Narrative:

We were on the lynsy 1 arrival into las at FL280. Shortly after crossing the igm VOR we were given off course vectors due to traffic flow into las. Sometime later, we were cleared direct to the lynsy fix and descend via the lynsy 1 arrival. There is both an altitude crossing and speed requirement at lynsy of 12000 ft and 250 KTS. Given our short distance from the fix at this point it was going to require a rapid rate of descent in order to meet the crossing requirements. In order to deploy more than 1/2 speed brake on our aircraft the autoplt must be disconnected. As I began the descent it was clear that I would need to use full speed brake in order to reach the required altitude/speed in time. I disconnected the autoplt and deployed full speed brake. Just about the same time as I began the descent there was a call from the flight attendants that we had a very ill pas in one of the lavatories and that we would need the paramedics to meet us on the ground in las. At this point the captain handed the #1 radio to me while he was communicating with company on the #2. Closer to the bottom of the descent, ZLA called to hand us off to las approach. Before answering the call, I re-engaged the autoplt. I then answered the call, entered the new frequency in the standby side of the radio, and returned my attention to the flying of the aircraft. I immediately saw that due to the rapid rate of descent that the autoplt was going to be unable to slow the rate of descent in order for it to level at 12000 ft. I disconnected the autoplt and manually attempted to level the aircraft at 12000 ft without either overstressing the airframe or causing major discomfort to the passenger. As a result, I went below 12000 ft by some 400-450 ft for about 10-15 seconds before regaining the correct altitude. It was only at this point that the PNF became aware of the situation. Reviewing the event, I should have told ZLA as soon as we received our descent clearance that we were unable to meet the crossing restr at lynsy. Given the need for such an aggressive descent combined with the medical situation in the rear of the aircraft taking the PNF out of the loop, I would say that we had a task overload situation. It happened so fast that neither the PNF nor myself realized it until too late. I think also that given our short time out from landing that the matter could have probably waited until we were on the ground. (A call to tower on final would still have had the medics at the gate when we arrived.) the rate of descent and/or the way of accomplishing it is not an uncommon occurrence these days. All too often, ATC will hold us high till the last possible second and then complicate the matter even more by slowing us down in the descent. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: crew was flying an airbus A320 aircraft. The aircraft restricts speed brake deployment to 1/2 speed brakes with the autoflt system engaged. In order to get full speed brakes, the autoflt system must be turned off. The reporter stated the A319 aircraft has no similar restr. It is essentially the same aircraft, just a little shorter. The first officer said the air carrier would never spend the money to allow direct access to the medical consultant without the requirement from the FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW HAD AN ALT OVERSHOOT AFTER THE CREW ACCEPTED A CLOSE IN XING RESTR. THINGS WERE COMPLICATED BY AN ACFT DESIGN DEFECT RESTR AND A SICK PAX.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE LYNSY 1 ARR INTO LAS AT FL280. SHORTLY AFTER XING THE IGM VOR WE WERE GIVEN OFF COURSE VECTORS DUE TO TFC FLOW INTO LAS. SOMETIME LATER, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO THE LYNSY FIX AND DSND VIA THE LYNSY 1 ARR. THERE IS BOTH AN ALT XING AND SPD REQUIREMENT AT LYNSY OF 12000 FT AND 250 KTS. GIVEN OUR SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE FIX AT THIS POINT IT WAS GOING TO REQUIRE A RAPID RATE OF DSCNT IN ORDER TO MEET THE XING REQUIREMENTS. IN ORDER TO DEPLOY MORE THAN 1/2 SPD BRAKE ON OUR ACFT THE AUTOPLT MUST BE DISCONNECTED. AS I BEGAN THE DSCNT IT WAS CLR THAT I WOULD NEED TO USE FULL SPD BRAKE IN ORDER TO REACH THE REQUIRED ALT/SPD IN TIME. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND DEPLOYED FULL SPD BRAKE. JUST ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS I BEGAN THE DSCNT THERE WAS A CALL FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE HAD A VERY ILL PAS IN ONE OF THE LAVATORIES AND THAT WE WOULD NEED THE PARAMEDICS TO MEET US ON THE GND IN LAS. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT HANDED THE #1 RADIO TO ME WHILE HE WAS COMMUNICATING WITH COMPANY ON THE #2. CLOSER TO THE BOTTOM OF THE DSCNT, ZLA CALLED TO HAND US OFF TO LAS APCH. BEFORE ANSWERING THE CALL, I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. I THEN ANSWERED THE CALL, ENTERED THE NEW FREQ IN THE STANDBY SIDE OF THE RADIO, AND RETURNED MY ATTN TO THE FLYING OF THE ACFT. I IMMEDIATELY SAW THAT DUE TO THE RAPID RATE OF DSCNT THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS GOING TO BE UNABLE TO SLOW THE RATE OF DSCNT IN ORDER FOR IT TO LEVEL AT 12000 FT. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND MANUALLY ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL THE ACFT AT 12000 FT WITHOUT EITHER OVERSTRESSING THE AIRFRAME OR CAUSING MAJOR DISCOMFORT TO THE PAX. AS A RESULT, I WENT BELOW 12000 FT BY SOME 400-450 FT FOR ABOUT 10-15 SECONDS BEFORE REGAINING THE CORRECT ALT. IT WAS ONLY AT THIS POINT THAT THE PNF BECAME AWARE OF THE SIT. REVIEWING THE EVENT, I SHOULD HAVE TOLD ZLA AS SOON AS WE RECEIVED OUR DSCNT CLRNC THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MEET THE XING RESTR AT LYNSY. GIVEN THE NEED FOR SUCH AN AGGRESSIVE DSCNT COMBINED WITH THE MEDICAL SIT IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT TAKING THE PNF OUT OF THE LOOP, I WOULD SAY THAT WE HAD A TASK OVERLOAD SIT. IT HAPPENED SO FAST THAT NEITHER THE PNF NOR MYSELF REALIZED IT UNTIL TOO LATE. I THINK ALSO THAT GIVEN OUR SHORT TIME OUT FROM LNDG THAT THE MATTER COULD HAVE PROBABLY WAITED UNTIL WE WERE ON THE GND. (A CALL TO TWR ON FINAL WOULD STILL HAVE HAD THE MEDICS AT THE GATE WHEN WE ARRIVED.) THE RATE OF DSCNT AND/OR THE WAY OF ACCOMPLISHING IT IS NOT AN UNCOMMON OCCURRENCE THESE DAYS. ALL TOO OFTEN, ATC WILL HOLD US HIGH TILL THE LAST POSSIBLE SECOND AND THEN COMPLICATE THE MATTER EVEN MORE BY SLOWING US DOWN IN THE DSCNT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CREW WAS FLYING AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT. THE ACFT RESTRICTS SPD BRAKE DEPLOYMENT TO 1/2 SPD BRAKES WITH THE AUTOFLT SYS ENGAGED. IN ORDER TO GET FULL SPD BRAKES, THE AUTOFLT SYS MUST BE TURNED OFF. THE RPTR STATED THE A319 ACFT HAS NO SIMILAR RESTR. IT IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ACFT, JUST A LITTLE SHORTER. THE FO SAID THE ACR WOULD NEVER SPEND THE MONEY TO ALLOW DIRECT ACCESS TO THE MEDICAL CONSULTANT WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT FROM THE FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.