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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 567070 |
Time | |
Date | 200211 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : dca.airport |
State Reference | DC |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 7000 msl bound upper : 9000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : iad.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure sid : n/s |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 260 flight time total : 3200 flight time type : 1800 |
ASRS Report | 567070 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | airspace violation : entry non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
On takeoff from runway 1 at dca, we incorrectly set up the single engine procedure radial instead of the P56 avoidance radial. This caused us to enter restr airspace. The problem arose from doing detailed briefings of things that were not really necessary for that day, 'clear VFR.' our focus should have been on the normal procedure, with a mention that if we should lose an engine, let's stay out of restr airspace and not hit anything. By focusing on this procedure as the last briefing, somehow that radial got put in the navaids, there is only a 16 degree difference between the single engine procedure and the P56 avoidance procedure. The other thing is that the P56 avoidance procedure is also a visual procedure. Had this been done visually, this incident would not have happened. The captain was busy flying and I was doing my after takeoff checks, nobody was looking outside. Had either of us looked outside, we would have seen that the picture was not correct. This was not a first time airport for either of us. I think the simplification of numerous procedures for this departure may have helped avert this problem. I think the single engine procedure could be put more in line with the departure procedure, this is a sea level airport. Had we flown this departure visually, which should have been done, the incorrect setting would not have mattered. Also, using automation on this takeoff would have helped. The PF would have been concentrating on what is going on around instead of flying. The bottom line is we missed the proper departure procedure, which I know will never happen to me again, because I will double-check when I get a briefing. Hard way to learn a lesson, but at least I learned from this.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CL65 FLC ENTERS P56 ON DEP FROM KDCA.
Narrative: ON TKOF FROM RWY 1 AT DCA, WE INCORRECTLY SET UP THE SINGLE ENG PROC RADIAL INSTEAD OF THE P56 AVOIDANCE RADIAL. THIS CAUSED US TO ENTER RESTR AIRSPACE. THE PROB AROSE FROM DOING DETAILED BRIEFINGS OF THINGS THAT WERE NOT REALLY NECESSARY FOR THAT DAY, 'CLR VFR.' OUR FOCUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE NORMAL PROC, WITH A MENTION THAT IF WE SHOULD LOSE AN ENG, LET'S STAY OUT OF RESTR AIRSPACE AND NOT HIT ANYTHING. BY FOCUSING ON THIS PROC AS THE LAST BRIEFING, SOMEHOW THAT RADIAL GOT PUT IN THE NAVAIDS, THERE IS ONLY A 16 DEG DIFFERENCE BTWN THE SINGLE ENG PROC AND THE P56 AVOIDANCE PROC. THE OTHER THING IS THAT THE P56 AVOIDANCE PROC IS ALSO A VISUAL PROC. HAD THIS BEEN DONE VISUALLY, THIS INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. THE CAPT WAS BUSY FLYING AND I WAS DOING MY AFTER TKOF CHKS, NOBODY WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE. HAD EITHER OF US LOOKED OUTSIDE, WE WOULD HAVE SEEN THAT THE PICTURE WAS NOT CORRECT. THIS WAS NOT A FIRST TIME ARPT FOR EITHER OF US. I THINK THE SIMPLIFICATION OF NUMEROUS PROCS FOR THIS DEP MAY HAVE HELPED AVERT THIS PROB. I THINK THE SINGLE ENG PROC COULD BE PUT MORE IN LINE WITH THE DEP PROC, THIS IS A SEA LEVEL ARPT. HAD WE FLOWN THIS DEP VISUALLY, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE, THE INCORRECT SETTING WOULD NOT HAVE MATTERED. ALSO, USING AUTOMATION ON THIS TKOF WOULD HAVE HELPED. THE PF WOULD HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATING ON WHAT IS GOING ON AROUND INSTEAD OF FLYING. THE BOTTOM LINE IS WE MISSED THE PROPER DEP PROC, WHICH I KNOW WILL NEVER HAPPEN TO ME AGAIN, BECAUSE I WILL DOUBLE-CHK WHEN I GET A BRIEFING. HARD WAY TO LEARN A LESSON, BUT AT LEAST I LEARNED FROM THIS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.