE TO OPEN ELECTRICALLY OR MANUALLY. THE VALVE WAS REPLACED, BUT ONLY FUNCTIONED BY MANUAL OP BY A MECH AT THE ENG. THE REMAINDER OF PREFLT OPS WAS NORMAL. THE CAPT REQUESTED AND RECEIVED ADDITIONAL FUEL FROM THE DISPATCHER TO ENABLE LONGER GND OP TIME IN HLN DUE TO THE EXTENSIVE DEICING REQUIREMENTS CAUSED BY HVY SNOW CONDITIONS AT THE FIELD. THE CAPT REVIEWED THE MEL START PROC WITH THE CONTRACT SVC MECH., WITH BOARDING COMPLETE, THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED. THE R ENG WAS MANUALLY STARTED. THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND DEICE CONFIGN CHKLIST WERE COMPLETED, AND THE ACFT THEN BEGAN INITIAL DEICING PROC ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. THE L ENG WAS STARTED NORMALLY, FOLLOWED BY THE DELAYED START CHKLIST. THE L GENERATOR WOULD NOT PWR ITS BUS AND THE L CONSTANT SPD DRIVE LOW PRESSURE LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED. THERE WAS NO COPPER SHEAR WIRE ON EITHER OF THE CONSTANT SPD DRIVE DISCONNECT SWITCH GUARDS. THE CREW SUSPECTED THAT THE CONSTANT SPD DRIVE DISCONNECT SWITCH HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY ACTIVATED THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. REFERRING TO THE MAINT MANUAL, DISPATCHER APPROVAL WAS REQUIRED FOR MEL XXXXX L GENERATOR INOP. NO DIRECT RADIO COMS WITH THE DISPATCHER WAS AVAILABLE AT HELENA, SO THE CAPT CALLED THE DISPATCHER ON HIS CELL PHONE. THE ZZZ B737 MAINT COORDINATOR JOINED THE CALL AND THE SIT WAS REVIEWED. THE FLT WAS RERELEASED AND THE LOGBOOK ENTRIES WERE MADE FOR A FLC PLACARD ALONG WITH THE MAINT CTL NUMBER. DEICING WAS COMPLETED AND THE ACFT DEPARTED FOR SLC. ENRTE TO SLC, THE CAPT REFERRED TO THE MAINT MANUAL TO REVIEW ANY RESTRS DUE TO THE ZZZ1 MEL ITEMS. IT WAS THEN THAT THE CAPT DETERMINED THAT MEL XXXXX 'COULD NOT BE FLC PLACARDED.' UPON ARR AT SLC, THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE DISPATCHER, SLC MAINT AND THE ZZZ2 CHIEF PLT OF THE ERROR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.