B747-100 crew had extreme language barrier problems and conflicting ATC clrncs when departing heca.

Attributes
ACN	555604
Time
Date	200207
Day	Wed
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
State Reference	FO
Altitude	agl single value : 2000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B747-100
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 40 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 3400
ASRS Report	555604
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : multi engine
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 90 flight time total : 4500 flight time type : 60
ASRS Report	555740
Events
Anomaly	other anomaly other other spatial deviation
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment : tcas other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance none taken : detected after the fact other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	ATC Human Performance
Primary Problem	ATC Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Inter Facility Coordination Failure other

Narrative:

On departure, proceeded as cleared in our initial clearance received by ground control on taxi out. Language barrier from cairo ground control arose while reading back clearance with reference to squawk code. After reading back squawk code 3 or 4 times with confirmation from ground control, it was selected into transponder. Cleared to 'line up and hold' on active runway. While holding for approximately 2-3 mins, we noticed on TCASII an aircraft at 700 ft behind us landing on same runway. As I was about to exit or ask tower for clearance to take off, a new squawk code was given and takeoff clearance received. On departure, a turn was made to the VOR as initially cleared. Checking on with departure frequency, another squawk code was given. I informed him of our right turn. A few mins later the departure controller instructed us to turn left. We did. Another controller asked why we turned right when we were supposed to maintain runway heading. On takeoff, I don't remember our clearance as runway heading. Especially with the aircraft landing behind us and the language problem with the squawk. Supplemental information from acn 555740: after takeoff, I flew out to the VOR and turned right on course (our clearance received on taxi out). The captain switched to departure control and advised that we were in the turn. We got no response twice and on the third call a different voice came on and told us to turn back to a heading. He was very upset and wanted to know why we turned. We explained that we were following our clearance and he said 'what about your clearance from the tower?' that was the first time we heard of an assigned heading for takeoff. I believe the extreme difficulty in understanding some foreign controllers increases the risk by itself. In our situation, the controller was hard to understand, we had an aircraft coming up our tail, and then we had confusion about the new transponder code. The captain and I both felt it was strange to turn on course that close to the airport and that is why the captain kept stating that we were in the turn when he tried to contact departure control. I think it is extremely important for each crew member to listen carefully and if in doubt -- clarify. We were rushed and distraction and it could have resulted in a worse situation than it was.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747-100 CREW HAD EXTREME LANGUAGE BARRIER PROBS AND CONFLICTING ATC CLRNCS WHEN DEPARTING HECA.

Narrative: ON DEP, PROCEEDED AS CLRED IN OUR INITIAL CLRNC RECEIVED BY GND CTL ON TAXI OUT. LANGUAGE BARRIER FROM CAIRO GND CTL AROSE WHILE READING BACK CLRNC WITH REF TO SQUAWK CODE. AFTER READING BACK SQUAWK CODE 3 OR 4 TIMES WITH CONFIRMATION FROM GND CTL, IT WAS SELECTED INTO XPONDER. CLRED TO 'LINE UP AND HOLD' ON ACTIVE RWY. WHILE HOLDING FOR APPROX 2-3 MINS, WE NOTICED ON TCASII AN ACFT AT 700 FT BEHIND US LNDG ON SAME RWY. AS I WAS ABOUT TO EXIT OR ASK TWR FOR CLRNC TO TAKE OFF, A NEW SQUAWK CODE WAS GIVEN AND TKOF CLRNC RECEIVED. ON DEP, A TURN WAS MADE TO THE VOR AS INITIALLY CLRED. CHKING ON WITH DEP FREQ, ANOTHER SQUAWK CODE WAS GIVEN. I INFORMED HIM OF OUR R TURN. A FEW MINS LATER THE DEP CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN L. WE DID. ANOTHER CTLR ASKED WHY WE TURNED R WHEN WE WERE SUPPOSED TO MAINTAIN RWY HDG. ON TKOF, I DON'T REMEMBER OUR CLRNC AS RWY HDG. ESPECIALLY WITH THE ACFT LNDG BEHIND US AND THE LANGUAGE PROB WITH THE SQUAWK. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 555740: AFTER TKOF, I FLEW OUT TO THE VOR AND TURNED R ON COURSE (OUR CLRNC RECEIVED ON TAXI OUT). THE CAPT SWITCHED TO DEP CTL AND ADVISED THAT WE WERE IN THE TURN. WE GOT NO RESPONSE TWICE AND ON THE THIRD CALL A DIFFERENT VOICE CAME ON AND TOLD US TO TURN BACK TO A HDG. HE WAS VERY UPSET AND WANTED TO KNOW WHY WE TURNED. WE EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING OUR CLRNC AND HE SAID 'WHAT ABOUT YOUR CLRNC FROM THE TWR?' THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME WE HEARD OF AN ASSIGNED HDG FOR TKOF. I BELIEVE THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING SOME FOREIGN CTLRS INCREASES THE RISK BY ITSELF. IN OUR SIT, THE CTLR WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND, WE HAD AN ACFT COMING UP OUR TAIL, AND THEN WE HAD CONFUSION ABOUT THE NEW XPONDER CODE. THE CAPT AND I BOTH FELT IT WAS STRANGE TO TURN ON COURSE THAT CLOSE TO THE ARPT AND THAT IS WHY THE CAPT KEPT STATING THAT WE WERE IN THE TURN WHEN HE TRIED TO CONTACT DEP CTL. I THINK IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR EACH CREW MEMBER TO LISTEN CAREFULLY AND IF IN DOUBT -- CLARIFY. WE WERE RUSHED AND DISTR AND IT COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A WORSE SIT THAN IT WAS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.