Narrative:

Departing dca, first officer flying, gear came up (after selection) and I noticed the nose warning light (unsafe red) illuminated. The anti-retract mechanism and nose landing gear indicator were both down and retracted. The rush of air below the cockpit indicated that the doors were open. We leveled off at 5000 ft, asked dca for vectors so we could work our QRH. The first officer noticed we did not pressurize. This indicated to me we didn't have ground shift into the flight mode. I reached for tiller to verify that we did not and the wheel was steerable and made a clunk. I radioed our company that we diverted to iad with our fuel, etc. We notified ATC we wanted iad and requested priority handling for the longest runway (runway 19L was assigned). On downwind I took over the flying duties and requested an 8 mi final. The gear came down normally and we came to a normal top with normal uneventful landing. Crash fire rescue equipment was waiting (the dispatcher and ATC declared an emergency). Apparently, due to the transponder tie to ground shift our signal was intermittent and we were 'lost' on the radar screen some of the time. ATC did get our fuel, souls on board, and nature of problem. The maintenance at iad found the nose strut flat, gear bypass bent, and the fluid coupling was loose allowing the strut to collapse. In other words, whoever svced the strut did not tighten it. The first officer did an excellent job pointing out the lack of pressurization allowing me to look for a ground shift problem. His advocacy (and initial inquiry) made for a successful outcome. Had he not said anything, our QRH called for recycling the gear, the outcome would/could have been much different. The indicators we had were contradictory (nose landing gear indication and anti-retract mechanism) which allowed us to go into further inquiry into the problem. Supplemental information from acn 549647: unsafe nose gear indication upon gear retraction departure dca. Determined aircraft was still in ground mode due to nose gear problem. Decided to divert to iad for longer runway in the event of a gear problem. Contacted company at dca. Told them to inform dispatch to amend our release to destination iad. Uneventful landing at iad after checklist completed. On landing, it was unclr as to whether or not our release was amended (to comply with part 121) or if our dispatcher declared it an emergency for us to divert. Contributing factors were rush to get aircraft on ground, concern that ATC may have had a concern of a security problem since they lost our transponder due to ground shift problem. I assumed as PF and first officer that captain had amended release when he spoke to company. Corrective action: slow down. Always consider amending release with an abnormal situation. Human factor: higher noise level in cockpit due to nose gear out, high workload in class B airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 CREW HAD A NOSE GEAR PROB CAUSED BY IMPROPER SVCING OF THE NOSE GEAR STRUT.

Narrative: DEPARTING DCA, FO FLYING, GEAR CAME UP (AFTER SELECTION) AND I NOTICED THE NOSE WARNING LIGHT (UNSAFE RED) ILLUMINATED. THE ANTI-RETRACT MECHANISM AND NOSE LNDG GEAR INDICATOR WERE BOTH DOWN AND RETRACTED. THE RUSH OF AIR BELOW THE COCKPIT INDICATED THAT THE DOORS WERE OPEN. WE LEVELED OFF AT 5000 FT, ASKED DCA FOR VECTORS SO WE COULD WORK OUR QRH. THE FO NOTICED WE DID NOT PRESSURIZE. THIS INDICATED TO ME WE DIDN'T HAVE GND SHIFT INTO THE FLT MODE. I REACHED FOR TILLER TO VERIFY THAT WE DID NOT AND THE WHEEL WAS STEERABLE AND MADE A CLUNK. I RADIOED OUR COMPANY THAT WE DIVERTED TO IAD WITH OUR FUEL, ETC. WE NOTIFIED ATC WE WANTED IAD AND REQUESTED PRIORITY HANDLING FOR THE LONGEST RWY (RWY 19L WAS ASSIGNED). ON DOWNWIND I TOOK OVER THE FLYING DUTIES AND REQUESTED AN 8 MI FINAL. THE GEAR CAME DOWN NORMALLY AND WE CAME TO A NORMAL TOP WITH NORMAL UNEVENTFUL LNDG. CFR WAS WAITING (THE DISPATCHER AND ATC DECLARED AN EMER). APPARENTLY, DUE TO THE XPONDER TIE TO GND SHIFT OUR SIGNAL WAS INTERMITTENT AND WE WERE 'LOST' ON THE RADAR SCREEN SOME OF THE TIME. ATC DID GET OUR FUEL, SOULS ON BOARD, AND NATURE OF PROB. THE MAINT AT IAD FOUND THE NOSE STRUT FLAT, GEAR BYPASS BENT, AND THE FLUID COUPLING WAS LOOSE ALLOWING THE STRUT TO COLLAPSE. IN OTHER WORDS, WHOEVER SVCED THE STRUT DID NOT TIGHTEN IT. THE FO DID AN EXCELLENT JOB POINTING OUT THE LACK OF PRESSURIZATION ALLOWING ME TO LOOK FOR A GND SHIFT PROB. HIS ADVOCACY (AND INITIAL INQUIRY) MADE FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. HAD HE NOT SAID ANYTHING, OUR QRH CALLED FOR RECYCLING THE GEAR, THE OUTCOME WOULD/COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH DIFFERENT. THE INDICATORS WE HAD WERE CONTRADICTORY (NOSE LNDG GEAR INDICATION AND ANTI-RETRACT MECHANISM) WHICH ALLOWED US TO GO INTO FURTHER INQUIRY INTO THE PROB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 549647: UNSAFE NOSE GEAR INDICATION UPON GEAR RETRACTION DEP DCA. DETERMINED ACFT WAS STILL IN GND MODE DUE TO NOSE GEAR PROB. DECIDED TO DIVERT TO IAD FOR LONGER RWY IN THE EVENT OF A GEAR PROB. CONTACTED COMPANY AT DCA. TOLD THEM TO INFORM DISPATCH TO AMEND OUR RELEASE TO DEST IAD. UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT IAD AFTER CHKLIST COMPLETED. ON LNDG, IT WAS UNCLR AS TO WHETHER OR NOT OUR RELEASE WAS AMENDED (TO COMPLY WITH PART 121) OR IF OUR DISPATCHER DECLARED IT AN EMER FOR US TO DIVERT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE RUSH TO GET ACFT ON GND, CONCERN THAT ATC MAY HAVE HAD A CONCERN OF A SECURITY PROB SINCE THEY LOST OUR XPONDER DUE TO GND SHIFT PROB. I ASSUMED AS PF AND FO THAT CAPT HAD AMENDED RELEASE WHEN HE SPOKE TO COMPANY. CORRECTIVE ACTION: SLOW DOWN. ALWAYS CONSIDER AMENDING RELEASE WITH AN ABNORMAL SIT. HUMAN FACTOR: HIGHER NOISE LEVEL IN COCKPIT DUE TO NOSE GEAR OUT, HIGH WORKLOAD IN CLASS B AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.