Narrative:

Moderate rainfall. I was the captain. Taxiing in to gate at sea, I made a right turn on the 'J' line to align the aircraft with the gate. There were 3 marshallers, 1 at each wing and the lead. All had vests, and I believe wands. The lead initially gave me a left turn signal as I approached the 'J' line (which would have pointed me at the 'D' gates). I made a right turn onto the 'J' line, at which point he began giving the correct turn indications. I accurately followed his instructions as we approached the jetway, making 2 small corrections he had signaled for. Both the first officer and I had our windshield wipers operating. The rain/night conditions made seeing the circle-of-safety lines impossible, so I was relying on the marshaler for alignment and clearance on the ground support equipment surrounding the gate. To the left of the aircraft there were several parked deicing trucks. My taxi speed was very slow as I was being extra careful with the poor visibility. Both the lead marshaller and the left wing walker gave me the continual/all clear signals. As we passed the jetway I could no longer see the left wingtip marshaller, nor the trucks. As the lead marshaller was (appearing) to start to give me the normal stop signal, I felt the aircraft impact something and immediately stopped. Our speed was very slow. The lead at that point also gave me the stop signal (post impact). The aircraft was stopped on the centerline, very close to the normal stop bar (the jetway was able to meet the aircraft normally). The ground crew left the gate/aircraft area almost immediately. 2 mechanics witnessed the incident from a van parked in front and slightly to the right of the aircraft nose. They reported to me that the lead apparently did not see the left wing walker's signal to stop. The left wing walker later reported that he had waited too long to give the stop signal. The aircraft's left wing leading edge impacted the back of the deice truck ladder assembly about 5 ft inboard of the wingtip. There were no apparent injuries to passenger, flight crew, or ground crew. The first officer and I were able to discuss the incident with the ground crew at a later time. All the ground crew members agreed that the incident would have been prevented had they followed their procedures. The marshallers stated that I had followed their instructions and was not taxiing quickly. Maintenance had evidently parked the deice truck inside the safety lines, and the ground crew failed to move it. I also failed to have it moved. However, as I stated, I could not see the safety lines and was relying on the marshallers to ensure clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 FLC HAS COLLISION WITH RAMP VEHICLE DURING TAXI TO GATE AT SEA.

Narrative: MODERATE RAINFALL. I WAS THE CAPT. TAXIING IN TO GATE AT SEA, I MADE A R TURN ON THE 'J' LINE TO ALIGN THE ACFT WITH THE GATE. THERE WERE 3 MARSHALLERS, 1 AT EACH WING AND THE LEAD. ALL HAD VESTS, AND I BELIEVE WANDS. THE LEAD INITIALLY GAVE ME A L TURN SIGNAL AS I APCHED THE 'J' LINE (WHICH WOULD HAVE POINTED ME AT THE 'D' GATES). I MADE A R TURN ONTO THE 'J' LINE, AT WHICH POINT HE BEGAN GIVING THE CORRECT TURN INDICATIONS. I ACCURATELY FOLLOWED HIS INSTRUCTIONS AS WE APCHED THE JETWAY, MAKING 2 SMALL CORRECTIONS HE HAD SIGNALED FOR. BOTH THE FO AND I HAD OUR WINDSHIELD WIPERS OPERATING. THE RAIN/NIGHT CONDITIONS MADE SEEING THE CIRCLE-OF-SAFETY LINES IMPOSSIBLE, SO I WAS RELYING ON THE MARSHALER FOR ALIGNMENT AND CLRNC ON THE GND SUPPORT EQUIP SURROUNDING THE GATE. TO THE L OF THE ACFT THERE WERE SEVERAL PARKED DEICING TRUCKS. MY TAXI SPD WAS VERY SLOW AS I WAS BEING EXTRA CAREFUL WITH THE POOR VISIBILITY. BOTH THE LEAD MARSHALLER AND THE L WING WALKER GAVE ME THE CONTINUAL/ALL CLR SIGNALS. AS WE PASSED THE JETWAY I COULD NO LONGER SEE THE L WINGTIP MARSHALLER, NOR THE TRUCKS. AS THE LEAD MARSHALLER WAS (APPEARING) TO START TO GIVE ME THE NORMAL STOP SIGNAL, I FELT THE ACFT IMPACT SOMETHING AND IMMEDIATELY STOPPED. OUR SPD WAS VERY SLOW. THE LEAD AT THAT POINT ALSO GAVE ME THE STOP SIGNAL (POST IMPACT). THE ACFT WAS STOPPED ON THE CTRLINE, VERY CLOSE TO THE NORMAL STOP BAR (THE JETWAY WAS ABLE TO MEET THE ACFT NORMALLY). THE GND CREW LEFT THE GATE/ACFT AREA ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. 2 MECHS WITNESSED THE INCIDENT FROM A VAN PARKED IN FRONT AND SLIGHTLY TO THE R OF THE ACFT NOSE. THEY RPTED TO ME THAT THE LEAD APPARENTLY DID NOT SEE THE L WING WALKER'S SIGNAL TO STOP. THE L WING WALKER LATER RPTED THAT HE HAD WAITED TOO LONG TO GIVE THE STOP SIGNAL. THE ACFT'S L WING LEADING EDGE IMPACTED THE BACK OF THE DEICE TRUCK LADDER ASSEMBLY ABOUT 5 FT INBOARD OF THE WINGTIP. THERE WERE NO APPARENT INJURIES TO PAX, FLC, OR GND CREW. THE FO AND I WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITH THE GND CREW AT A LATER TIME. ALL THE GND CREW MEMBERS AGREED THAT THE INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD THEY FOLLOWED THEIR PROCS. THE MARSHALLERS STATED THAT I HAD FOLLOWED THEIR INSTRUCTIONS AND WAS NOT TAXIING QUICKLY. MAINT HAD EVIDENTLY PARKED THE DEICE TRUCK INSIDE THE SAFETY LINES, AND THE GND CREW FAILED TO MOVE IT. I ALSO FAILED TO HAVE IT MOVED. HOWEVER, AS I STATED, I COULD NOT SEE THE SAFETY LINES AND WAS RELYING ON THE MARSHALLERS TO ENSURE CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.