Narrative:

Glider tow operation was being conducted. I was pilot of the tow plane. I took off for a tow to 3000 ft, believing that I had adequate fuel to complete this, the last tow of the day. This was on the basis of the fuel level indicator being clearly visible in the bubble (on a piper pawnee) and actively bouncing due to fuel movement in the tank. However, I was aware that the fuel indicator was low, and decided to keep the tow within gliding distance of the field (for the tow plane) at all times, just in case. After takeoff to the south, I turned to left crosswind and downwind legs. At 1000 ft, the plane lost power. At the time the plane was on a downwind leg about 1/2 NM to the east of the field, at about the position for a turn from downwind to base. When power was lost, I signaled the glider in tow to release immediately (by rocking the wings of the tow plane), and also gave him a radio call requesting immediate release. The glider pilot complied with this request, and both planes landed back at the airfield without further incident. Clearly my decision to initiate the tow was in error. I should have refueled first. It was bad enough to risk my own safety and the glider club's equipment on takeoff, but in this case, I was also exposing the pilot of the glider in tow to a risk of which he was unaware. I allowed myself to expect to be able to complete the tow operation without refueling because I had begun the day with adequate fuel for the number of tows involved. However, this expectation should have been adjusted when I had to make several flts to another nearby airfield to retrieve a glider that had landed out there. An additional human factor was the desire to finish with this last tow and then refuel. I would also note that in this plane, while the fuel indicator has some level marks, the numbers that associate those marks with gallonage have been obliterated, allowing some confusion as to how much fuel is left in the tank. This does not excuse the PIC from ultimate responsibility to assure that adequate fuel in on board, but may be considered a contributing factor nonetheless. I am fortunate that this event did not result in injury or damage to equipment or property. For me it was a wake-up call to be absolutely sure that I know the status of my fuel level before initiating a flight. If I cannot read the gauge very well, I will have to take such action as may be necessary to ensure that adequate fuel is on board.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA25 PAWNEE TOW PLT LOST PWR DURING CLBOUT WHILE TOWING GLIDER DUE TO RUNNING OUT OF FUEL. SUCCESSFUL LNDG WAS MADE BY BOTH ACFT BACK AT THE DEPARTING ARPT.

Narrative: GLIDER TOW OP WAS BEING CONDUCTED. I WAS PLT OF THE TOW PLANE. I TOOK OFF FOR A TOW TO 3000 FT, BELIEVING THAT I HAD ADEQUATE FUEL TO COMPLETE THIS, THE LAST TOW OF THE DAY. THIS WAS ON THE BASIS OF THE FUEL LEVEL INDICATOR BEING CLRLY VISIBLE IN THE BUBBLE (ON A PIPER PAWNEE) AND ACTIVELY BOUNCING DUE TO FUEL MOVEMENT IN THE TANK. HOWEVER, I WAS AWARE THAT THE FUEL INDICATOR WAS LOW, AND DECIDED TO KEEP THE TOW WITHIN GLIDING DISTANCE OF THE FIELD (FOR THE TOW PLANE) AT ALL TIMES, JUST IN CASE. AFTER TKOF TO THE S, I TURNED TO L XWIND AND DOWNWIND LEGS. AT 1000 FT, THE PLANE LOST PWR. AT THE TIME THE PLANE WAS ON A DOWNWIND LEG ABOUT 1/2 NM TO THE E OF THE FIELD, AT ABOUT THE POS FOR A TURN FROM DOWNWIND TO BASE. WHEN PWR WAS LOST, I SIGNALED THE GLIDER IN TOW TO RELEASE IMMEDIATELY (BY ROCKING THE WINGS OF THE TOW PLANE), AND ALSO GAVE HIM A RADIO CALL REQUESTING IMMEDIATE RELEASE. THE GLIDER PLT COMPLIED WITH THIS REQUEST, AND BOTH PLANES LANDED BACK AT THE AIRFIELD WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CLRLY MY DECISION TO INITIATE THE TOW WAS IN ERROR. I SHOULD HAVE REFUELED FIRST. IT WAS BAD ENOUGH TO RISK MY OWN SAFETY AND THE GLIDER CLUB'S EQUIP ON TKOF, BUT IN THIS CASE, I WAS ALSO EXPOSING THE PLT OF THE GLIDER IN TOW TO A RISK OF WHICH HE WAS UNAWARE. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO COMPLETE THE TOW OP WITHOUT REFUELING BECAUSE I HAD BEGUN THE DAY WITH ADEQUATE FUEL FOR THE NUMBER OF TOWS INVOLVED. HOWEVER, THIS EXPECTATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED WHEN I HAD TO MAKE SEVERAL FLTS TO ANOTHER NEARBY AIRFIELD TO RETRIEVE A GLIDER THAT HAD LANDED OUT THERE. AN ADDITIONAL HUMAN FACTOR WAS THE DESIRE TO FINISH WITH THIS LAST TOW AND THEN REFUEL. I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT IN THIS PLANE, WHILE THE FUEL INDICATOR HAS SOME LEVEL MARKS, THE NUMBERS THAT ASSOCIATE THOSE MARKS WITH GALLONAGE HAVE BEEN OBLITERATED, ALLOWING SOME CONFUSION AS TO HOW MUCH FUEL IS LEFT IN THE TANK. THIS DOES NOT EXCUSE THE PIC FROM ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSURE THAT ADEQUATE FUEL IN ON BOARD, BUT MAY BE CONSIDERED A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR NONETHELESS. I AM FORTUNATE THAT THIS EVENT DID NOT RESULT IN INJURY OR DAMAGE TO EQUIP OR PROPERTY. FOR ME IT WAS A WAKE-UP CALL TO BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT I KNOW THE STATUS OF MY FUEL LEVEL BEFORE INITIATING A FLT. IF I CANNOT READ THE GAUGE VERY WELL, I WILL HAVE TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE FUEL IS ON BOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.