Narrative:

On the first flight of the day, I loaded a cessna 206, with 444 pounds of mail and headed VFR to north haven witherspoon's airport, a private airport on an island off the coast of maine. Prior to departure I conducted a preflight inspection, added 10 gals of fuel to bring my fuel load to 25 gals, performed a full run-up, and found no discrepancies. I back taxied for a full-length departure off of runway 21 rkd, used full power and checked the engine instruments before committing to flight. The wind was calm. Arriving at 700 ft AGL I turned left (easterly), climbed to cruise altitude and headed for north haven which was 11 mi away. The early morning air was still and smooth. I began to contemplate which of the runways I would use at north haven. As I approached the island, I took notice of the glassy water indicating a lack of wind. Boats southwest of the island favored a runway 24 landing, boats northeast favored runway 6. I elected to make a complete pattern of the field and observe conditions. The flag at midfield was limp. This field is private. The rollout end of runway 24 terminates at a public road, runway 6 terminates in brush. The public road is protected by pilot-activated lights to warn passing motorists of a landing airplane. I tried to activate these lights on each leg of my pattern without success. I imagined what an overrun across the road might mean if traffic were not stopped. I elected to make a runway 6 landing. North haven is charted at 1000 ft long, although it is commonly believed to be 900 ft. The last 130 ft of runway 6 are mowed grass, leading into taller weeds and then brush. The approach to both ends of the field are obstructed by trees, so landing in either direction requires maximum performance of both the aircraft and pilot. I have made numerous lndgs at this field before and although I was alert to the requirements, I had every confidence that the landing was achievable. Because of these requirements, I was careful to execute a precise pattern, and hold the short field speed on final. I approached the field with 40 degrees of flaps, and clearing the trees reduced power to idle and maintained airspeed with pitch. The plane was clearly aimed at the landing threshold of runway 6 and the profile seemed ideal, confirmed later by an employee on the ground who witnessed the event. I rounded out, anticipated a touchdown, but none occurred. I moved the flap selector handle up to remove the flaps to end the float, but the plane still did not touch down. At this point I momentarily considered a go around, but realized that the chances of clearing the trees ahead posed a greater hazard than continuing the landing. In other words, I consciously elected to chance a low speed incident on the ground rather than risk a high speed accident at altitude. When the wheels contacted the gravel, I applied maximum braking. The airplane continued onto the grass, wet with morning dew, and then through the weeds, and then brush, and then a low stonewall. The wall knocked off the nosewheel, and 1 blade of the propeller contacted the earth. I secured the fuel, power, and magnetos and exited the airplane. Not knowing the extent of damage, I anticipated a post crash fire. None occurred. As it turns out, there was no structural damage, and much to my relief, the aircraft was repaired the next day and ferried out under its own power for maintenance. Several factors contributed to this incident. First, the failure of the lights to activate led to my decision to land on runway 6 rather than runway 24. Runway 24 has a little more distance between the runway end and the stand of trees than does runway 6, so getting to the threshold in stabilized flight on runway 24 is more easily accomplished. Had I elected runway 24 in the first place, I would have had more room to descend and round out. Second, the failure of the flaps to retract extended my float as the airplane did not settle to the ground as I expected when I commanded flaps up. This limited the distance available for braking and contributed to the overrun. As regards the go around option, when it became clear that this was going to be a non-standard landing, probably 1/3 of the runway was behind me, I was slow, and carrying 444 pounds of cargo. I did not know then that the flaps were still at 40 degrees. I am supremely happy with my decision to continue straight ahead, even though I had an almost overwhelming urge to 'boot it out of there.' I believe that a go around would have led to a fatal accident in the trees. In the future, landing on runway 24 in calm wind would be a better choice, although I can't say whether I would not have overrun in that direction as well, considering the flap failure. Nevertheless, other pilots offered anecdotally that their preference is runway 24 in calm wind, so a policy outlining runway 24 as the landing runway in calm conditions would be helpful. It will certainly be my policy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CESSNA 206 PLT WENT OFF THE END OF UNCTLED ARPT RWY CAUSING THE NOSEWHEEL AND 1 PROP BLADE TO BREAK OFF WHEN THE ACFT RAN OVER A SHORT ROCK WALL IN THE OVERRUN AREA.

