Narrative:

Pilot performed a low approach to the incorrect runway. Pilot was cleared for a low approach to runway 12L at williams gateway airport but actually performed the approach to runway 12R. I was the lead of a 2 plane formation of extra 300L's. The incident occurred during the return to base phase of a standard aerobatic mission. During the VFR recovery from the northeast, the formation of 2 extra 300L's were cleared by tower to perform a low approach to runway 12L. The formation joined the downwind pattern to runway 12L. However, the pilot actually performed the low approach to runway 12R. Thereafter, the formation was cleared for a right downwind to runway 12R and landed without further incident. During the low approach to runway 12R, there were no other aircraft in the pattern or on the runway for runway 12L or runway 12R. There was a light civilian aircraft on final approach to runway 30C. Also, another aircraft (light civilian) was given takeoff clearance on runway 12R, but had not yet physically taken position on the runway. It is my assessment that I am entirely at fault due to 'expectancy.' typical practice is for tower to initially clear the formation to join downwind runway 12L and thereafter change the clearance to a low approach to runway 12R during the downwind segment. However, the follow on clearance (to switch to runway 12R) was not given in this case, yet the pilot assumed it was. As a result, the pilot completed the wide base turn, switching from runway 12L to runway 12R and completed the low approach. Although not an excuse, I believe the following factors contributed to the incident. 1) my wing man's radios were not working well. The wing man had a difficult time receiving. During the standard initial check-in with tower, the wingman did not acknowledge the frequency change. As a result, lead directed attention to the wingman giving visual signals to ensure the wingman switched to the tower frequency. It was during this time that the formation received clearance for the low approach to runway 12L. 2) the passenger of lead's aircraft was speaking extensively during the recovery phase of the mission. As a result, the pilot believes he allowed himself to become distraction. The incident was extensively debriefed with tower, the chief of operations for the company with which the pilots are employed, and among the formation members. We have idented the following cause factors: expectancy channelized attention, distraction, and weak wingman radios. In order to prevent this from occurring again, the following actions have been taken. Expectancy: the pilot has received extra training highlighting the importance of fully understanding and complying with ATC instructions. Further, not to 'expect' a clearance but to comply with actual clrncs given. Despite trying to ensure that the wingman was on the correct frequency, lead must ensure he keeps good situational awareness regarding activities and communications concerning the formation. The company for which the formation is employed has now established a sterile cockpit policy to prevent customers from distracting pilots. No longer will aircrew be allowed to casually talk to customers during the recovery phase of the mission. Customers will be advised of this policy during the preflight briefing. The company is replacing the 'weak' radio and antenna in the wing man's aircraft, thus precluding the possibility of missed and/or misunderstood radio calls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AEROBATIC PLT, CLRED FOR A LOW APCH TO RWY 12L AT IWA, MADE THE APCH TO RWY 12R.

Narrative: PLT PERFORMED A LOW APCH TO THE INCORRECT RWY. PLT WAS CLRED FOR A LOW APCH TO RWY 12L AT WILLIAMS GATEWAY ARPT BUT ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE APCH TO RWY 12R. I WAS THE LEAD OF A 2 PLANE FORMATION OF EXTRA 300L'S. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING THE RETURN TO BASE PHASE OF A STANDARD AEROBATIC MISSION. DURING THE VFR RECOVERY FROM THE NE, THE FORMATION OF 2 EXTRA 300L'S WERE CLRED BY TWR TO PERFORM A LOW APCH TO RWY 12L. THE FORMATION JOINED THE DOWNWIND PATTERN TO RWY 12L. HOWEVER, THE PLT ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE LOW APCH TO RWY 12R. THEREAFTER, THE FORMATION WAS CLRED FOR A R DOWNWIND TO RWY 12R AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. DURING THE LOW APCH TO RWY 12R, THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT IN THE PATTERN OR ON THE RWY FOR RWY 12L OR RWY 12R. THERE WAS A LIGHT CIVILIAN ACFT ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 30C. ALSO, ANOTHER ACFT (LIGHT CIVILIAN) WAS GIVEN TKOF CLRNC ON RWY 12R, BUT HAD NOT YET PHYSICALLY TAKEN POS ON THE RWY. IT IS MY ASSESSMENT THAT I AM ENTIRELY AT FAULT DUE TO 'EXPECTANCY.' TYPICAL PRACTICE IS FOR TWR TO INITIALLY CLR THE FORMATION TO JOIN DOWNWIND RWY 12L AND THEREAFTER CHANGE THE CLRNC TO A LOW APCH TO RWY 12R DURING THE DOWNWIND SEGMENT. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOW ON CLRNC (TO SWITCH TO RWY 12R) WAS NOT GIVEN IN THIS CASE, YET THE PLT ASSUMED IT WAS. AS A RESULT, THE PLT COMPLETED THE WIDE BASE TURN, SWITCHING FROM RWY 12L TO RWY 12R AND COMPLETED THE LOW APCH. ALTHOUGH NOT AN EXCUSE, I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT. 1) MY WING MAN'S RADIOS WERE NOT WORKING WELL. THE WING MAN HAD A DIFFICULT TIME RECEIVING. DURING THE STANDARD INITIAL CHK-IN WITH TWR, THE WINGMAN DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE FREQ CHANGE. AS A RESULT, LEAD DIRECTED ATTN TO THE WINGMAN GIVING VISUAL SIGNALS TO ENSURE THE WINGMAN SWITCHED TO THE TWR FREQ. IT WAS DURING THIS TIME THAT THE FORMATION RECEIVED CLRNC FOR THE LOW APCH TO RWY 12L. 2) THE PAX OF LEAD'S ACFT WAS SPEAKING EXTENSIVELY DURING THE RECOVERY PHASE OF THE MISSION. AS A RESULT, THE PLT BELIEVES HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BECOME DISTR. THE INCIDENT WAS EXTENSIVELY DEBRIEFED WITH TWR, THE CHIEF OF OPS FOR THE COMPANY WITH WHICH THE PLTS ARE EMPLOYED, AND AMONG THE FORMATION MEMBERS. WE HAVE IDENTED THE FOLLOWING CAUSE FACTORS: EXPECTANCY CHANNELIZED ATTN, DISTR, AND WEAK WINGMAN RADIOS. IN ORDER TO PREVENT THIS FROM OCCURRING AGAIN, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. EXPECTANCY: THE PLT HAS RECEIVED EXTRA TRAINING HIGHLIGHTING THE IMPORTANCE OF FULLY UNDERSTANDING AND COMPLYING WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS. FURTHER, NOT TO 'EXPECT' A CLRNC BUT TO COMPLY WITH ACTUAL CLRNCS GIVEN. DESPITE TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE WINGMAN WAS ON THE CORRECT FREQ, LEAD MUST ENSURE HE KEEPS GOOD SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REGARDING ACTIVITIES AND COMS CONCERNING THE FORMATION. THE COMPANY FOR WHICH THE FORMATION IS EMPLOYED HAS NOW ESTABLISHED A STERILE COCKPIT POLICY TO PREVENT CUSTOMERS FROM DISTRACTING PLTS. NO LONGER WILL AIRCREW BE ALLOWED TO CASUALLY TALK TO CUSTOMERS DURING THE RECOVERY PHASE OF THE MISSION. CUSTOMERS WILL BE ADVISED OF THIS POLICY DURING THE PREFLT BRIEFING. THE COMPANY IS REPLACING THE 'WEAK' RADIO AND ANTENNA IN THE WING MAN'S ACFT, THUS PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF MISSED AND/OR MISUNDERSTOOD RADIO CALLS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.