Narrative:

The flight was from rjaa to panc to teb. It was an extremely long flight with an extremely long duty day. This was not helped by the fact that I had little sleep in the 24 hour period before takeoff, due to the telephone going off and other duties associated with this flight. Takeoff was scheduled at XA00 from narita, which meant our flight would take off at night and land at night with some daylight in between. In addition to little sleep, the copilot was brand new to the company and to the airplane. He had never flown an international, overwater flight. In panc, we took a short maintenance delay while I tried to get the water system working in the airplane so the passenger could have running water. We took off from panc for an XA00 arrival in teb. By the time we got to teb, I was exhausted. We were radar vectored to the final approach course to runway 6 for a straight-in landing. I briefly looked over the approach plate expecting to follow the final approach course for runway 6 and asking to break off the approach and circle visually to land on runway 1, much more into the wind. After having been cleared for the approach, the breakoff was approved after passing torby, the OM. I had trouble picking up the airport and identing runway 1. The stadiums we use as a point of visual reference for runway 1 could not be idented because all associated lighting for these stadiums were not on. We were at 2000 ft (assigned) when cleared for the ILS 6 approach. Things began to happen fast. I became disoriented on the ILS to runway 6. I started a descent from 2000 ft on the final approach course when GS interception altitude was reached. At this point, I was still trying to find runway 1 so I could enter a downwind/base for runway 1. Concentrating too much on the circle for runway 1, I missed the crossing altitude of 1500 ft at dandy intersection before the OM. With runway 6 now in good visual sight, I was descending. I felt I was high and then I felt I was low, too low for a circle to runway 1. I started out at 2000 ft at GS intercept down to 1600 ft (below GS) and then back to 2000 ft to wait for the GS intercept. It was at this point where I didn't really know what altitude I should be at and what altitude I should circle to runway 1 at. I saw big, fat taxiway 5 right in front of me. I did not want to turn off of the final approach course. I had no other references right at this time other than the ILS and runway 6 and I certainly didn't want to add to the problem by leaving these references in search of a runway that I was not all that familiar with. I told the copilot to ask teb tower for a straight-in landing to runway 6. This was approved. I thought that getting the airplane on the ground now on runway 6 was the best option, after all wind at 360 degrees at 9 KTS gusting to 15 KTS is not that much of a crosswind when landing on runway 5. Several factors led me to vary the altitude/descent rate (and climb), which then led me to not follow the altitude requirements for the final approach to runway 5. These are: 1) my personal reserves were gone. I was exhausted. 2) momentary disorientation in respect to runway 5, which led to indecision about the best altitude to circle to runway 1. I wanted to keep as much altitude as possible for the circle. At this moment, I was actually still trying to decide which runway I wanted to use for the landing. My decision making process was hampered. I had no real 'plan of attack' for this approach: circle/not circle, straight in/not straight in runway 1/runway 6. 3) we didn't brief the approach completely. 4) new copilot. Much of the flight was taken up talking about airplane operations and international operations. By the time we arrived in teb in addition to being tired I was getting hoarse. The copilot CRM was virtually non existent. 5) excellent WX. This gave me several options for approaching the airport (IFR, VFR, straight in, circling) and I didn't focus on any one option and did not concentrate on any one approach. In the future, I need to be more attentive to long distance/long duty day flts. I can request a third pilot for these flts but in the past I have shied away from doing so because crew transportation is expensive. 3 pilots in the cockpit, under any circumstance, is better because 3 heads are better than 2, especially during high workload periods, takeoff, approach, landing. First flight for a copilot in the airplane and first time international operations for the copilot. These 2 factors should not be mixed. So the company needs to look at more experienced coplts. Working as we were this flight, we were both stressed out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GLF4 CREW HAD ALT EXCURSION AND TRACK DEV ON APCH TO TEB AFTER EXCESSIVE FLT TIME, DUTY TIME, AND NO RELIEF PLT OR CREW CHANGE FROM RJAA TO PANC, AND ON TO TEB.