Narrative: ON THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY, I LOADED A CESSNA 206, WITH 444 LBS OF MAIL AND HEADED VFR TO NORTH HAVEN WITHERSPOON'S ARPT, A PVT ARPT ON AN ISLAND OFF THE COAST OF MAINE. PRIOR TO DEP I CONDUCTED A PREFLT INSPECTION, ADDED 10 GALS OF FUEL TO BRING MY FUEL LOAD TO 25 GALS, PERFORMED A FULL RUN-UP, AND FOUND NO DISCREPANCIES. I BACK TAXIED FOR A FULL-LENGTH DEP OFF OF RWY 21 RKD, USED FULL PWR AND CHKED THE ENG INSTS BEFORE COMMITTING TO FLT. THE WIND WAS CALM. ARRIVING AT 700 FT AGL I TURNED L (EASTERLY), CLBED TO CRUISE ALT AND HEADED FOR NORTH HAVEN WHICH WAS 11 MI AWAY. THE EARLY MORNING AIR WAS STILL AND SMOOTH. I BEGAN TO CONTEMPLATE WHICH OF THE RWYS I WOULD USE AT NORTH HAVEN. AS I APCHED THE ISLAND, I TOOK NOTICE OF THE GLASSY WATER INDICATING A LACK OF WIND. BOATS SW OF THE ISLAND FAVORED A RWY 24 LNDG, BOATS NE FAVORED RWY 6. I ELECTED TO MAKE A COMPLETE PATTERN OF THE FIELD AND OBSERVE CONDITIONS. THE FLAG AT MIDFIELD WAS LIMP. THIS FIELD IS PVT. THE ROLLOUT END OF RWY 24 TERMINATES AT A PUBLIC ROAD, RWY 6 TERMINATES IN BRUSH. THE PUBLIC ROAD IS PROTECTED BY PLT-ACTIVATED LIGHTS TO WARN PASSING MOTORISTS OF A LNDG AIRPLANE. I TRIED TO ACTIVATE THESE LIGHTS ON EACH LEG OF MY PATTERN WITHOUT SUCCESS. I IMAGINED WHAT AN OVERRUN ACROSS THE ROAD MIGHT MEAN IF TFC WERE NOT STOPPED. I ELECTED TO MAKE A RWY 6 LNDG. NORTH HAVEN IS CHARTED AT 1000 FT LONG, ALTHOUGH IT IS COMMONLY BELIEVED TO BE 900 FT. THE LAST 130 FT OF RWY 6 ARE MOWED GRASS, LEADING INTO TALLER WEEDS AND THEN BRUSH. THE APCH TO BOTH ENDS OF THE FIELD ARE OBSTRUCTED BY TREES, SO LNDG IN EITHER DIRECTION REQUIRES MAX PERFORMANCE OF BOTH THE ACFT AND PLT. I HAVE MADE NUMEROUS LNDGS AT THIS FIELD BEFORE AND ALTHOUGH I WAS ALERT TO THE REQUIREMENTS, I HAD EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT THE LNDG WAS ACHIEVABLE. BECAUSE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS, I WAS CAREFUL TO EXECUTE A PRECISE PATTERN, AND HOLD THE SHORT FIELD SPD ON FINAL. I APCHED THE FIELD WITH 40 DEGS OF FLAPS, AND CLRING THE TREES REDUCED PWR TO IDLE AND MAINTAINED AIRSPD WITH PITCH. THE PLANE WAS CLRLY AIMED AT THE LNDG THRESHOLD OF RWY 6 AND THE PROFILE SEEMED IDEAL, CONFIRMED LATER BY An EMPLOYEE ON THE GND WHO WITNESSED THE EVENT. I ROUNDED OUT, ANTICIPATED A TOUCHDOWN, BUT NONE OCCURRED. I MOVED THE FLAP SELECTOR HANDLE UP TO REMOVE THE FLAPS TO END THE FLOAT, BUT THE PLANE STILL DID NOT TOUCH DOWN. AT THIS POINT I MOMENTARILY CONSIDERED