Narrative:

4-6 planes were routinely arriving at or departing saf airport. One runway (runway 20) was in use. No aircraft were conducting instrument approachs, either IFR or practice. WX was good VMC with benign winds. This should have been a very routine traffic flow. Yet it appeared the single controller in the tower cabin attendant was overwhelmed by the situation. Arriving aircraft were ordered to delay entry into class D airspace for various periods. The tower controller repeatedly tied up the tower frequency by calling for position reports from aircraft that should have been easily visible from and tracked by the tower. Instructions given to aircraft in the pattern were nonstandard, leaving all pilots unsure about who was where doing what. In my own case, I was ordered to 'turn left' (without elaboration as to what to expect next) while on right base preparing to turn final. This type of situation has become common practice at this facility the past 2 yrs. It has been the subject of numerous ASRS reports and discussions with the tower chief, airport manager, and abq FSDO by various pilots. My sense in this instance, as in all the previous ones, was that the controller: 1) was not watching traffic visually, 2) did not have adequate situational awareness, and 3) was acting overloaded for his skill and capability level, in spite of the modest traffic volume. The situation appeared dangerous to me and I elected to 'turn left' right out of the class D airspace and divert to another airport. Sustained systematic poor performance by a (contract) ATC facility is intolerable. There has been some recent turnover among controllers, but the situation is basically unchanged. The responsibility rests with the tower chief.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 IS ISSUED UNCLR CTL INSTRUCTIONS BY SAF LCL CTLR AND ELECTS TO DEPART THE TFC PATTERN.

Narrative: 4-6 PLANES WERE ROUTINELY ARRIVING AT OR DEPARTING SAF ARPT. ONE RWY (RWY 20) WAS IN USE. NO ACFT WERE CONDUCTING INST APCHS, EITHER IFR OR PRACTICE. WX WAS GOOD VMC WITH BENIGN WINDS. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN A VERY ROUTINE TFC FLOW. YET IT APPEARED THE SINGLE CTLR IN THE TWR CAB WAS OVERWHELMED BY THE SIT. ARRIVING ACFT WERE ORDERED TO DELAY ENTRY INTO CLASS D AIRSPACE FOR VARIOUS PERIODS. THE TWR CTLR REPEATEDLY TIED UP THE TWR FREQ BY CALLING FOR POS RPTS FROM ACFT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EASILY VISIBLE FROM AND TRACKED BY THE TWR. INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO ACFT IN THE PATTERN WERE NONSTANDARD, LEAVING ALL PLTS UNSURE ABOUT WHO WAS WHERE DOING WHAT. IN MY OWN CASE, I WAS ORDERED TO 'TURN L' (WITHOUT ELABORATION AS TO WHAT TO EXPECT NEXT) WHILE ON R BASE PREPARING TO TURN FINAL. THIS TYPE OF SIT HAS BECOME COMMON PRACTICE AT THIS FACILITY THE PAST 2 YRS. IT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF NUMEROUS ASRS RPTS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TWR CHIEF, ARPT MGR, AND ABQ FSDO BY VARIOUS PLTS. MY SENSE IN THIS INSTANCE, AS IN ALL THE PREVIOUS ONES, WAS THAT THE CTLR: 1) WAS NOT WATCHING TFC VISUALLY, 2) DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND 3) WAS ACTING OVERLOADED FOR HIS SKILL AND CAPABILITY LEVEL, IN SPITE OF THE MODEST TFC VOLUME. THE SIT APPEARED DANGEROUS TO ME AND I ELECTED TO 'TURN L' RIGHT OUT OF THE CLASS D AIRSPACE AND DIVERT TO ANOTHER ARPT. SUSTAINED SYSTEMATIC POOR PERFORMANCE BY A (CONTRACT) ATC FACILITY IS INTOLERABLE. THERE HAS BEEN SOME RECENT TURNOVER AMONG CTLRS, BUT THE SIT IS BASICALLY UNCHANGED. THE RESPONSIBILITY RESTS WITH THE TWR CHIEF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.