Narrative:

Landing runway 4R, flap 3 degrees. Arrival planned no automatic brakes for light weight. Maximum automatic brakes activated after main landing gear touchdown causing nose gear to 'land hard.' no injuries. No masks knocked down. Brake temperature over 300 degrees due to maximum braking. Don't know why maximum automatic brakes were selected. Can only guess that after approach/descent checklist, first officer thought he was selecting terrain switch due to proximity to automatic brake switch. Factors may include stress of 9/11, plus reduced rest night before. We first thought automatic brake activation was a malfunction. But after debrief, we assumed that automatic brakes were selected inadvertently and, when spoilers deployed, we got maximum braking. Other factors: during approach/descent checklist, when verifying selected automatic brakes, we were used to looking at only the low or medium position due to the fact that maximum is only used for takeoff. Even though the maximum switch/light is nearby, it may have gone unnoticed. Another factor may be the placement of the terrain switch on most aircraft. It is nearby the automatic brake switch, unlike this aircraft, where the terrain switch is on the lower right side of the first officer's forward panel. If the first officer thought he was selecting terrain, out of habit, he may have pushed the maximum automatic brake switch by mistake because of its expected panel position. Both switches, automatic brake and terrain will annunciate 'on' when selected, which would reinforce the selection of the wrong switch. Supplemental information from acn 559836: touchdown descent followed by abrupt deceleration with hard nose touchdown. First officer flying flap 3 degree ILS. Immediately noticed maximum automatic brake deceleration light on with an ECAM 'engine #2 reverser pressurized.' stowed reversers before going beyond reverse idle. Took a lot of pressure, but manually kicked off automatic brakes. Landing weight 116000 pounds. Analysis: I may have selected maximum automatic brake after captain completed approach descent checklist. Remember thinking I would delay terrain switch 'on' because there might be precipitation in the low deck of cumulo nimbus clouds. Don't remember if I actually followed through with that thought as we were being vectored. This was an older A320 with terrain switch on right side of mfds versus under brakes. A side note for the day should include reduced rest night prior and rushed 1ST leg.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLC HAS MAX AUTO BRAKES ENGAGE ON TOUCHDOWN CAUSING A HARD NOSEWHEEL LNDG AND HOT BRAKES.

Narrative: LNDG RWY 4R, FLAP 3 DEGS. ARR PLANNED NO AUTO BRAKES FOR LIGHT WT. MAX AUTO BRAKES ACTIVATED AFTER MAIN LNDG GEAR TOUCHDOWN CAUSING NOSE GEAR TO 'LAND HARD.' NO INJURIES. NO MASKS KNOCKED DOWN. BRAKE TEMP OVER 300 DEGS DUE TO MAX BRAKING. DON'T KNOW WHY MAX AUTO BRAKES WERE SELECTED. CAN ONLY GUESS THAT AFTER APCH/DSCNT CHKLIST, FO THOUGHT HE WAS SELECTING TERRAIN SWITCH DUE TO PROX TO AUTO BRAKE SWITCH. FACTORS MAY INCLUDE STRESS OF 9/11, PLUS REDUCED REST NIGHT BEFORE. WE FIRST THOUGHT AUTO BRAKE ACTIVATION WAS A MALFUNCTION. BUT AFTER DEBRIEF, WE ASSUMED THAT AUTO BRAKES WERE SELECTED INADVERTENTLY AND, WHEN SPOILERS DEPLOYED, WE GOT MAX BRAKING. OTHER FACTORS: DURING APCH/DSCNT CHKLIST, WHEN VERIFYING SELECTED AUTO BRAKES, WE WERE USED TO LOOKING AT ONLY THE LOW OR MEDIUM POS DUE TO THE FACT THAT MAX IS ONLY USED FOR TKOF. EVEN THOUGH THE MAX SWITCH/LIGHT IS NEARBY, IT MAY HAVE GONE UNNOTICED. ANOTHER FACTOR MAY BE THE PLACEMENT OF THE TERRAIN SWITCH ON MOST ACFT. IT IS NEARBY THE AUTO BRAKE SWITCH, UNLIKE THIS ACFT, WHERE THE TERRAIN SWITCH IS ON THE LOWER R SIDE OF THE FO'S FORWARD PANEL. IF THE FO THOUGHT HE WAS SELECTING TERRAIN, OUT OF HABIT, HE MAY HAVE PUSHED THE MAX AUTO BRAKE SWITCH BY MISTAKE BECAUSE OF ITS EXPECTED PANEL POS. BOTH SWITCHES, AUTO BRAKE AND TERRAIN WILL ANNUNCIATE 'ON' WHEN SELECTED, WHICH WOULD REINFORCE THE SELECTION OF THE WRONG SWITCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 559836: TOUCHDOWN DSCNT FOLLOWED BY ABRUPT DECELERATION WITH HARD NOSE TOUCHDOWN. FO FLYING FLAP 3 DEG ILS. IMMEDIATELY NOTICED MAX AUTO BRAKE DECELERATION LIGHT ON WITH AN ECAM 'ENG #2 REVERSER PRESSURIZED.' STOWED REVERSERS BEFORE GOING BEYOND REVERSE IDLE. TOOK A LOT OF PRESSURE, BUT MANUALLY KICKED OFF AUTO BRAKES. LNDG WT 116000 LBS. ANALYSIS: I MAY HAVE SELECTED MAX AUTO BRAKE AFTER CAPT COMPLETED APCH DSCNT CHKLIST. REMEMBER THINKING I WOULD DELAY TERRAIN SWITCH 'ON' BECAUSE THERE MIGHT BE PRECIPITATION IN THE LOW DECK OF CUMULO NIMBUS CLOUDS. DON'T REMEMBER IF I ACTUALLY FOLLOWED THROUGH WITH THAT THOUGHT AS WE WERE BEING VECTORED. THIS WAS AN OLDER A320 WITH TERRAIN SWITCH ON R SIDE OF MFDS VERSUS UNDER BRAKES. A SIDE NOTE FOR THE DAY SHOULD INCLUDE REDUCED REST NIGHT PRIOR AND RUSHED 1ST LEG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.