Narrative:

Prior to leaving jfk, I and the first officer went to dispatch to obtain a full briefing and ascertain the WX conditions in buf and surrounding area including alternates. The dispatcher informed us that a high minimums captain had diverted from buf to iag because of his high minimums and that we should be ok. We had roc as an alternate although the dispatcher indicated that if we had to go to an alternate, iag was a better airport. We observed on the dispatcher's radar a band of snow approximately 800 NM long by 100 NM wide stretching from and moving west to east. This WX was covering buf. We departed with roc as our alternate. As part of our descent preparation, we obtained WX for buf, roc, and iag. We briefed the approach and ascertained that roc was not suitable as an alternate and that iag was getting worse, but was still good as an alternate. At 12000 ft inbound to buf, approximately 10 mins from the buf VOR, we received holding instructions from center to hold over buf VOR at 12000 ft. I inquired to the reason for holding and center replied that they had not been told, we continued presuming that it was probably a spacing problem into buf. I picked up more ATIS and discovered a special for iag had been issued indicating 1/4 mi visibility, thus bringing it below minimums. I ACARS'ed dispatch requesting information on other alternate airports and informing them that roc and iag were now no good as alternates. No response was received from dispatch. I let the first officer set up and fly the hold. I made an announcement to the passenger indicating that we would be holding. I then checked for nearest suitable airports for a possible diversion while waiting for dispatch's reply. We looked at 7 different airports and obtained WX for each. I proceeded to look at our fuel and possible alternates to the south of buf. I asked approach what was the reason for the hold. They told me buf was below minimums and that there were 8 airplanes stacked below us. We ACARS'ed dispatch again asking for a suitable alternate giving fuel on board and efc of XB00Z. It was XA27Z when entering the hold. Everyone in the cockpit concurred that with the information received it was highly unlikely that we would be landing at buf and that holding over buf VOR was wasting fuel. Again knowing dispatch was probably very busy, we formulated a plan of action and looked at the fuel requirements to go to a number of airports south of buf. In addition, as a final thought, I called the tower at roc on communication #2 and told them we were considering diverting there. I requested a WX condition and field report including NOTAMS. They told us that the WX was improving there and that everyone was getting into roc without a problem. I realized that if I wanted to go to roc and have enough fuel to go south in the event of a missed, I needed to go right away. I considered calling commercial radio for a phone patch to discuss the plan with dispatch, but I decided the time required to do that based on possible frequency congestion coupled with our fuel on board and the possibility that the poor visibility in buf was blowing towards roc, so I opted to proceed to roc, our filed alternate, and send dispatch an ACARS informing them that we were going to roc. Shortly after telling approach our intentions and receiving clearance to roc, we received a reply to our first ACARS saying alb looked good (this was not an in-flight rerte and did not contain any instructions). As we were now on our way to roc and the plan looked good and also based on our training to make a plan and stick with it, we continued to roc. I did notify buf and roc operations to let them know that we were on the way to roc. I notified the flight attendants that we were diverting to roc for WX. I asked our jump seating captain to make an announcement to inform the passenger that we were diverting to roc, as buf WX was not suitable for landing. He then informed the passenger for me. We landed safely and without incident. When we landed in roc, there was another A320 air carrier airplane at the gate. We parked on the ramp waiting for the other aircraft to push back. As soon as we set the parking brake, I called dispatch on my cell phone and informed them we were in roc on the ground and asked for a plan of action. They told me to expect a new dispatch to buf in about 30 mins. I made an announcement to the passenger telling them we were going to leave for buf in about 30-45 mins, that we would be adding extra fuel and departing. I did apologize for the inconvenience and explained that it was a WX related diversion. We refueled, deiced, and anti-iced and departed to buf. On arrival at buf, we intercepted the localizer and prior to FAF the airport went below minimums where we were given holding instructions. We held over the OM. After 1 turn in holding, we were then informed the airport was at minimums. We were cleared for the approach and told to contact the tower at the FAF. We contacted the tower after passing the FAF and they replied that the airport was once again below minimums and they would be issuing holding instructions. I replied that we had passed the FAF and that we wished to continue the approach. We were cleared to continue, and shortly after we were informed that the airport was at 4000 ft RVR, the required minimum for landing. We continued to our minimums and landing uneventfully. The next day, I was told by a dispatcher that roc had a NOTAM that approach lights were not working and minimums were 4000 ft RVR. When we landed, I think with reported 3000 ft RVR, but the approach lights were working. I think the problem had been fixed by the time we got there. I think the dispatcher was confused between buf 4000 ft NOTAM and roc. I had asked for NOTAMS and the tower said they had none. I could not find any fdc NOTAMS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW HAD NO DISPATCHER HELP WITH A WX DIVERSION AND RETURN TO THE DEST STATION.

