Narrative:

I submit to you a detailed description of the event of apr/mon/02 aboard hs-125 800XP between bil and apa, roughly 75 mi south of billings, mt, and our company policy regarding flight deck management of altitude assignments. I was the sic (PNF) and mr X was the PIC (PF). In the course of a sbound hand flown climb to our first assigned altitude after takeoff to FL370 out of billings, ARTCC revised the climb clearance to maintain FL240 for traffic, which I acknowledged with a readback to the controller, putting aside passenger-requested cabin temperature adjustment activity. The controller further elaborated that the nature of the traffic was a flight of 2 military aircraft crossing from east to west. My attention was diverted from resetting the altitude alert/preselect by the urgency of 1) visually searching for and locating the multiple traffic, which I did (I believe I radioed 'traffic in sight'). I then pointed out the traffic to the PF and the passenger behind me, and proceeded to visually interpretation the 2-ACFT TCASII alert (no RA) that followed on the mfd, comparing the position/movement of the targets against the actual aircraft, which I observed at our 2 O'clock position moving northwest. The PF took no horizontal or vertical evasive action other than to immediately level off when the controller called again to ask for our altitude and it became evident that the latest clearance had been exceeded. For reasons not shared with me, the PF heard neither ARTCC's transmission nor my readback (and possibly the traffic call itself). Also, he was not cued by the altitude alerter/preselect, due to my failure to perform that task. The cpr aircraft operations manual states in standard operating performance, 'all assigned altitudes will be set in the altitude alerter/preselect.' I was hired by mr. X, my employer's chief pilot, as a hawker 800XP captain on 02/fri/02. Although already current in type, my employer provided recurrent training for me in mid february, while mr X underwent initial training in the HS125. I also audited ground school with him, but did not train with him in the simulator. From my perspective, there were 2 factors affecting crew quality of human performance. Prior crew interface: my employer took final acceptance of aircraft from the factory on 03/thu/02. From then up to and including the above event, mr X had accumulated a total of 9 segments in an hs-125 outside the simulator, he and I had flown a total of 4 segments as a crew, and of those 4, this was the second segment in which he assumed PIC responsibility. Technology: this aircraft is the second hawker 800XP delivered with the new collins proline 21 display/FMS. In the span of less than 10 days and 9 segments (and some classroom tutelage at the factory), mr X has had to unlearn the honeywell FMS he trained with initially in the simulator, and absorb the proline 21 suite ab initio. His instrument scan is adjusting to its new environment, as are his reaction times to being in a jet aircraft once again. Scope of situational awareness is inversely proportional to the degree of concentration being devoted to making these adjustments. With respect to judgements and decisions made leading up to this event, I believe this event would have been averted, or at least the probability of it occurring minimized, if I had trained with mr X during his initial training in the simulator, building as much time and cockpit experience together prior to delivery as possible as the permanent crew we would ultimately be.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC OF AN HS125-800XP PERFORMS AN ALT OVERSHOOT WHICH IS NOT NOTED BY THE FO BUT BY THE ZMP CTLR AFTER THE PIC HAD MISSED THE AMENDED CLRNC ALT CHANGE 75 MI S OF BIL, MT.

