Narrative:

I was captain on flight to las. It was my leg to fly. I had initially set up the FMC to fly the lynsy RNAV 1 arrival to runway 25L in las. When the first officer left the ATC frequency to get the ATIS, I contacted ZLA and was given several headings and speed reductions for traffic into las. When the first officer returned, he said '19L.' he showed me the card which showed runway 19L in the approach section, and '19L' in the runway section. He made some comment about the winds, which were written on the card as '180 degrees at 15 KTS gusting to 23 KTS.' I was mildly surprised but considered the winds and reset the FMC to reflect the lynsy arrival to runway 19L. We both reviewed the restrs and constraints that applied to this procedure to this runway and verified that they were correctly installed in the box. We were finally cleared directly to lynsy and further cleared to descend via the lynsy 1 arrival. I do not recall any runway being mentioned by ZLA. We were further slowed and just prior to reaching lynsy, we were again told to descend via the lynsy arrival. I was concentrating on making sure all the constraints were met as we passed lynsy and then mirok we commented on how we seldom got to fly beyond the first fix before we got a vector. Again, concentrating on making all the proper constraints, I could hear center talking on the radio, but no call was made to our flight. As we descended through 10000 ft approaching zedul, I suddenly became aware that I was only hearing the aircraft half of the radio xmissions. I told the first officer to call approach on 135.0 as I knew this was the approach frequency for las. He did and we were told to stop our descent (we were at about 6400 ft at this time) and to turn to a heading of 090 degrees. We continued to get vectors for our landing on runway 25L. As instructed, I called the TRACON when I got to operations. The supervisor in TRACON listened to what I had to say about what had happened and took my information down and said he would contact me after he had a chance to listen to all the tapes involved. I thanked him and went about getting ready for my next flight. Just before we were ready to push back, I was given a note to call the supervisor. I went to the gate and called him again. He said that he had listened to all the tapes from approach and ZLA and he said he was very disappointed that no one had done anything to intervene in this situation prior to us calling approach control. He reminded me that in this time of increased security, it was doubly important not to be out of contact with ATC, especially as we approach large cities since arriving with F16 escorts was not a good thing, I asked him what I needed to do now and he said that apart from telling my first officer to be more vigilant about things on the ATIS and required frequency monitoring, just to be more careful in the future. He said no paperwork about the incident would be forthcoming from his office. Contributing factors as I see it: I should have been more alert to the lack of a handoff from center to approach. Getting preoccupied with the constraints on the RNAV arrival was imprudent. My first officer's personal life was disrupting his thought processes during the entire pairing. Things were not going well for him and he seemed more involved with this than our flying most of the time, to the point that he had missed a lot of calls and instructions on this and the previous 4 legs. He made the statement on the first day, 'if it weren't for having to fly, I could work harder at my real job.' he is also in the middle of attempting to reconcile with his wife after a long separation. He seems to be generally quite competent and has a good personality and attitude, but he was very distraction by things other than flying -- at least on this trip.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG ARR PROC FLOWN BY AN A320 FLC WHEN THE FO COPIES THE WRONG RWY AND FLT DOES NOT GET A HDOF FREQ CHANGE TO TRACON AT LAS, NV.