Narrative: PRIOR TO LEAVING JFK, I AND THE FO WENT TO DISPATCH TO OBTAIN A FULL BRIEFING AND ASCERTAIN THE WX CONDITIONS IN BUF AND SURROUNDING AREA INCLUDING ALTERNATES. THE DISPATCHER INFORMED US THAT A HIGH MINIMUMS CAPT HAD DIVERTED FROM BUF TO IAG BECAUSE OF HIS HIGH MINIMUMS AND THAT WE SHOULD BE OK. WE HAD ROC AS AN ALTERNATE ALTHOUGH THE DISPATCHER INDICATED THAT IF WE HAD TO GO TO AN ALTERNATE, IAG WAS A BETTER ARPT. WE OBSERVED ON THE DISPATCHER'S RADAR A BAND OF SNOW APPROX 800 NM LONG BY 100 NM WIDE STRETCHING FROM AND MOVING W TO E. THIS WX WAS COVERING BUF. WE DEPARTED WITH ROC AS OUR ALTERNATE. AS PART OF OUR DSCNT PREPARATION, WE OBTAINED WX FOR BUF, ROC, AND IAG. WE BRIEFED THE APCH AND ASCERTAINED THAT ROC WAS NOT SUITABLE AS AN ALTERNATE AND THAT IAG WAS GETTING WORSE, BUT WAS STILL GOOD AS AN ALTERNATE. AT 12000 FT INBOUND TO BUF, APPROX 10 MINS FROM THE BUF VOR, WE RECEIVED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM CTR TO HOLD OVER BUF VOR AT 12000 FT. I INQUIRED TO THE REASON FOR HOLDING AND CTR REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN TOLD, WE CONTINUED PRESUMING THAT IT WAS PROBABLY A SPACING PROB INTO BUF. I PICKED UP MORE ATIS AND DISCOVERED A SPECIAL FOR IAG HAD BEEN ISSUED INDICATING 1/4 MI VISIBILITY, THUS BRINGING IT BELOW MINIMUMS. I ACARS'ED DISPATCH REQUESTING INFO ON OTHER ALTERNATE ARPTS AND INFORMING THEM THAT ROC AND IAG WERE NOW NO GOOD AS ALTERNATES. NO RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED FROM DISPATCH. I LET THE FO SET UP AND FLY THE HOLD. I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX INDICATING THAT WE WOULD BE HOLDING. I THEN CHKED FOR NEAREST SUITABLE ARPTS FOR A POSSIBLE DIVERSION WHILE WAITING FOR DISPATCH'S REPLY. WE LOOKED AT 7 DIFFERENT ARPTS AND OBTAINED WX FOR EACH. I PROCEEDED TO LOOK AT OUR FUEL AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATES TO THE S OF BUF. I ASKED APCH WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR THE HOLD. THEY TOLD ME BUF WAS BELOW MINIMUMS AND THAT THERE WERE 8 AIRPLANES STACKED BELOW US. WE ACARS'ED DISPATCH AGAIN ASKING FOR A SUITABLE ALTERNATE GIVING FUEL ON BOARD AND EFC OF XB00Z. IT WAS XA27Z WHEN ENTERING THE HOLD. EVERYONE IN THE COCKPIT CONCURRED THAT WITH THE INFO RECEIVED IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD BE LNDG AT BUF AND THAT HOLDING OVER BUF VOR WAS WASTING FUEL. AGAIN KNOWING DISPATCH WAS PROBABLY VERY BUSY, WE FORMULATED A PLAN OF ACTION AND LOOKED AT THE FUEL REQUIREMENTS TO GO TO A NUMBER OF ARPTS S OF BUF. IN ADDITION, AS A FINAL THOUGHT, I CALLED THE TWR AT ROC ON COM #2 AND TOLD THEM WE WERE CONSIDERING DIVERTING THERE. I REQUESTED A WX CONDITION AND FIELD RPT INCLUDING NOTAMS. THEY TOLD US THAT THE WX WAS IMPROVING THERE AND THAT EVERYONE WAS GETTING INTO ROC WITHOUT A PROB. I REALIZED THAT IF I WANTED TO GO TO ROC AND HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO GO S IN THE EVENT OF A MISSED, I NEEDED TO GO RIGHT AWAY. I CONSIDERED CALLING COMMERCIAL RADIO FOR A PHONE PATCH TO DISCUSS THE PLAN WITH DISPATCH, BUT I DECIDED THE TIME REQUIRED