Narrative:

When calling in-range to msy we were told we would keep the aircraft we were bringing in abc and needed to put 3200 pounds of fuel on it for the outbound flight to lit. We landed in msy, deplaned the passenger, fueled the aircraft and did a 15 min turn. Our round-trip msy-lit-msy was uneventful. We swapped planes in lit, into def and brought def back down to msy. On return to msy I was told by another pilot (who had been notified by dispatch) that we were supposed to swap planes prior to the lit turn, in msy, that we had both taken the wrong aircraft to our respective destinations. The aircraft he took from msy to shv was abd. The aircraft I took from msy-lit was abc. I was supposed to take abd and he was supposed to take abc. Since we had used the weights posted in the aircraft for weight and balance, the weight and balance and center of gravity calculations had been correct. However the takeoff data used on the release were for the incorrect aircraft. Although the difference in takeoff data between the 2 aircraft was negligible, we continued our shift without further incident. A similar situation occurred in the company a month ago. No action was taken to improve notification of unscheduled aircraft swaps. Although it is the captain's responsibility to verify their dispatched airplane, flying the same few airplanes lulls you into a false sense of security. Improved company notification and communication with the pilots would mitigate this recurring weakness. Supplemental information from acn 542903: as I was filling out performance data I just took a quick glance at the release. We were in the aircraft abc. I saw ab on the release as I scanned over it. We were supposed to swap into aircraft abd. 3 crews and ground people missed the swap.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 3 FLCS AND SEVERAL GND PERSONNEL MISSED THE SCHEDULED BE1900 ACFT SWAP AT MSY, LA.

Narrative: WHEN CALLING IN-RANGE TO MSY WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD KEEP THE ACFT WE WERE BRINGING IN ABC AND NEEDED TO PUT 3200 LBS OF FUEL ON IT FOR THE OUTBOUND FLT TO LIT. WE LANDED IN MSY, DEPLANED THE PAX, FUELED THE ACFT AND DID A 15 MIN TURN. OUR ROUND-TRIP MSY-LIT-MSY WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE SWAPPED PLANES IN LIT, INTO DEF AND BROUGHT DEF BACK DOWN TO MSY. ON RETURN TO MSY I WAS TOLD BY ANOTHER PLT (WHO HAD BEEN NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH) THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO SWAP PLANES PRIOR TO THE LIT TURN, IN MSY, THAT WE HAD BOTH TAKEN THE WRONG ACFT TO OUR RESPECTIVE DESTS. THE ACFT HE TOOK FROM MSY TO SHV WAS ABD. THE ACFT I TOOK FROM MSY-LIT WAS ABC. I WAS SUPPOSED TO TAKE ABD AND HE WAS SUPPOSED TO TAKE ABC. SINCE WE HAD USED THE WTS POSTED IN THE ACFT FOR WT AND BAL, THE WT AND BAL AND CTR OF GRAVITY CALCULATIONS HAD BEEN CORRECT. HOWEVER THE TKOF DATA USED ON THE RELEASE WERE FOR THE INCORRECT ACFT. ALTHOUGH THE DIFFERENCE IN TKOF DATA BTWN THE 2 ACFT WAS NEGLIGIBLE, WE CONTINUED OUR SHIFT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. A SIMILAR SIT OCCURRED IN THE COMPANY A MONTH AGO. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN TO IMPROVE NOTIFICATION OF UNSCHEDULED ACFT SWAPS. ALTHOUGH IT IS THE CAPT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO VERIFY THEIR DISPATCHED AIRPLANE, FLYING THE SAME FEW AIRPLANES LULLS YOU INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. IMPROVED COMPANY NOTIFICATION AND COM WITH THE PLTS WOULD MITIGATE THIS RECURRING WEAKNESS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 542903: AS I WAS FILLING OUT PERFORMANCE DATA I JUST TOOK A QUICK GLANCE AT THE RELEASE. WE WERE IN THE ACFT ABC. I SAW AB ON THE RELEASE AS I SCANNED OVER IT. WE WERE SUPPOSED TO SWAP INTO ACFT ABD. 3 CREWS AND GND PEOPLE MISSED THE SWAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.