Near ground conflict between the tug and the pushed back MD80 after there is a miscom between the tu...

Attributes
ACN	556296
Time
Date	200208
Day	Tue
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sat.airport
State Reference	TX
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	MD-80 Super 80
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : pushback ground other : tow-in
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
ASRS Report	556296
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical conflict : ground critical ground encounters : vehicle non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure
Independent Detector	other flight crewa other other : gnd 4
Resolutory Action	flight crew : became reoriented flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action other
Consequence	other other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance Environmental Factor Aircraft Company
Primary Problem	Environmental Factor

Narrative:

I am writing this up as a safety and training issue. During a push-out at sat, the left engine generator kicked off-line. I had already told the trainee doing the pushback to disconnect the aircraft from the tug. This normally would have been the end of the push-out and she had done a great job. I told her not to disconnect the headset because we just had a problem with the aircraft and that she may have to tow us back to the gate. After talking with maintenance, it was determined that we needed to go back to the gate. The tug driver again asked to disconnect the headset and I said no and that we needed to be towed back to the gate. I could see that the push crew was putting the tug into reverse. Knowing that movement was imminent, I tried but was unable to establish communication. Believing that I was connected to the tug and fearing damage to the aircraft, I released the brakes. Both the tug and the aircraft started to move. With our engines still running, we were at first perfectly matched in speed with the tug and it appeared that we were being towed. Within seconds, we noticed a closure rate between the aircraft and the tug. At just that moment, the tug instructor signaled us to stop the aircraft. I applied the brakes. Other than a firm application of the brakes, no harm was done. My suggestion is to have both trainee and instructor on headset able to talk and listen at the same time. Currently, we talk to the trainees and they repeat it to the instructor and then the instructor talks back to the trainee explaining things. For a trainee, listening to me on headset and an instructor not on headset at the same time, while pushing out a 130000 pound aircraft for the first time, is probably a full time job. To then throw in an abnormal situation, it might be a bit much for a trainee. In future sits, I think when the event turns into something other than routine, I will ask to speak to the instructor and possibly terminate the training.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEAR GND CONFLICT BTWN THE TUG AND THE PUSHED BACK MD80 AFTER THERE IS A MISCOM BTWN THE TUG DRIVER TRAINEE AND THE PIC FOR A PULL BACK IN TO THE GATE AT SAT, TX.

Narrative: I AM WRITING THIS UP AS A SAFETY AND TRAINING ISSUE. DURING A PUSH-OUT AT SAT, THE L ENG GENERATOR KICKED OFF-LINE. I HAD ALREADY TOLD THE TRAINEE DOING THE PUSHBACK TO DISCONNECT THE ACFT FROM THE TUG. THIS NORMALLY WOULD HAVE BEEN THE END OF THE PUSH-OUT AND SHE HAD DONE A GREAT JOB. I TOLD HER NOT TO DISCONNECT THE HEADSET BECAUSE WE JUST HAD A PROB WITH THE ACFT AND THAT SHE MAY HAVE TO TOW US BACK TO THE GATE. AFTER TALKING WITH MAINT, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WE NEEDED TO GO BACK TO THE GATE. THE TUG DRIVER AGAIN ASKED TO DISCONNECT THE HEADSET AND I SAID NO AND THAT WE NEEDED TO BE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE. I COULD SEE THAT THE PUSH CREW WAS PUTTING THE TUG INTO REVERSE. KNOWING THAT MOVEMENT WAS IMMINENT, I TRIED BUT WAS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH COM. BELIEVING THAT I WAS CONNECTED TO THE TUG AND FEARING DAMAGE TO THE ACFT, I RELEASED THE BRAKES. BOTH THE TUG AND THE ACFT STARTED TO MOVE. WITH OUR ENGS STILL RUNNING, WE WERE AT FIRST PERFECTLY MATCHED IN SPD WITH THE TUG AND IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE BEING TOWED. WITHIN SECONDS, WE NOTICED A CLOSURE RATE BTWN THE ACFT AND THE TUG. AT JUST THAT MOMENT, THE TUG INSTRUCTOR SIGNALED US TO STOP THE ACFT. I APPLIED THE BRAKES. OTHER THAN A FIRM APPLICATION OF THE BRAKES, NO HARM WAS DONE. MY SUGGESTION IS TO HAVE BOTH TRAINEE AND INSTRUCTOR ON HEADSET ABLE TO TALK AND LISTEN AT THE SAME TIME. CURRENTLY, WE TALK TO THE TRAINEES AND THEY REPEAT IT TO THE INSTRUCTOR AND THEN THE INSTRUCTOR TALKS BACK TO THE TRAINEE EXPLAINING THINGS. FOR A TRAINEE, LISTENING TO ME ON HEADSET AND AN INSTRUCTOR NOT ON HEADSET AT THE SAME TIME, WHILE PUSHING OUT A 130000 LB ACFT FOR THE FIRST TIME, IS PROBABLY A FULL TIME JOB. TO THEN THROW IN AN ABNORMAL SIT, IT MIGHT BE A BIT MUCH FOR A TRAINEE. IN FUTURE SITS, I THINK WHEN THE EVENT TURNS INTO SOMETHING OTHER THAN ROUTINE, I WILL ASK TO SPEAK TO THE INSTRUCTOR AND POSSIBLY TERMINATE THE TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Near ground conflict between the tug and the pushed back MD80 after there is a miscom between the tug driver trainee and the PIC for a pull back in to the gate at sat, tx.