TO DO THAT BASED ON POSSIBLE FREQ CONGESTION COUPLED WITH OUR FUEL ON BOARD AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE POOR VISIBILITY IN BUF WAS BLOWING TOWARDS ROC, SO I OPTED TO PROCEED TO ROC, OUR FILED ALTERNATE, AND SEND DISPATCH AN ACARS INFORMING THEM THAT WE WERE GOING TO ROC. SHORTLY AFTER TELLING APCH OUR INTENTIONS AND RECEIVING CLRNC TO ROC, WE RECEIVED A REPLY TO OUR FIRST ACARS SAYING ALB LOOKED GOOD (THIS WAS NOT AN INFLT RERTE AND DID NOT CONTAIN ANY INSTRUCTIONS). AS WE WERE NOW ON OUR WAY TO ROC AND THE PLAN LOOKED GOOD AND ALSO BASED ON OUR TRAINING TO MAKE A PLAN AND STICK WITH IT, WE CONTINUED TO ROC. I DID NOTIFY BUF AND ROC OPS TO LET THEM KNOW THAT WE WERE ON THE WAY TO ROC. I NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE WERE DIVERTING TO ROC FOR WX. I ASKED OUR JUMP SEATING CAPT TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO INFORM THE PAX THAT WE WERE DIVERTING TO ROC, AS BUF WX WAS NOT SUITABLE FOR LNDG. HE THEN INFORMED THE PAX FOR ME. WE LANDED SAFELY AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. WHEN WE LANDED IN ROC, THERE WAS ANOTHER A320 ACR AIRPLANE AT THE GATE. WE PARKED ON THE RAMP WAITING FOR THE OTHER ACFT TO PUSH BACK. AS SOON AS WE SET THE PARKING BRAKE, I CALLED DISPATCH ON MY CELL PHONE AND INFORMED THEM WE WERE IN ROC ON THE GND AND ASKED FOR A PLAN OF ACTION. THEY TOLD ME TO EXPECT A NEW DISPATCH TO BUF IN ABOUT 30 MINS. I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX TELLING THEM WE WERE GOING TO LEAVE FOR BUF IN ABOUT 30-45 MINS, THAT WE WOULD BE ADDING EXTRA FUEL AND DEPARTING. I DID APOLOGIZE FOR THE INCONVENIENCE AND EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS A WX RELATED DIVERSION. WE REFUELED, DEICED, AND ANTI-ICED AND DEPARTED TO BUF. ON ARR AT BUF, WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND PRIOR TO FAF THE ARPT WENT BELOW MINIMUMS WHERE WE WERE GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. WE HELD OVER THE OM. AFTER 1 TURN IN HOLDING, WE WERE THEN INFORMED THE ARPT WAS AT MINIMUMS. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND TOLD TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THE FAF. WE CONTACTED THE TWR AFTER PASSING THE FAF AND THEY REPLIED THAT THE ARPT WAS ONCE AGAIN BELOW MINIMUMS AND THEY WOULD BE ISSUING HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD PASSED THE FAF AND THAT WE WISHED TO CONTINUE THE APCH. WE WERE CLRED TO CONTINUE, AND SHORTLY AFTER WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE ARPT WAS AT 4000 FT RVR, THE REQUIRED MINIMUM FOR LNDG. WE CONTINUED TO OUR MINIMUMS AND LNDG UNEVENTFULLY. THE NEXT DAY, I WAS TOLD BY A DISPATCHER THAT ROC HAD A NOTAM THAT APCH LIGHTS WERE NOT WORKING AND MINIMUMS WERE 4000 FT RVR. WHEN WE LANDED, I THINK WITH RPTED 3000 FT RVR, BUT THE APCH LIGHTS WERE WORKING. I THINK THE PROB HAD BEEN FIXED BY THE TIME WE GOT THERE. I THINK THE DISPATCHER WAS CONFUSED BTWN BUF 4000 FT NOTAM AND ROC. I HAD ASKED FOR NOTAMS AND THE TWR SAID THEY HAD NONE. I COULD NOT FIND ANY FDC NOTAMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.