Narrative:

This report is being submitted because of a mode 2 GPWS warning received on the VOR DME B approach into hayden, co. The captain was the PF. At approximately 45 mins prior to landing, the captain gave a thorough brief of his plan for the arrival and approach into hdn. The WX on the flight plan called for calm winds (0000), scattered clouds, 7 SM visibility. He briefed the missed approach and extensively covered the high terrain in the surrounding area along with the pictorial. Even though the approach plate had been deleted, both pilots kept them in their approach plates for the pictorial presentation of the runways. Just prior to descent, the first officer received updated WX from denver FSS with winds 280 degrees at 19 KTS, visibility 1 3/4 mi, altimeter 29.77 in hg. At this time, ZDV was giving clearance for the ILS DME 10 to a bac jet. The first officer monitored the unicom frequency and asked for a PIREP when workload permitted. With the strong winds out of the west, our plan was to circle to runway 28 out of the ILS. In the meantime, our flight was given extended vectors while waiting for the bac jet to land. After landing, the bac jet reported fair visibility of about 3 SM. Since a circling approach must be at higher minimums, the first officer recommended the VOR DME B, since the winds were 19 KTS down runway 28. The captain agreed and the first officer reset the captain's navaids while he flew the vector to intercept the 076 degree radial. Since there was not an approach in the box, the first officer had time to build one using the navigation data page. Fixes were built using the place-bearing-distance technique. Radar contact was terminated by ZDV at 12000 ft MSL and clearance for the approach was given. The captain descended to 10000 ft MSL while turning from the 17 DME arc to the 285 degree course and tracked the course in VOR/localizer. He then configured to gear down. Just prior to 10.4 DME 'while straight and level at 9000 ft MSL' we received a mode 2 GPWS aural warning. The captain pushed in power to the stops. The pitch was then increased to just below the stall warning symbol followed by a momentary overshoot. The aural warnings stopped and the aircraft was climbed to over 11000 ft MSL. Toga was not engaged. The flight directors would have been beneficial in this instance. We broke out of the WX and had good visibility to the west of the airport. ZDV was contacted and we asked for the ILS DME 10. The ILS DME 10 was flown. Inbound, the field was in sight by 10 NM. The intent was to circle to runway 28, but the winds were now reported on unicom as 260 degrees at 8 KTS. The apt elected to land on runway 10. A thorough debrief was conducted by the captain with the following conclusions: 1) it would have been beneficial to take a look at the VOR DME B approach at altitude even though that was not our primary plan. It would have prevented us from overlooking the 8200 ft mountain just north of course. By looking at how close together the terrain contours are on the 8200 ft hill, we might have predicted some sort of GPWS activation. We got the warning even though we were straight and level, on altitude, and on course. 2) building the VOR DME B in the box helped our positional awareness. 3)some of our flight parameters were a touch out of tolerance on the ILS DME 10. This was a result of being rushed in resetting the approach in the box to the ILS DME 10. We maybe should have held once at the VOR, got better organized for a more disciplined approach. Hindsight is 20/20.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-500 CREW RECEIVED A GPWS 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN' WARNING WHILE FLYING THE VOR DME B APCH TO HDN.

