Narrative:

During the takeoff roll and an airspeed of 120 KTS, I noticed with my peripheral vision a warning light on the caution and warning panel. At that moment, I looked at the light in question and could read 'door,' meaning that a door on the aircraft was not properly closed and locked. Simultaneously, the flight engineer called 'cargo door,' I then executed a rejected takeoff procedure as per our company aircraft operating manual. Prior to entering the runway for takeoff, I armed the autobrakes, also per our company normal procedures. During the rejected takeoff process a very rapid deceleration rate was in progress, a normal event with the autobrakes system active. However, I tried to regain manual braking with the brake pedals and finally by turning the rotary arming switch to off. When we came to a full stop, I could not move the aircraft with normal power. I requested from the central tower a visual inspection of our undercarriage for smoke or flames, with a negative response, but they would send the ground equipment. By the time they arrived, they commenced to spray a cooling agent, foam and water, into the brakes for further cooling. Shortly thereafter, I observed the main landing gear truck light illuminated indicating a tire or tires being deflated. Human performance considerations -- the decision to discontinue the takeoff was correct. Perhaps an additional procedure to disarm the autobrake system electrically at or below a certain speed, should be considered. The reason being to prevent locking the main gear brakes and excessive heat build up. Inactions -- a delay on shutting the engines down to facilitate the work of the ground crew. Other factors -- the frantic calls from the control tower asking the causes of the aborted takeoff and number of souls on board, did contribute to crew member's distraction to our procedures during the last few precious seconds. Supplemental information from acn 551676: rejected takeoff was initiated by captain at approximately 130 KIAS. Rejected takeoff was accomplished in accordance with aom procedure. Tower asked if we could clear the runway on to runway 4/22. At this point, aircraft was slowing through approximately 80 KIAS. Aircraft then came quickly to a stop on the runway, at the intersection of runway 15R and runway 4/22, with quite a bit of shuddering and squealing from the brakes. Captain applied power to taxi clear of runway 15R onto runway 4/22, but aircraft would not move. Advised tower that aircraft would not move, and that brakes appeared to be locked. Captain stated he had applied pressure to brake pedals at least twice during the rejected takeoff, and had moved the autobrake switch to off at approximately 80-100 KIAS. Crash fire rescue equipment arrived in approximately 5 mins. Shortly after they arrived, they reported flames from one gear, and applied foam to both main landing gear. Emergency evacuate/evacuation was considered, but decided that crash fire rescue equipment had situation under control, and that evacuate/evacuation was not necessary at that time. After approximately 45 mins, crash fire rescue equipment determined it was safe to approach the aircraft and passenger and crew were removed by people movers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A L1011 REJECTS ITS TKOF WHEN A CARGO DOOR LIGHT COMES ON JUST PRIOR TO 130 KTS. ACFT STOPS AT THE INTXN OF RWY 15 AND 4-22 WITH LOCKED BRAKES AND A GEAR FIRE AT BWI, MD.

Narrative: DURING THE TKOF ROLL AND AN AIRSPD OF 120 KTS, I NOTICED WITH MY PERIPHERAL VISION A WARNING LIGHT ON THE CAUTION AND WARNING PANEL. AT THAT MOMENT, I LOOKED AT THE LIGHT IN QUESTION AND COULD READ 'DOOR,' MEANING THAT A DOOR ON THE ACFT WAS NOT PROPERLY CLOSED AND LOCKED. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE FE CALLED 'CARGO DOOR,' I THEN EXECUTED A REJECTED TKOF PROC AS PER OUR COMPANY ACFT OPERATING MANUAL. PRIOR TO ENTERING THE RWY FOR TKOF, I ARMED THE AUTOBRAKES, ALSO PER OUR COMPANY NORMAL PROCS. DURING THE REJECTED TKOF PROCESS A VERY RAPID DECELERATION RATE WAS IN PROGRESS, A NORMAL EVENT WITH THE AUTOBRAKES SYS ACTIVE. HOWEVER, I TRIED TO REGAIN MANUAL BRAKING WITH THE BRAKE PEDALS AND FINALLY BY TURNING THE ROTARY ARMING SWITCH TO OFF. WHEN WE CAME TO A FULL STOP, I COULD NOT MOVE THE ACFT WITH NORMAL PWR. I REQUESTED FROM THE CENTRAL TWR A VISUAL INSPECTION OF OUR UNDERCARRIAGE FOR SMOKE OR FLAMES, WITH A NEGATIVE RESPONSE, BUT THEY WOULD SEND THE GND EQUIP. BY THE TIME THEY ARRIVED, THEY COMMENCED TO SPRAY A COOLING AGENT, FOAM AND WATER, INTO THE BRAKES FOR FURTHER COOLING. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I OBSERVED THE MAIN LNDG GEAR TRUCK LIGHT ILLUMINATED INDICATING A TIRE OR TIRES BEING DEFLATED. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS -- THE DECISION TO DISCONTINUE THE TKOF WAS CORRECT. PERHAPS AN ADDITIONAL PROC TO DISARM THE AUTOBRAKE SYS ELECTRICALLY AT OR BELOW A CERTAIN SPD, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THE REASON BEING TO PREVENT LOCKING THE MAIN GEAR BRAKES AND EXCESSIVE HEAT BUILD UP. INACTIONS -- A DELAY ON SHUTTING THE ENGS DOWN TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE GND CREW. OTHER FACTORS -- THE FRANTIC CALLS FROM THE CTL TWR ASKING THE CAUSES OF THE ABORTED TKOF AND NUMBER OF SOULS ON BOARD, DID CONTRIBUTE TO CREW MEMBER'S DISTR TO OUR PROCS DURING THE LAST FEW PRECIOUS SECONDS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 551676: REJECTED TKOF WAS INITIATED BY CAPT AT APPROX 130 KIAS. REJECTED TKOF WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AOM PROC. TWR ASKED IF WE COULD CLR THE RWY ON TO RWY 4/22. AT THIS POINT, ACFT WAS SLOWING THROUGH APPROX 80 KIAS. ACFT THEN CAME QUICKLY TO A STOP ON THE RWY, AT THE INTXN OF RWY 15R AND RWY 4/22, WITH QUITE A BIT OF SHUDDERING AND SQUEALING FROM THE BRAKES. CAPT APPLIED PWR TO TAXI CLR OF RWY 15R ONTO RWY 4/22, BUT ACFT WOULD NOT MOVE. ADVISED TWR THAT ACFT WOULD NOT MOVE, AND THAT BRAKES APPEARED TO BE LOCKED. CAPT STATED HE HAD APPLIED PRESSURE TO BRAKE PEDALS AT LEAST TWICE DURING THE REJECTED TKOF, AND HAD MOVED THE AUTOBRAKE SWITCH TO OFF AT APPROX 80-100 KIAS. CFR ARRIVED IN APPROX 5 MINS. SHORTLY AFTER THEY ARRIVED, THEY RPTED FLAMES FROM ONE GEAR, AND APPLIED FOAM TO BOTH MAIN LNDG GEAR. EMER EVAC WAS CONSIDERED, BUT DECIDED THAT CFR HAD SIT UNDER CTL, AND THAT EVAC WAS NOT NECESSARY AT THAT TIME. AFTER APPROX 45 MINS, CFR DETERMINED IT WAS SAFE TO APPROACH THE ACFT AND PAX AND CREW WERE REMOVED BY PEOPLE MOVERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.