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT ON FLT TO LAS. IT WAS MY LEG TO FLY. I HAD INITIALLY SET UP THE FMC TO FLY THE LYNSY RNAV 1 ARR TO RWY 25L IN LAS. WHEN THE FO LEFT THE ATC FREQ TO GET THE ATIS, I CONTACTED ZLA AND WAS GIVEN SEVERAL HDGS AND SPD REDUCTIONS FOR TFC INTO LAS. WHEN THE FO RETURNED, HE SAID '19L.' HE SHOWED ME THE CARD WHICH SHOWED RWY 19L IN THE APCH SECTION, AND '19L' IN THE RWY SECTION. HE MADE SOME COMMENT ABOUT THE WINDS, WHICH WERE WRITTEN ON THE CARD AS '180 DEGS AT 15 KTS GUSTING TO 23 KTS.' I WAS MILDLY SURPRISED BUT CONSIDERED THE WINDS AND RESET THE FMC TO REFLECT THE LYNSY ARR TO RWY 19L. WE BOTH REVIEWED THE RESTRS AND CONSTRAINTS THAT APPLIED TO THIS PROC TO THIS RWY AND VERIFIED THAT THEY WERE CORRECTLY INSTALLED IN THE BOX. WE WERE FINALLY CLRED DIRECTLY TO LYNSY AND FURTHER CLRED TO DSND VIA THE LYNSY 1 ARR. I DO NOT RECALL ANY RWY BEING MENTIONED BY ZLA. WE WERE FURTHER SLOWED AND JUST PRIOR TO REACHING LYNSY, WE WERE AGAIN TOLD TO DSND VIA THE LYNSY ARR. I WAS CONCENTRATING ON MAKING SURE ALL THE CONSTRAINTS WERE MET AS WE PASSED LYNSY AND THEN MIROK WE COMMENTED ON HOW WE SELDOM GOT TO FLY BEYOND THE FIRST FIX BEFORE WE GOT A VECTOR. AGAIN, CONCENTRATING ON MAKING ALL THE PROPER CONSTRAINTS, I COULD HEAR CTR TALKING ON THE RADIO, BUT NO CALL WAS MADE TO OUR FLT. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 10000 FT APCHING ZEDUL, I SUDDENLY BECAME AWARE THAT I WAS ONLY HEARING THE ACFT HALF OF THE RADIO XMISSIONS. I TOLD THE FO TO CALL APCH ON 135.0 AS I KNEW THIS WAS THE APCH FREQ FOR LAS. HE DID AND WE WERE TOLD TO STOP OUR DSCNT (WE WERE AT ABOUT 6400 FT AT THIS TIME) AND TO TURN TO A HDG OF 090 DEGS. WE CONTINUED TO GET VECTORS FOR OUR LNDG ON RWY 25L. AS INSTRUCTED, I CALLED THE TRACON WHEN I GOT TO OPS. THE SUPVR IN TRACON LISTENED TO WHAT I HAD TO SAY ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND TOOK MY INFO DOWN AND SAID HE WOULD CONTACT ME AFTER HE HAD A CHANCE TO LISTEN TO ALL THE TAPES INVOLVED. I THANKED HIM AND WENT ABOUT GETTING READY FOR MY NEXT FLT. JUST BEFORE WE WERE READY TO PUSH BACK, I WAS GIVEN A NOTE TO CALL THE SUPVR. I WENT TO THE GATE AND CALLED HIM AGAIN. HE SAID THAT HE HAD LISTENED TO ALL THE TAPES FROM APCH AND ZLA AND HE SAID HE WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT NO ONE HAD DONE ANYTHING TO INTERVENE IN THIS SIT PRIOR TO US CALLING APCH CTL. HE REMINDED ME THAT IN THIS TIME OF INCREASED SECURITY, IT WAS DOUBLY IMPORTANT NOT TO BE OUT OF CONTACT WITH ATC, ESPECIALLY AS WE APCH LARGE CITIES SINCE ARRIVING WITH F16 ESCORTS WAS NOT A GOOD THING, I ASKED HIM WHAT I NEEDED TO DO NOW AND HE SAID THAT APART FROM TELLING MY FO TO BE MORE VIGILANT ABOUT THINGS ON THE ATIS AND REQUIRED FREQ MONITORING, JUST TO BE MORE CAREFUL IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID NO PAPERWORK ABOUT THE INCIDENT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING FROM HIS OFFICE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AS I SEE IT: I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ALERT TO THE LACK OF A HDOF FROM CTR TO APCH. GETTING PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE RNAV ARR WAS IMPRUDENT. MY FO'S PERSONAL LIFE WAS DISRUPTING HIS THOUGHT PROCESSES DURING THE ENTIRE PAIRING. THINGS WERE NOT GOING WELL FOR HIM AND HE SEEMED MORE INVOLVED WITH THIS THAN OUR FLYING MOST OF THE TIME, TO THE POINT THAT HE HAD MISSED A LOT OF CALLS AND INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS AND THE PREVIOUS 4 LEGS. HE MADE THE STATEMENT ON THE FIRST DAY, 'IF IT WEREN'T FOR HAVING TO FLY, I COULD WORK HARDER AT MY REAL JOB.' HE IS ALSO IN THE MIDDLE OF ATTEMPTING TO RECONCILE WITH HIS WIFE AFTER A LONG SEPARATION. HE SEEMS TO BE GENERALLY QUITE COMPETENT AND HAS A GOOD PERSONALITY AND ATTITUDE, BUT HE WAS VERY DISTR BY THINGS OTHER THAN FLYING -- AT LEAST ON THIS TRIP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.