Narrative: THIS RPT IS BEING SUBMITTED BECAUSE OF A MODE 2 GPWS WARNING RECEIVED ON THE VOR DME B APCH INTO HAYDEN, CO. THE CAPT WAS THE PF. AT APPROX 45 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG, THE CAPT GAVE A THOROUGH BRIEF OF HIS PLAN FOR THE ARR AND APCH INTO HDN. THE WX ON THE FLT PLAN CALLED FOR CALM WINDS (0000), SCATTERED CLOUDS, 7 SM VISIBILITY. HE BRIEFED THE MISSED APCH AND EXTENSIVELY COVERED THE HIGH TERRAIN IN THE SURROUNDING AREA ALONG WITH THE PICTORIAL. EVEN THOUGH THE APCH PLATE HAD BEEN DELETED, BOTH PLTS KEPT THEM IN THEIR APCH PLATES FOR THE PICTORIAL PRESENTATION OF THE RWYS. JUST PRIOR TO DSCNT, THE FO RECEIVED UPDATED WX FROM DENVER FSS WITH WINDS 280 DEGS AT 19 KTS, VISIBILITY 1 3/4 MI, ALTIMETER 29.77 IN HG. AT THIS TIME, ZDV WAS GIVING CLRNC FOR THE ILS DME 10 TO A BAC JET. THE FO MONITORED THE UNICOM FREQ AND ASKED FOR A PIREP WHEN WORKLOAD PERMITTED. WITH THE STRONG WINDS OUT OF THE W, OUR PLAN WAS TO CIRCLE TO RWY 28 OUT OF THE ILS. IN THE MEANTIME, OUR FLT WAS GIVEN EXTENDED VECTORS WHILE WAITING FOR THE BAC JET TO LAND. AFTER LNDG, THE BAC JET RPTED FAIR VISIBILITY OF ABOUT 3 SM. SINCE A CIRCLING APCH MUST BE AT HIGHER MINIMUMS, THE FO RECOMMENDED THE VOR DME B, SINCE THE WINDS WERE 19 KTS DOWN RWY 28. THE CAPT AGREED AND THE FO RESET THE CAPT'S NAVAIDS WHILE HE FLEW THE VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE 076 DEG RADIAL. SINCE THERE WAS NOT AN APCH IN THE BOX, THE FO HAD TIME TO BUILD ONE USING THE NAV DATA PAGE. FIXES WERE BUILT USING THE PLACE-BEARING-DISTANCE TECHNIQUE. RADAR CONTACT WAS TERMINATED BY ZDV AT 12000 FT MSL AND CLRNC FOR THE APCH WAS GIVEN. THE CAPT DSNDED TO 10000 FT MSL WHILE TURNING FROM THE 17 DME ARC TO THE 285 DEG COURSE AND TRACKED THE COURSE IN VOR/LOC. HE THEN CONFIGURED TO GEAR DOWN. JUST PRIOR TO 10.4 DME 'WHILE STRAIGHT AND LEVEL AT 9000 FT MSL' WE RECEIVED A MODE 2 GPWS AURAL WARNING. THE CAPT PUSHED IN PWR TO THE STOPS. THE PITCH WAS THEN INCREASED TO JUST BELOW THE STALL WARNING SYMBOL FOLLOWED BY A MOMENTARY OVERSHOOT. THE AURAL WARNINGS STOPPED AND THE ACFT WAS CLBED TO OVER 11000 FT MSL. TOGA WAS NOT ENGAGED. THE FLT DIRECTORS WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL IN THIS INSTANCE. WE BROKE OUT OF THE WX AND HAD GOOD VISIBILITY TO THE W OF THE ARPT. ZDV WAS CONTACTED AND WE ASKED FOR THE ILS DME 10. THE ILS DME 10 WAS FLOWN. INBOUND, THE FIELD WAS IN SIGHT BY 10 NM. THE INTENT WAS TO CIRCLE TO RWY 28, BUT THE WINDS WERE NOW RPTED ON UNICOM AS 260 DEGS AT 8 KTS. THE APT ELECTED TO LAND ON RWY 10. A THOROUGH DEBRIEF WAS CONDUCTED BY THE CAPT WITH THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: 1) IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE VOR DME B APCH AT ALT EVEN THOUGH THAT WAS NOT OUR PRIMARY PLAN. IT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED US FROM OVERLOOKING THE 8200 FT MOUNTAIN JUST N OF COURSE. BY LOOKING AT HOW CLOSE TOGETHER THE TERRAIN CONTOURS ARE ON THE 8200 FT HILL, WE MIGHT HAVE PREDICTED SOME SORT OF GPWS ACTIVATION. WE GOT THE WARNING EVEN THOUGH WE WERE STRAIGHT AND LEVEL, ON ALT, AND ON COURSE. 2) BUILDING THE VOR DME B IN THE BOX HELPED OUR POSITIONAL AWARENESS. 3)SOME OF OUR FLT PARAMETERS WERE A TOUCH OUT OF TOLERANCE ON THE ILS DME 10. THIS WAS A RESULT OF BEING RUSHED IN RESETTING THE APCH IN THE BOX TO THE ILS DME 10. WE MAYBE SHOULD HAVE HELD ONCE AT THE VOR, GOT BETTER ORGANIZED FOR A MORE DISCIPLINED APCH. HINDSIGHT IS 20/20.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.