Narrative:

We were departing teb via the teb 5 SID. The captain (PF) had instructed me to conduct the exterior preflight inspection while he did the interior and set up the cockpit for the flight. For our departure runway, the teb 5 SID calls for a climb on runway heading until 1500 ft, then a right turn to a heading of 280 degrees upon reaching 4.5 DME from teb, a climb to 2000 ft. The captain briefed the departure properly but elected to set the altitude alerter to 2000 ft, the final altitude on the SID rather than the initial altitude of 1500 ft. When I fly this departure, I always elect to set the initial SID altitude, as do most other pilots with whom I have flown, but it seems to be an item of personal preference. Immediately after departure, I executed the captain's commands for gear up and flaps up. As per our company SOP, I accomplished the after takeoff flow. As I was doing so, the captain called for wing anti-ice (we departed in a rain/snow mix) and the tower told us to contact departure control. Concurrent with the tower's instruction to contact departure, the captain called for heading select on the flight guidance panel and a heading of 280 degrees. I engaged the heading mode on the flight guidance panel and as I was setting 280 degrees in the heading select window, we received a TCASII TA. The captain instructed me to attempt to acquire the aircraft visually. As I was looking for the traffic, I keyed the microphone and checked in with departure control. Departure immediately pointed out to us that we should have been at 1500 ft since we had not crossed the 4.5 DME fix from teb. I then returned my attention to inside the cockpit and verified for myself that we had not crossed the 4.5 DME fix. I acknowledged departure's instructions to descend to 1500 ft and apologized for our error. I believe this error could have been avoided if the captain had set the altitude preselect to the appropriate initial SID altitude. While I regret not being able to alert the captain prior to his failure to maintain the proper altitude on the SID, my workload was heavy and following his instructions kept my attention diverted from the flight instruments. I was not aware that we had not passed the 4.5 DME fix when the captain continued the climb beyond 1500 ft. With our initial rate of climb, we would have climbed from 1500 ft to 2000 ft within 10 seconds. Supplemental information from 539419: at 1000 ft MSL, TA off left front could not read vertical distance because of TCASII clutter. Made right turn climbing 1500 ft MSL, heading select 280 degrees autoplt engaged. I continued to monitor TCASII. PNF selected 2000 ft on flight guidance computer. After leveloff, ATC confirmed our altitude then instructed us to descend back down to 1500 ft, which I did immediately.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT AND AN ALTDEV DURING A TEB 5 SID DURING A TCASII TA ALERT BY A GIV FLC OUT OF TEB, NJ.

Narrative: WE WERE DEPARTING TEB VIA THE TEB 5 SID. THE CAPT (PF) HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO CONDUCT THE EXTERIOR PREFLT INSPECTION WHILE HE DID THE INTERIOR AND SET UP THE COCKPIT FOR THE FLT. FOR OUR DEP RWY, THE TEB 5 SID CALLS FOR A CLB ON RWY HDG UNTIL 1500 FT, THEN A R TURN TO A HDG OF 280 DEGS UPON REACHING 4.5 DME FROM TEB, A CLB TO 2000 FT. THE CAPT BRIEFED THE DEP PROPERLY BUT ELECTED TO SET THE ALT ALERTER TO 2000 FT, THE FINAL ALT ON THE SID RATHER THAN THE INITIAL ALT OF 1500 FT. WHEN I FLY THIS DEP, I ALWAYS ELECT TO SET THE INITIAL SID ALT, AS DO MOST OTHER PLTS WITH WHOM I HAVE FLOWN, BUT IT SEEMS TO BE AN ITEM OF PERSONAL PREFERENCE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEP, I EXECUTED THE CAPT'S COMMANDS FOR GEAR UP AND FLAPS UP. AS PER OUR COMPANY SOP, I ACCOMPLISHED THE AFTER TKOF FLOW. AS I WAS DOING SO, THE CAPT CALLED FOR WING ANTI-ICE (WE DEPARTED IN A RAIN/SNOW MIX) AND THE TWR TOLD US TO CONTACT DEP CTL. CONCURRENT WITH THE TWR'S INSTRUCTION TO CONTACT DEP, THE CAPT CALLED FOR HDG SELECT ON THE FLT GUIDANCE PANEL AND A HDG OF 280 DEGS. I ENGAGED THE HDG MODE ON THE FLT GUIDANCE PANEL AND AS I WAS SETTING 280 DEGS IN THE HDG SELECT WINDOW, WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA. THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE THE ACFT VISUALLY. AS I WAS LOOKING FOR THE TFC, I KEYED THE MIKE AND CHKED IN WITH DEP CTL. DEP IMMEDIATELY POINTED OUT TO US THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 1500 FT SINCE WE HAD NOT CROSSED THE 4.5 DME FIX FROM TEB. I THEN RETURNED MY ATTN TO INSIDE THE COCKPIT AND VERIFIED FOR MYSELF THAT WE HAD NOT CROSSED THE 4.5 DME FIX. I ACKNOWLEDGED DEP'S INSTRUCTIONS TO DSND TO 1500 FT AND APOLOGIZED FOR OUR ERROR. I BELIEVE THIS ERROR COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE CAPT HAD SET THE ALT PRESELECT TO THE APPROPRIATE INITIAL SID ALT. WHILE I REGRET NOT BEING ABLE TO ALERT THE CAPT PRIOR TO HIS FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE PROPER ALT ON THE SID, MY WORKLOAD WAS HVY AND FOLLOWING HIS INSTRUCTIONS KEPT MY ATTN DIVERTED FROM THE FLT INSTS. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT WE HAD NOT PASSED THE 4.5 DME FIX WHEN THE CAPT CONTINUED THE CLB BEYOND 1500 FT. WITH OUR INITIAL RATE OF CLB, WE WOULD HAVE CLBED FROM 1500 FT TO 2000 FT WITHIN 10 SECONDS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM 539419: AT 1000 FT MSL, TA OFF L FRONT COULD NOT READ VERT DISTANCE BECAUSE OF TCASII CLUTTER. MADE R TURN CLBING 1500 FT MSL, HDG SELECT 280 DEGS AUTOPLT ENGAGED. I CONTINUED TO MONITOR TCASII. PNF SELECTED 2000 FT ON FLT GUIDANCE COMPUTER. AFTER LEVELOFF, ATC CONFIRMED OUR ALT THEN INSTRUCTED US TO DSND BACK DOWN TO 1500 FT, WHICH I DID IMMEDIATELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.