A GAR, BUT REALIZED THAT THE CHANCES OF CLRING THE TREES AHEAD POSED A GREATER HAZARD THAN CONTINUING THE LNDG. IN OTHER WORDS, I CONSCIOUSLY ELECTED TO CHANCE A LOW SPD INCIDENT ON THE GND RATHER THAN RISK A HIGH SPD ACCIDENT AT ALT. WHEN THE WHEELS CONTACTED THE GRAVEL, I APPLIED MAX BRAKING. THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED ONTO THE GRASS, WET WITH MORNING DEW, AND THEN THROUGH THE WEEDS, AND THEN BRUSH, AND THEN A LOW STONEWALL. THE WALL KNOCKED OFF THE NOSEWHEEL, AND 1 BLADE OF THE PROP CONTACTED THE EARTH. I SECURED THE FUEL, PWR, AND MAGNETOS AND EXITED THE AIRPLANE. NOT KNOWING THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE, I ANTICIPATED A POST CRASH FIRE. NONE OCCURRED. AS IT TURNS OUT, THERE WAS NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, AND MUCH TO MY RELIEF, THE ACFT WAS REPAIRED THE NEXT DAY AND FERRIED OUT UNDER ITS OWN PWR FOR MAINT. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST, THE FAILURE OF THE LIGHTS TO ACTIVATE LED TO MY DECISION TO LAND ON RWY 6 RATHER THAN RWY 24. RWY 24 HAS A LITTLE MORE DISTANCE BTWN THE RWY END AND THE STAND OF TREES THAN DOES RWY 6, SO GETTING TO THE THRESHOLD IN STABILIZED FLT ON RWY 24 IS MORE EASILY ACCOMPLISHED. HAD I ELECTED RWY 24 IN THE FIRST PLACE, I WOULD HAVE HAD MORE ROOM TO DSND AND ROUND OUT. SECOND, THE FAILURE OF THE FLAPS TO RETRACT EXTENDED MY FLOAT AS THE AIRPLANE DID NOT SETTLE TO THE GND AS I EXPECTED WHEN I COMMANDED FLAPS UP. THIS LIMITED THE DISTANCE AVAILABLE FOR BRAKING AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERRUN. AS REGARDS THE GAR OPTION, WHEN IT BECAME CLR THAT THIS WAS GOING TO BE A NON-STANDARD LNDG, PROBABLY 1/3 OF THE RWY WAS BEHIND ME, I WAS SLOW, AND CARRYING 444 LBS OF CARGO. I DID NOT KNOW THEN THAT THE FLAPS WERE STILL AT 40 DEGS. I AM SUPREMELY HAPPY WITH MY DECISION TO CONTINUE STRAIGHT AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH I HAD AN ALMOST OVERWHELMING URGE TO 'BOOT IT OUT OF THERE.' I BELIEVE THAT A GAR WOULD HAVE LED TO A FATAL ACCIDENT IN THE TREES. IN THE FUTURE, LNDG ON RWY 24 IN CALM WIND WOULD BE A BETTER CHOICE, ALTHOUGH I CAN'T SAY WHETHER I WOULD NOT HAVE OVERRUN IN THAT DIRECTION AS WELL, CONSIDERING THE FLAP FAILURE. NEVERTHELESS, OTHER PLTS OFFERED ANECDOTALLY THAT THEIR PREFERENCE IS RWY 24 IN CALM WIND, SO A POLICY OUTLINING RWY 24 AS THE LNDG RWY IN CALM CONDITIONS WOULD BE HELPFUL. IT WILL CERTAINLY BE MY POLICY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.