Narrative:

10 mins prior to departure for flight abc dtw-dfw, cockpit crew in seats, checklists complete. Gate agent shuts door. I noted all cargo doors open, aft avionics hatch open, no tug for push connected, and no ramp activity from my vantage in the captain's seat. For some reason, I decided to re-open the passenger entry door to query the agent, just before he backed up the jetbridge. The agent quickly informed me that all he knew was that there was some aircraft damage in the belly. He had been instructed by the operations supervisor to close the door and then inform the captain through the window. I proceeded to the ramp to find ramp personnel in the aft cargo bin, starting to load baggage. When asked, they showed me a wall panel that had been knocked in earlier, but now was visibly in its normal position. This panel displacement would have rendered this class D compartment non fire retardant, had it been left in its earlier condition. I was satisfied that everything was back to normal, and no maintenance entry was required whether ramp or maintenance personnel resolved the problem. I did not see anyone from maintenance. The issue here is the fact that the agents would have withheld that information/decision from the captain in order to achieve an on-time departure. Not until I re-opened the passenger entry door and talked with the agent, was that information provided to me. I, like all capts I know, strive for on-time departures. The problem is this prevailing attitude among many station personnel -- pressured or not -- is a serious issue that threatens the safety of passenger/crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN FK100 PIC LEARNS OF DAMAGE IN THE CARGO HOLD AFTER THE CABIN DOOR IS CLOSED FOR A SUPPOSED OR PLANNED ON-TIME DEP FROM DTW, MI.

Narrative: 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP FOR FLT ABC DTW-DFW, COCKPIT CREW IN SEATS, CHKLISTS COMPLETE. GATE AGENT SHUTS DOOR. I NOTED ALL CARGO DOORS OPEN, AFT AVIONICS HATCH OPEN, NO TUG FOR PUSH CONNECTED, AND NO RAMP ACTIVITY FROM MY VANTAGE IN THE CAPT'S SEAT. FOR SOME REASON, I DECIDED TO RE-OPEN THE PAX ENTRY DOOR TO QUERY THE AGENT, JUST BEFORE HE BACKED UP THE JETBRIDGE. THE AGENT QUICKLY INFORMED ME THAT ALL HE KNEW WAS THAT THERE WAS SOME ACFT DAMAGE IN THE BELLY. HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE OPS SUPVR TO CLOSE THE DOOR AND THEN INFORM THE CAPT THROUGH THE WINDOW. I PROCEEDED TO THE RAMP TO FIND RAMP PERSONNEL IN THE AFT CARGO BIN, STARTING TO LOAD BAGGAGE. WHEN ASKED, THEY SHOWED ME A WALL PANEL THAT HAD BEEN KNOCKED IN EARLIER, BUT NOW WAS VISIBLY IN ITS NORMAL POS. THIS PANEL DISPLACEMENT WOULD HAVE RENDERED THIS CLASS D COMPARTMENT NON FIRE RETARDANT, HAD IT BEEN LEFT IN ITS EARLIER CONDITION. I WAS SATISFIED THAT EVERYTHING WAS BACK TO NORMAL, AND NO MAINT ENTRY WAS REQUIRED WHETHER RAMP OR MAINT PERSONNEL RESOLVED THE PROB. I DID NOT SEE ANYONE FROM MAINT. THE ISSUE HERE IS THE FACT THAT THE AGENTS WOULD HAVE WITHHELD THAT INFO/DECISION FROM THE CAPT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN ON-TIME DEP. NOT UNTIL I RE-OPENED THE PAX ENTRY DOOR AND TALKED WITH THE AGENT, WAS THAT INFO PROVIDED TO ME. I, LIKE ALL CAPTS I KNOW, STRIVE FOR ON-TIME DEPS. THE PROB IS THIS PREVAILING ATTITUDE AMONG MANY STATION PERSONNEL -- PRESSURED OR NOT -- IS A SERIOUS ISSUE THAT THREATENS THE SAFETY OF PAX/CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.