Narrative:

We called for taxi and were told to taxi via taxiway west and hold short of runway 6. Approaching runway 6, we were then cleared to taxi to runway 33L via runway 10. I took 1 more look at the runway diagram and we proceeded onto runway 6 for runway 10. We were asked to expedite clearing runway 6 for arriving traffic. Taxiing down runway 10, we finished up the taxi and before takeoff checklist. At some point taxiing down runway 10, I got the perception that we were cleared into position and hold for runway 33L. I called for the runway line-up checklist and turned onto runway 33L. Tower then called us telling us to clear the runway immediately and there was landing traffic. I cleared the runway to the east. As I tried to figure out how I entered an active runway without clearance, I found several things that might have contributed: 1) I was very tired. I had gotten home at XA30 that morning from a 3 day trip. This had some effect on my alertness. My normal habit patterns were disrupted and I failed to verbally confirm we were cleared on the hold and failed to visually check final. 2) I was flying with someone whom I had never met/flown with before. He was not familiar with the lj-60. The SOP's that I am accustomed to using were not common between us. 3) the aircraft we flew in had no headsets, which I usually use, so we used the handheld microphone with aircraft speakers instead. All of these factors should have been a huge alert causing me to slow down and be very deliberate. I have recently reached a point where I am very comfortable and confident flying the lj-60. This confidence probably masked the above warning signs. Realizing I was tired, I should have slowed things down and been more methodical and cautious in my actions. Flying with someone for the first time, rather than curtailing the crew brief, I should have taken the time to get an unfamiliar copilot up to speed with the lj-60 and my expectations. I am fortunate that this incident did not result in an accident. I realize in this profession, there is zero tolerance for error. I also realize that better crew coordination and communications would have prevented this incident. I am fortunate to have learned a great deal about recognizing my own limitations.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LJ-60 FLT CREW TAXIED ONTO ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC AT ISP WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL, CAUSING A GAR.

Narrative: WE CALLED FOR TAXI AND WERE TOLD TO TAXI VIA TXWY W AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 6. APCHING RWY 6, WE WERE THEN CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 33L VIA RWY 10. I TOOK 1 MORE LOOK AT THE RWY DIAGRAM AND WE PROCEEDED ONTO RWY 6 FOR RWY 10. WE WERE ASKED TO EXPEDITE CLRING RWY 6 FOR ARRIVING TFC. TAXIING DOWN RWY 10, WE FINISHED UP THE TAXI AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. AT SOME POINT TAXIING DOWN RWY 10, I GOT THE PERCEPTION THAT WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD FOR RWY 33L. I CALLED FOR THE RWY LINE-UP CHKLIST AND TURNED ONTO RWY 33L. TWR THEN CALLED US TELLING US TO CLR THE RWY IMMEDIATELY AND THERE WAS LNDG TFC. I CLRED THE RWY TO THE E. AS I TRIED TO FIGURE OUT HOW I ENTERED AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC, I FOUND SEVERAL THINGS THAT MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED: 1) I WAS VERY TIRED. I HAD GOTTEN HOME AT XA30 THAT MORNING FROM A 3 DAY TRIP. THIS HAD SOME EFFECT ON MY ALERTNESS. MY NORMAL HABIT PATTERNS WERE DISRUPTED AND I FAILED TO VERBALLY CONFIRM WE WERE CLRED ON THE HOLD AND FAILED TO VISUALLY CHK FINAL. 2) I WAS FLYING WITH SOMEONE WHOM I HAD NEVER MET/FLOWN WITH BEFORE. HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE LJ-60. THE SOP'S THAT I AM ACCUSTOMED TO USING WERE NOT COMMON BTWN US. 3) THE ACFT WE FLEW IN HAD NO HEADSETS, WHICH I USUALLY USE, SO WE USED THE HANDHELD MIKE WITH ACFT SPEAKERS INSTEAD. ALL OF THESE FACTORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN A HUGE ALERT CAUSING ME TO SLOW DOWN AND BE VERY DELIBERATE. I HAVE RECENTLY REACHED A POINT WHERE I AM VERY COMFORTABLE AND CONFIDENT FLYING THE LJ-60. THIS CONFIDENCE PROBABLY MASKED THE ABOVE WARNING SIGNS. REALIZING I WAS TIRED, I SHOULD HAVE SLOWED THINGS DOWN AND BEEN MORE METHODICAL AND CAUTIOUS IN MY ACTIONS. FLYING WITH SOMEONE FOR THE FIRST TIME, RATHER THAN CURTAILING THE CREW BRIEF, I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO GET AN UNFAMILIAR COPLT UP TO SPD WITH THE LJ-60 AND MY EXPECTATIONS. I AM FORTUNATE THAT THIS INCIDENT DID NOT RESULT IN AN ACCIDENT. I REALIZE IN THIS PROFESSION, THERE IS ZERO TOLERANCE FOR ERROR. I ALSO REALIZE THAT BETTER CREW COORD AND COMS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. I AM FORTUNATE TO HAVE LEARNED A GREAT DEAL ABOUT RECOGNIZING MY OWN LIMITATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.