Narrative:

Descending onto GS for sna runway 19R we heard socal approach talking to traffic to our west. We watched the traffic climbing toward us. As we descended onto the profile the traffic was supposed to maintain visual separation. We responded to a TCASII RA at XA54 to climb to avoid traffic, who passed behind us. Vertical separation was 300 ft and laterally approximately 1/2 mi. Socal approach canceled our approach clearance and gave us a descent with vectors around to the west. After turning downwind, we finished cleaning the aircraft up, resequencing the approach, and accomplishing checklists. On downwind about 1 min, a TCASII target approached. The TCASII RA came on nearly immediately. This occurred as socal was trying to call out the traffic. The RA required a climb of around 3000 FPM. Vertical separation was 300 ft or less and laterally around 1/2 mi. The traffic was never sighted. The second RA occurred at XA57 3 mins after the first. The climb was initiated with an ATC directed turn. It was believed from the time TCASII showed the traffic until the RA was less than 15 seconds. We continued the approach to sna after the second RA, and had an uneventful landing after recovering from the TA and vector across final. After landing, socal approach supervisor was contacted. He said the tape was pulled and being analyzed, and both incidents set off socal approach conflict alert. Both incidents had vertical separation of 300 ft or less and lateral separation of 1 mi or less, around 1/2 mi. He continued to say the first incident was caused by an aircraft assigned to maintain visual separation, and the pilot misjudged the separation. The second incident was with a cherokee on an IFR clearance at 3000 ft, and he described this as an 'operational error error.' both TCASII RA's were responded to using SOP's, and cockpit coordination was excellent. We received a descent on a go around profile after a climbing RA, while nearly fully configured and speed brakes extended. Cleaning up and coordinating this maneuver produced a high workload all the way from the first to the second RA, though we were able to identify the second TCASII traffic momentarily before the second RA maneuver was required. This multiple incident proved to be quite a test of the airmanship, CRM, and situational awareness of the crew involved. It appears multiple failures to properly separate traffic greatly contributed to this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLC HAVE MULTIPLE INCIDENTS ON APCH INTO SNA RESULTING IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION.

Narrative: DSNDING ONTO GS FOR SNA RWY 19R WE HEARD SOCAL APCH TALKING TO TFC TO OUR W. WE WATCHED THE TFC CLBING TOWARD US. AS WE DSNDED ONTO THE PROFILE THE TFC WAS SUPPOSED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. WE RESPONDED TO A TCASII RA AT XA54 TO CLB TO AVOID TFC, WHO PASSED BEHIND US. VERT SEPARATION WAS 300 FT AND LATERALLY APPROX 1/2 MI. SOCAL APCH CANCELED OUR APCH CLRNC AND GAVE US A DSCNT WITH VECTORS AROUND TO THE W. AFTER TURNING DOWNWIND, WE FINISHED CLEANING THE ACFT UP, RESEQUENCING THE APCH, AND ACCOMPLISHING CHKLISTS. ON DOWNWIND ABOUT 1 MIN, A TCASII TARGET APCHED. THE TCASII RA CAME ON NEARLY IMMEDIATELY. THIS OCCURRED AS SOCAL WAS TRYING TO CALL OUT THE TFC. THE RA REQUIRED A CLB OF AROUND 3000 FPM. VERT SEPARATION WAS 300 FT OR LESS AND LATERALLY AROUND 1/2 MI. THE TFC WAS NEVER SIGHTED. THE SECOND RA OCCURRED AT XA57 3 MINS AFTER THE FIRST. THE CLB WAS INITIATED WITH AN ATC DIRECTED TURN. IT WAS BELIEVED FROM THE TIME TCASII SHOWED THE TFC UNTIL THE RA WAS LESS THAN 15 SECONDS. WE CONTINUED THE APCH TO SNA AFTER THE SECOND RA, AND HAD AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AFTER RECOVERING FROM THE TA AND VECTOR ACROSS FINAL. AFTER LNDG, SOCAL APCH SUPVR WAS CONTACTED. HE SAID THE TAPE WAS PULLED AND BEING ANALYZED, AND BOTH INCIDENTS SET OFF SOCAL APCH CONFLICT ALERT. BOTH INCIDENTS HAD VERT SEPARATION OF 300 FT OR LESS AND LATERAL SEPARATION OF 1 MI OR LESS, AROUND 1/2 MI. HE CONTINUED TO SAY THE FIRST INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY AN ACFT ASSIGNED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION, AND THE PLT MISJUDGED THE SEPARATION. THE SECOND INCIDENT WAS WITH A CHEROKEE ON AN IFR CLRNC AT 3000 FT, AND HE DESCRIBED THIS AS AN 'OPERROR ERROR.' BOTH TCASII RA'S WERE RESPONDED TO USING SOP'S, AND COCKPIT COORD WAS EXCELLENT. WE RECEIVED A DSCNT ON A GAR PROFILE AFTER A CLBING RA, WHILE NEARLY FULLY CONFIGURED AND SPD BRAKES EXTENDED. CLEANING UP AND COORDINATING THIS MANEUVER PRODUCED A HIGH WORKLOAD ALL THE WAY FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND RA, THOUGH WE WERE ABLE TO IDENT THE SECOND TCASII TFC MOMENTARILY BEFORE THE SECOND RA MANEUVER WAS REQUIRED. THIS MULTIPLE INCIDENT PROVED TO BE QUITE A TEST OF THE AIRMANSHIP, CRM, AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE CREW INVOLVED. IT APPEARS MULTIPLE FAILURES TO PROPERLY SEPARATE TFC GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.