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS FROM RJAA TO PANC TO TEB. IT WAS AN EXTREMELY LONG FLT WITH AN EXTREMELY LONG DUTY DAY. THIS WAS NOT HELPED BY THE FACT THAT I HAD LITTLE SLEEP IN THE 24 HR PERIOD BEFORE TKOF, DUE TO THE TELEPHONE GOING OFF AND OTHER DUTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FLT. TKOF WAS SCHEDULED AT XA00 FROM NARITA, WHICH MEANT OUR FLT WOULD TAKE OFF AT NIGHT AND LAND AT NIGHT WITH SOME DAYLIGHT IN BTWN. IN ADDITION TO LITTLE SLEEP, THE COPLT WAS BRAND NEW TO THE COMPANY AND TO THE AIRPLANE. HE HAD NEVER FLOWN AN INTL, OVERWATER FLT. IN PANC, WE TOOK A SHORT MAINT DELAY WHILE I TRIED TO GET THE WATER SYS WORKING IN THE AIRPLANE SO THE PAX COULD HAVE RUNNING WATER. WE TOOK OFF FROM PANC FOR AN XA00 ARR IN TEB. BY THE TIME WE GOT TO TEB, I WAS EXHAUSTED. WE WERE RADAR VECTORED TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO RWY 6 FOR A STRAIGHT-IN LNDG. I BRIEFLY LOOKED OVER THE APCH PLATE EXPECTING TO FOLLOW THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR RWY 6 AND ASKING TO BREAK OFF THE APCH AND CIRCLE VISUALLY TO LAND ON RWY 1, MUCH MORE INTO THE WIND. AFTER HAVING BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH, THE BREAKOFF WAS APPROVED AFTER PASSING TORBY, THE OM. I HAD TROUBLE PICKING UP THE ARPT AND IDENTING RWY 1. THE STADIUMS WE USE AS A POINT OF VISUAL REF FOR RWY 1 COULD NOT BE IDENTED BECAUSE ALL ASSOCIATED LIGHTING FOR THESE STADIUMS WERE NOT ON. WE WERE AT 2000 FT (ASSIGNED) WHEN CLRED FOR THE ILS 6 APCH. THINGS BEGAN TO HAPPEN FAST. I BECAME DISORIENTED ON THE ILS TO RWY 6. I STARTED A DSCNT FROM 2000 FT ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE WHEN GS INTERCEPTION ALT WAS REACHED. AT THIS POINT, I WAS STILL TRYING TO FIND RWY 1 SO I COULD ENTER A DOWNWIND/BASE FOR RWY 1. CONCENTRATING TOO MUCH ON THE CIRCLE FOR RWY 1, I MISSED THE XING ALT OF 1500 FT AT DANDY INTXN BEFORE THE OM. WITH RWY 6 NOW IN GOOD VISUAL SIGHT, I WAS DSNDING. I FELT I WAS HIGH AND THEN I FELT I WAS LOW, TOO LOW FOR A CIRCLE TO RWY 1. I STARTED OUT AT 2000 FT AT GS INTERCEPT DOWN TO 1600 FT (BELOW GS) AND THEN BACK TO 2000 FT TO WAIT FOR THE GS INTERCEPT. IT WAS AT THIS POINT WHERE I DIDN'T REALLY KNOW WHAT ALT I SHOULD BE AT AND WHAT ALT I SHOULD CIRCLE TO RWY 1 AT. I SAW BIG, FAT TXWY 5 RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. I DID NOT WANT TO TURN OFF OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE. I HAD NO OTHER REFS RIGHT AT THIS TIME OTHER THAN THE ILS AND RWY 6 AND I CERTAINLY DIDN'T WANT TO ADD TO THE PROB BY LEAVING THESE REFS IN SEARCH OF A RWY THAT I WAS NOT ALL THAT FAMILIAR WITH. I TOLD THE COPLT TO ASK TEB TWR FOR A STRAIGHT-IN LNDG TO RWY 6. THIS WAS APPROVED. I THOUGHT THAT GETTING THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND NOW ON RWY 6 WAS THE BEST OPTION, AFTER ALL WIND AT 360 DEGS AT 9 KTS GUSTING TO 15 KTS IS NOT THAT MUCH OF A XWIND WHEN LNDG ON RWY 5. SEVERAL FACTORS LED ME TO VARY THE ALT/DSCNT RATE (AND CLB), WHICH THEN LED ME TO NOT FOLLOW THE ALT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FINAL APCH TO RWY 5. THESE ARE: 1) MY PERSONAL RESERVES WERE GONE. I WAS EXHAUSTED. 2) MOMENTARY DISORIENTATION IN RESPECT TO RWY 5, WHICH LED TO INDECISION ABOUT THE BEST ALT TO CIRCLE TO RWY 1. I WANTED TO KEEP AS MUCH ALT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE CIRCLE. AT THIS MOMENT, I WAS ACTUALLY STILL TRYING TO DECIDE WHICH RWY I WANTED TO USE FOR THE LNDG. MY DECISION MAKING PROCESS WAS HAMPERED. I HAD NO REAL 'PLAN OF ATTACK' FOR THIS APCH: CIRCLE/NOT CIRCLE, STRAIGHT IN/NOT STRAIGHT IN RWY 1/RWY 6. 3) WE DIDN'T BRIEF THE APCH COMPLETELY. 4) NEW COPLT. MUCH OF THE FLT WAS TAKEN UP TALKING ABOUT AIRPLANE OPS AND INTL OPS. BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED IN TEB IN ADDITION TO BEING TIRED I WAS GETTING HOARSE. THE COPLT CRM WAS VIRTUALLY NON EXISTENT. 5) EXCELLENT WX. THIS GAVE ME SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR APCHING THE ARPT (IFR, VFR, STRAIGHT IN, CIRCLING) AND I DIDN'T FOCUS ON ANY ONE OPTION AND DID NOT CONCENTRATE ON ANY ONE APCH. IN THE FUTURE, I NEED TO BE MORE ATTENTIVE TO LONG DISTANCE/LONG DUTY DAY FLTS. I CAN REQUEST A THIRD PLT FOR THESE FLTS BUT IN THE PAST I HAVE SHIED AWAY FROM DOING SO BECAUSE CREW TRANSPORTATION IS EXPENSIVE. 3 PLTS IN THE COCKPIT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE, IS BETTER BECAUSE 3 HEADS ARE BETTER THAN 2, ESPECIALLY DURING HIGH WORKLOAD PERIODS, TKOF, APCH, LNDG. FIRST FLT FOR A COPLT IN THE AIRPLANE AND FIRST TIME INTL OPS FOR THE COPLT. THESE 2 FACTORS SHOULD NOT BE MIXED. SO THE COMPANY NEEDS TO LOOK AT MORE EXPERIENCED COPLTS. WORKING AS WE WERE THIS FLT, WE WERE BOTH STRESSED OUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.