Narrative: I SUBMIT TO YOU A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT OF APR/MON/02 ABOARD HS-125 800XP BTWN BIL AND APA, ROUGHLY 75 MI S OF BILLINGS, MT, AND OUR COMPANY POLICY REGARDING FLT DECK MGMNT OF ALT ASSIGNMENTS. I WAS THE SIC (PNF) AND MR X WAS THE PIC (PF). IN THE COURSE OF A SBOUND HAND FLOWN CLB TO OUR FIRST ASSIGNED ALT AFTER TKOF TO FL370 OUT OF BILLINGS, ARTCC REVISED THE CLB CLRNC TO MAINTAIN FL240 FOR TFC, WHICH I ACKNOWLEDGED WITH A READBACK TO THE CTLR, PUTTING ASIDE PAX-REQUESTED CABIN TEMP ADJUSTMENT ACTIVITY. THE CTLR FURTHER ELABORATED THAT THE NATURE OF THE TFC WAS A FLT OF 2 MIL ACFT XING FROM E TO W. MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED FROM RESETTING THE ALT ALERT/PRESELECT BY THE URGENCY OF 1) VISUALLY SEARCHING FOR AND LOCATING THE MULTIPLE TFC, WHICH I DID (I BELIEVE I RADIOED 'TFC IN SIGHT'). I THEN POINTED OUT THE TFC TO THE PF AND THE PAX BEHIND ME, AND PROCEEDED TO VISUALLY INTERP THE 2-ACFT TCASII ALERT (NO RA) THAT FOLLOWED ON THE MFD, COMPARING THE POS/MOVEMENT OF THE TARGETS AGAINST THE ACTUAL ACFT, WHICH I OBSERVED AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS MOVING NW. THE PF TOOK NO HORIZ OR VERT EVASIVE ACTION OTHER THAN TO IMMEDIATELY LEVEL OFF WHEN THE CTLR CALLED AGAIN TO ASK FOR OUR ALT AND IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE LATEST CLRNC HAD BEEN EXCEEDED. FOR REASONS NOT SHARED WITH ME, THE PF HEARD NEITHER ARTCC'S XMISSION NOR MY READBACK (AND POSSIBLY THE TFC CALL ITSELF). ALSO, HE WAS NOT CUED BY THE ALT ALERTER/PRESELECT, DUE TO MY FAILURE TO PERFORM THAT TASK. THE CPR ACFT OPS MANUAL STATES IN STANDARD OPERATING PERFORMANCE, 'ALL ASSIGNED ALTS WILL BE SET IN THE ALT ALERTER/PRESELECT.' I WAS HIRED BY MR. X, MY EMPLOYER'S CHIEF PLT, AS A HAWKER 800XP CAPT ON 02/FRI/02. ALTHOUGH ALREADY CURRENT IN TYPE, MY EMPLOYER PROVIDED RECURRENT TRAINING FOR ME IN MID FEBRUARY, WHILE MR X UNDERWENT INITIAL TRAINING IN THE HS125. I ALSO AUDITED GND SCHOOL WITH HIM, BUT DID NOT TRAIN WITH HIM IN THE SIMULATOR. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, THERE WERE 2 FACTORS AFFECTING CREW QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE. PRIOR CREW INTERFACE: MY EMPLOYER TOOK FINAL ACCEPTANCE OF ACFT FROM THE FACTORY ON 03/THU/02. FROM THEN UP TO AND INCLUDING THE ABOVE EVENT, MR X HAD ACCUMULATED A TOTAL OF 9 SEGMENTS IN AN HS-125 OUTSIDE THE SIMULATOR, HE AND I HAD FLOWN A TOTAL OF 4 SEGMENTS AS A CREW, AND OF THOSE 4, THIS WAS THE SECOND SEGMENT IN WHICH HE ASSUMED PIC RESPONSIBILITY. TECHNOLOGY: THIS ACFT IS THE SECOND HAWKER 800XP DELIVERED WITH THE NEW COLLINS PROLINE 21 DISPLAY/FMS. IN THE SPAN OF LESS THAN 10 DAYS AND 9 SEGMENTS (AND SOME CLASSROOM TUTELAGE AT THE FACTORY), MR X HAS HAD TO UNLEARN THE HONEYWELL FMS HE TRAINED WITH INITIALLY IN THE SIMULATOR, AND ABSORB THE PROLINE 21 SUITE AB INITIO. HIS INST SCAN IS ADJUSTING TO ITS NEW ENVIRONMENT, AS ARE HIS REACTION TIMES TO BEING IN A JET ACFT ONCE AGAIN. SCOPE OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO THE DEG OF CONCENTRATION BEING DEVOTED TO MAKING THESE ADJUSTMENTS. WITH RESPECT TO JUDGEMENTS AND DECISIONS MADE LEADING UP TO THIS EVENT, I BELIEVE THIS EVENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED, OR AT LEAST THE PROBABILITY OF IT OCCURRING MINIMIZED, IF I HAD TRAINED WITH MR X DURING HIS INITIAL TRAINING IN THE SIMULATOR, BUILDING AS MUCH TIME AND COCKPIT EXPERIENCE TOGETHER PRIOR TO DELIVERY AS POSSIBLE AS THE PERMANENT CREW WE WOULD ULTIMATELY BE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.