A320 crew found the fire bottle squib circuit breakers were tripped.

Attributes
ACN	565378
Time
Date	200211
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : zlc.artcc
State Reference	UT
Altitude	msl single value : 39000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zlc.artcc
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	A320
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	cruise : level
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time type : 633
ASRS Report	565378
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 90 flight time total : 3500 flight time type : 90
ASRS Report	565375
Events
Anomaly	maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted other
Consequence	other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : work cards performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : training
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Company Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

During cruise, first officer noticed that all 4 engine fire bottle squib circuit breakers were open. We assumed they were pulled during some previous maintenance action. Contacted the air carrier maintenance controller via ACARS. Decided to leave breakers open until at gate, unless the fire bottles were needed. The air carrier maintenance controller found that their checklist for bringing an aircraft into a hangar call for these breakers to be opened, but the checklist for taking an aircraft out of the hangar makes no mention of these breakers. Ours was the 4TH leg flown since the aircraft was towed from the hangar. Recommend the maintenance checklist be modified to ensure any circuit breakers pulled during hangar work are reset upon returning aircraft to service. These breakers are not monitored by the ECAM system. All 4 capts should have noticed the lack of squib lights during preflight fire system checks. Center jump seat headrest can partially obscure the breakers in question, but was not a factor on our flight. Supplemental information from acn 565375: 2/3 of the way to lax, I noticed that 4 circuit breakers in a row were out. They were the 2 engine fire bottle squibs (I believe around position Q45, Q46, Q47, Q48). After a few ACARS messages with maintenance, we figured they were missed during our preflight. We discussed possibly resetting the breakers, but decided to leave them out unless there was a need to use the engine fire bottle. After numerous ACARS messages with the maintenance controller, it appears that the breakers might have been out for 4 flts. The maintenance controller was addressing the issue that the hangar docking cards mentions pulling the breakers inbound, but doesn't mention resetting them on the exit card. As for myself and captain, we understand we both missed them on the preflight and on the fire test without the illuminated squib light.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW FOUND THE FIRE BOTTLE SQUIB CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE TRIPPED.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE, FO NOTICED THAT ALL 4 ENG FIRE BOTTLE SQUIB CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE OPEN. WE ASSUMED THEY WERE PULLED DURING SOME PREVIOUS MAINT ACTION. CONTACTED THE ACR MAINT CTLR VIA ACARS. DECIDED TO LEAVE BREAKERS OPEN UNTIL AT GATE, UNLESS THE FIRE BOTTLES WERE NEEDED. THE ACR MAINT CTLR FOUND THAT THEIR CHKLIST FOR BRINGING AN ACFT INTO A HANGAR CALL FOR THESE BREAKERS TO BE OPENED, BUT THE CHKLIST FOR TAKING AN ACFT OUT OF THE HANGAR MAKES NO MENTION OF THESE BREAKERS. OURS WAS THE 4TH LEG FLOWN SINCE THE ACFT WAS TOWED FROM THE HANGAR. RECOMMEND THE MAINT CHKLIST BE MODIFIED TO ENSURE ANY CIRCUIT BREAKERS PULLED DURING HANGAR WORK ARE RESET UPON RETURNING ACFT TO SVC. THESE BREAKERS ARE NOT MONITORED BY THE ECAM SYS. ALL 4 CAPTS SHOULD HAVE NOTICED THE LACK OF SQUIB LIGHTS DURING PREFLT FIRE SYS CHKS. CTR JUMP SEAT HEADREST CAN PARTIALLY OBSCURE THE BREAKERS IN QUESTION, BUT WAS NOT A FACTOR ON OUR FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 565375: 2/3 OF THE WAY TO LAX, I NOTICED THAT 4 CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN A ROW WERE OUT. THEY WERE THE 2 ENG FIRE BOTTLE SQUIBS (I BELIEVE AROUND POS Q45, Q46, Q47, Q48). AFTER A FEW ACARS MESSAGES WITH MAINT, WE FIGURED THEY WERE MISSED DURING OUR PREFLT. WE DISCUSSED POSSIBLY RESETTING THE BREAKERS, BUT DECIDED TO LEAVE THEM OUT UNLESS THERE WAS A NEED TO USE THE ENG FIRE BOTTLE. AFTER NUMEROUS ACARS MESSAGES WITH THE MAINT CTLR, IT APPEARS THAT THE BREAKERS MIGHT HAVE BEEN OUT FOR 4 FLTS. THE MAINT CTLR WAS ADDRESSING THE ISSUE THAT THE HANGAR DOCKING CARDS MENTIONS PULLING THE BREAKERS INBOUND, BUT DOESN'T MENTION RESETTING THEM ON THE EXIT CARD. AS FOR MYSELF AND CAPT, WE UNDERSTAND WE BOTH MISSED THEM ON THE PREFLT AND ON THE FIRE TEST WITHOUT THE ILLUMINATED SQUIB LIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.