Narrative:

I was the first officer on this flight, performing the PNF duties. After we conducted a flaps 1 degree, bleeds-off takeoff from runway 25R in phx, I reconfigured the pneumatics panel after the first power reduction. The captain, as PF, was following flight director guidance in 'heading select' and was complying with the silow 1 departure procedure. We had just been issued a heading of 360 degrees from departure control, when 'air conditioning' was annunciated on the master caution panel with both master caution lights. Further investigation showed that the left 'wing body overheat' light was illuminated on the pneumatics panel, but this was not surprising since both packs had been working hard on the ground in phx. I was focused on the bleed panel to comply with the irregular procedure, when departure gave us direct thomm intersection for the rest of the silow 1. I did not understand the name of the fix, asked for a repeat, which we got, and then entered the clearance into the FMC. I saw that we were turning to thomm (autoplt was off), and again reconfigured the bleed panel to normal since the light had extinguished. About this time, the controller issued us a heading of 050 degrees, since he thought we 'were having such a hard time finding thomm' or words to that effect. I saw that we were still in the right turn to thomm, but also that our airspeed was too fast since we were still below 10000 ft. I asked the controller which one he wanted the heading of 050 degrees or direct to thomm. He stated that he thought that we were some number of mi from where he thought we should be, but eventually we were reclred to thomm intersection and then switched to ZAB. Initially, the captain and I were surprised by the notion that we were not in compliance with the clearance. But, in retrospect, I could see how the controller would perceive us as slow to follow instructions. First, we should have informed him of our situation concerning the irregular procedure. Secondly, our airspeed deviation caused us to fly a wider radius of turn over the ground, probably contributing to our being further to the north than necessary in the turn to thomm. Third, the captain was xchking my manipulation of the bleed panel (understandably) and this perhaps also delayed our immediate compliance with the clearance as issued by departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CREW DISTRACTED BY A MINOR MECHANICAL PROB IS SLOW TO FOLLOW THE CLRNC ISSUED. THIS IS NOTED BY THE CTLR WHO ISSUES A VECTOR TO GET THE TRACK HE EXPECTED THE ACFT TO FLY.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON THIS FLT, PERFORMING THE PNF DUTIES. AFTER WE CONDUCTED A FLAPS 1 DEG, BLEEDS-OFF TKOF FROM RWY 25R IN PHX, I RECONFIGURED THE PNEUMATICS PANEL AFTER THE FIRST PWR REDUCTION. THE CAPT, AS PF, WAS FOLLOWING FLT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE IN 'HEADING SELECT' AND WAS COMPLYING WITH THE SILOW 1 DEP PROC. WE HAD JUST BEEN ISSUED A HEADING OF 360 DEGS FROM DEP CTL, WHEN 'AIR CONDITIONING' WAS ANNUNCIATED ON THE MASTER CAUTION PANEL WITH BOTH MASTER CAUTION LIGHTS. FURTHER INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT THE L 'WING BODY OVERHEAT' LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED ON THE PNEUMATICS PANEL, BUT THIS WAS NOT SURPRISING SINCE BOTH PACKS HAD BEEN WORKING HARD ON THE GND IN PHX. I WAS FOCUSED ON THE BLEED PANEL TO COMPLY WITH THE IRREGULAR PROC, WHEN DEP GAVE US DIRECT THOMM INTXN FOR THE REST OF THE SILOW 1. I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NAME OF THE FIX, ASKED FOR A REPEAT, WHICH WE GOT, AND THEN ENTERED THE CLRNC INTO THE FMC. I SAW THAT WE WERE TURNING TO THOMM (AUTOPLT WAS OFF), AND AGAIN RECONFIGURED THE BLEED PANEL TO NORMAL SINCE THE LIGHT HAD EXTINGUISHED. ABOUT THIS TIME, THE CTLR ISSUED US A HEADING OF 050 DEGS, SINCE HE THOUGHT WE 'WERE HAVING SUCH A HARD TIME FINDING THOMM' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. I SAW THAT WE WERE STILL IN THE R TURN TO THOMM, BUT ALSO THAT OUR AIRSPD WAS TOO FAST SINCE WE WERE STILL BELOW 10000 FT. I ASKED THE CTLR WHICH ONE HE WANTED THE HEADING OF 050 DEGS OR DIRECT TO THOMM. HE STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WE WERE SOME NUMBER OF MI FROM WHERE HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE, BUT EVENTUALLY WE WERE RECLRED TO THOMM INTXN AND THEN SWITCHED TO ZAB. INITIALLY, THE CAPT AND I WERE SURPRISED BY THE NOTION THAT WE WERE NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLRNC. BUT, IN RETROSPECT, I COULD SEE HOW THE CTLR WOULD PERCEIVE US AS SLOW TO FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. FIRST, WE SHOULD HAVE INFORMED HIM OF OUR SIT CONCERNING THE IRREGULAR PROC. SECONDLY, OUR AIRSPD DEV CAUSED US TO FLY A WIDER RADIUS OF TURN OVER THE GND, PROBABLY CONTRIBUTING TO OUR BEING FURTHER TO THE N THAN NECESSARY IN THE TURN TO THOMM. THIRD, THE CAPT WAS XCHKING MY MANIPULATION OF THE BLEED PANEL (UNDERSTANDABLY) AND THIS PERHAPS ALSO DELAYED OUR IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLRNC AS ISSUED BY DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.