Narrative:

The flight was progressing normally through taxi and initial departure off slc runway 17. The first officer was at the controls in the right seat. We were assigned a 280 degree heading and a climb to 10000 ft. It was a cool morning and we were light, thus had a good climb going. Through 7000 ft or 8000 ft, we got a TA. I looked at the TCASII display and saw the traffic indicated at our 10 O'clock position, level at 11000 ft. I looked out my window pausing to look at my pfd noting a climb rate of around 3000 FPM, thus giving me an explanation for the TA. I then saw the brasilia where the TCASII had indicated. We were now going through 9000 ft and I told the first officer to 'get the nose down.' I continued to keep the traffic in sight. Getting at or near 10000 ft, I pushed forward on the yoke to arrest our rate of climb, then looked back out the window to keep the traffic in sight. The TCASII then issued an RA 'monitor vertical climb!' looking back inside, I noticed we were still in a slow climb, so I told the first officer to 'get the plane back down to 'ten',' and ran the manual trim wheel forward to facilitate the descent. At this point the aircraft finally started to descend. The maximum altitude the aircraft reached was approximately 10250 ft, but at no time did we reach or go above 10300 ft. After confirming the aircraft was in a descent, I looked out the window to see the brasilia appear to pitch up slightly and bank to the left as it passed overhead. We again reached 10000 ft, and the flight continued normally. In 5 yrs of flying with company X, this is only the second person I've had to 'push forward on the yoke,' to induce leveloff, and the only time an first officer 'froze up' and wouldn't fly the aircraft. I will need to be more assertive in the future if I see this situation recurring. Having that aircraft so close and wanting to make sure something more serious wasn't about to happen kept me looking out the window and trying to monitor all that was going on. I will be more aggressive in prevention of this sort of situation in the future. Supplemental information from acn 540256: unfortunately, in striving to stay below 250 KTS while executing a smooth leveloff, I did not apply aggressive enough forward pressure on the yoke or reduce the power enough to arrest our rate of climb before we had exceeded our assigned altitude. This problem was caused by my failure to correctly take into account the high rate of climb we had and apply aggressive enough control forces and power adjustments to avoid exceeding our assigned altitude. Further training in procedures to follow in the citation excel when you have short climbs or dscnts combined with speed limits would be helpful. In particular, the citation excel has significantly better climb capability than the jets I have flown previously and I have been slower than I expected in developing the procedural habits for dealing well with this situation. In addition, I was somewhat distraction by looking for the traffic. I need to learn to rely more on the other pilot for this when I am flying the plane, ie, better CRM would also help.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C560 CITATION FO OVERSHOT INTERMEDIATE CLB ALT DURING CLBOUT RESULTING IN THE CAPT TAKING CTL TO HELP LEVEL OFF AND RETURN TO ASSIGNED ALT, AND AN EMB120 TAKING EVASIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA. DEP CTLR HAD ISSUED TA TO THE CITATION.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS PROGRESSING NORMALLY THROUGH TAXI AND INITIAL DEP OFF SLC RWY 17. THE FO WAS AT THE CTLS IN THE R SEAT. WE WERE ASSIGNED A 280 DEG HDG AND A CLB TO 10000 FT. IT WAS A COOL MORNING AND WE WERE LIGHT, THUS HAD A GOOD CLB GOING. THROUGH 7000 FT OR 8000 FT, WE GOT A TA. I LOOKED AT THE TCASII DISPLAY AND SAW THE TFC INDICATED AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, LEVEL AT 11000 FT. I LOOKED OUT MY WINDOW PAUSING TO LOOK AT MY PFD NOTING A CLB RATE OF AROUND 3000 FPM, THUS GIVING ME AN EXPLANATION FOR THE TA. I THEN SAW THE BRASILIA WHERE THE TCASII HAD INDICATED. WE WERE NOW GOING THROUGH 9000 FT AND I TOLD THE FO TO 'GET THE NOSE DOWN.' I CONTINUED TO KEEP THE TFC IN SIGHT. GETTING AT OR NEAR 10000 FT, I PUSHED FORWARD ON THE YOKE TO ARREST OUR RATE OF CLB, THEN LOOKED BACK OUT THE WINDOW TO KEEP THE TFC IN SIGHT. THE TCASII THEN ISSUED AN RA 'MONITOR VERT CLB!' LOOKING BACK INSIDE, I NOTICED WE WERE STILL IN A SLOW CLB, SO I TOLD THE FO TO 'GET THE PLANE BACK DOWN TO 'TEN',' AND RAN THE MANUAL TRIM WHEEL FORWARD TO FACILITATE THE DSCNT. AT THIS POINT THE ACFT FINALLY STARTED TO DSND. THE MAX ALT THE ACFT REACHED WAS APPROX 10250 FT, BUT AT NO TIME DID WE REACH OR GO ABOVE 10300 FT. AFTER CONFIRMING THE ACFT WAS IN A DSCNT, I LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW TO SEE THE BRASILIA APPEAR TO PITCH UP SLIGHTLY AND BANK TO THE L AS IT PASSED OVERHEAD. WE AGAIN REACHED 10000 FT, AND THE FLT CONTINUED NORMALLY. IN 5 YRS OF FLYING WITH COMPANY X, THIS IS ONLY THE SECOND PERSON I'VE HAD TO 'PUSH FORWARD ON THE YOKE,' TO INDUCE LEVELOFF, AND THE ONLY TIME AN FO 'FROZE UP' AND WOULDN'T FLY THE ACFT. I WILL NEED TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE IN THE FUTURE IF I SEE THIS SIT RECURRING. HAVING THAT ACFT SO CLOSE AND WANTING TO MAKE SURE SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS WASN'T ABOUT TO HAPPEN KEPT ME LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW AND TRYING TO MONITOR ALL THAT WAS GOING ON. I WILL BE MORE AGGRESSIVE IN PREVENTION OF THIS SORT OF SIT IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 540256: UNFORTUNATELY, IN STRIVING TO STAY BELOW 250 KTS WHILE EXECUTING A SMOOTH LEVELOFF, I DID NOT APPLY AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE OR REDUCE THE PWR ENOUGH TO ARREST OUR RATE OF CLB BEFORE WE HAD EXCEEDED OUR ASSIGNED ALT. THIS PROB WAS CAUSED BY MY FAILURE TO CORRECTLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE HIGH RATE OF CLB WE HAD AND APPLY AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH CTL FORCES AND PWR ADJUSTMENTS TO AVOID EXCEEDING OUR ASSIGNED ALT. FURTHER TRAINING IN PROCS TO FOLLOW IN THE CITATION EXCEL WHEN YOU HAVE SHORT CLBS OR DSCNTS COMBINED WITH SPD LIMITS WOULD BE HELPFUL. IN PARTICULAR, THE CITATION EXCEL HAS SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER CLB CAPABILITY THAN THE JETS I HAVE FLOWN PREVIOUSLY AND I HAVE BEEN SLOWER THAN I EXPECTED IN DEVELOPING THE PROCEDURAL HABITS FOR DEALING WELL WITH THIS SIT. IN ADDITION, I WAS SOMEWHAT DISTR BY LOOKING FOR THE TFC. I NEED TO LEARN TO RELY MORE ON THE OTHER PLT FOR THIS WHEN I AM FLYING THE PLANE, IE, BETTER CRM WOULD ALSO HELP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.