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Attributes | |
ACN | 568984 |
Time | |
Date | 200212 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mem.airport |
State Reference | TN |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mem.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A310 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mem.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 206 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 2000 |
ASRS Report | 568984 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical incursion : runway non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 70 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance Airport |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Intra Facility Coordination Failure Operational Error |
Narrative:
After initial contact on 121.9, we were given clearance to switch to another frequency, 121.0, who gave us taxi clearance from spot X to hold short of runway 27, taxiway V, hold short of runway 27 on taxiway north. A third of the way down taxiway V, we were told to hold short of runway 27 on taxiway B, and that the field was in the process of changing to north oriented operations (from south operations). I stopped on taxiway V just short of taxiway B (this alleviates jetblast possibilities on reinitiating taxi due to close proximity of the ramp). After ground gave other taxi instructions to other aircraft, we were given, and read back verbatim, full route taxi clearance 'taxiway B, to taxiway south, to runway 36R,' to taxi. Cognizant of the limitations of taxiway B and runway 27 intersection, I pwred up for taxi while still aligned with taxiway V, taxied ever so slightly beyond taxiway B, and performed a minor over-center turn from taxiway V wbound to taxiway B swbound. This technique permits an enhanced view of the runway 27 from approach corridor due to a slightly more perpendicular alignment of the aircraft with runway 27. I immediately saw a DC10 on short final for runway 27 and slammed on the brakes. The 'more perpendicular' alignment was a noteworthy factor in a clear view of the conflict aircraft's position, estimated to have been 300-500 ft AGL at first sighting. The DC10 would have been more difficult to see had our aircraft been exactly aligned with taxiway B's centerline. (This is taxiway B, north of runway 27.) we did slightly encroach on taxiway B to runway 27 hold short line. There was no contact between the aircraft, and the DC10 did not appear to take any evasive action. We were again cleared 'taxiway B, taxiway south to runway 36R' and departed on runway 36R without further incident. Items of note 1) there were no FMS changes or other cockpit distrs occurring prior to this incident. 2) I strongly suspect there was/were considerable distrs in the controling agency associated with turning the field around from southerly operations to northerly operations. 3) 'habit patterns for survival' saved the day. That is: a) no distrs prior to crossing the active runways. B) good aircraft alignment (to facilitate:) C) properly clearing both left and right before crossing active runways and txwys. This was quite a jolt, and reinforces why we do things the way we do, even for an experienced and proficient captain. A piece of wisdom came to mind as I reviewed these issues. The wisdom originated from my father, (a 40 yr airline veteran) as this: it's the holidays, and people don't concentrate like they do at other times. (The cockpit tape recorder was retained.)
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RWY INCURSION RELATED TO A SYS ERROR WHEN AN A310 CARGO FLT CREW STOPS OVER THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 27 AT TXWY B AFTER BEING CLRED TO CROSS, AND THEN SEEING TFC ON SHORT FINAL AT MEM, TN.
Narrative: AFTER INITIAL CONTACT ON 121.9, WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO SWITCH TO ANOTHER FREQ, 121.0, WHO GAVE US TAXI CLRNC FROM SPOT X TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27, TXWY V, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27 ON TXWY N. A THIRD OF THE WAY DOWN TXWY V, WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27 ON TXWY B, AND THAT THE FIELD WAS IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGING TO N ORIENTED OPS (FROM S OPS). I STOPPED ON TXWY V JUST SHORT OF TXWY B (THIS ALLEVIATES JETBLAST POSSIBILITIES ON REINITIATING TAXI DUE TO CLOSE PROX OF THE RAMP). AFTER GND GAVE OTHER TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO OTHER ACFT, WE WERE GIVEN, AND READ BACK VERBATIM, FULL RTE TAXI CLRNC 'TXWY B, TO TXWY S, TO RWY 36R,' TO TAXI. COGNIZANT OF THE LIMITATIONS OF TXWY B AND RWY 27 INTXN, I PWRED UP FOR TAXI WHILE STILL ALIGNED WITH TXWY V, TAXIED EVER SO SLIGHTLY BEYOND TXWY B, AND PERFORMED A MINOR OVER-CTR TURN FROM TXWY V WBOUND TO TXWY B SWBOUND. THIS TECHNIQUE PERMITS AN ENHANCED VIEW OF THE RWY 27 FROM APCH CORRIDOR DUE TO A SLIGHTLY MORE PERPENDICULAR ALIGNMENT OF THE ACFT WITH RWY 27. I IMMEDIATELY SAW A DC10 ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 27 AND SLAMMED ON THE BRAKES. THE 'MORE PERPENDICULAR' ALIGNMENT WAS A NOTEWORTHY FACTOR IN A CLR VIEW OF THE CONFLICT ACFT'S POS, ESTIMATED TO HAVE BEEN 300-500 FT AGL AT FIRST SIGHTING. THE DC10 WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DIFFICULT TO SEE HAD OUR ACFT BEEN EXACTLY ALIGNED WITH TXWY B'S CTRLINE. (THIS IS TXWY B, N OF RWY 27.) WE DID SLIGHTLY ENCROACH ON TXWY B TO RWY 27 HOLD SHORT LINE. THERE WAS NO CONTACT BTWN THE ACFT, AND THE DC10 DID NOT APPEAR TO TAKE ANY EVASIVE ACTION. WE WERE AGAIN CLRED 'TXWY B, TXWY S TO RWY 36R' AND DEPARTED ON RWY 36R WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ITEMS OF NOTE 1) THERE WERE NO FMS CHANGES OR OTHER COCKPIT DISTRS OCCURRING PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT. 2) I STRONGLY SUSPECT THERE WAS/WERE CONSIDERABLE DISTRS IN THE CTLING AGENCY ASSOCIATED WITH TURNING THE FIELD AROUND FROM SOUTHERLY OPS TO NORTHERLY OPS. 3) 'HABIT PATTERNS FOR SURVIVAL' SAVED THE DAY. THAT IS: A) NO DISTRS PRIOR TO XING THE ACTIVE RWYS. B) GOOD ACFT ALIGNMENT (TO FACILITATE:) C) PROPERLY CLRING BOTH L AND R BEFORE XING ACTIVE RWYS AND TXWYS. THIS WAS QUITE A JOLT, AND REINFORCES WHY WE DO THINGS THE WAY WE DO, EVEN FOR AN EXPERIENCED AND PROFICIENT CAPT. A PIECE OF WISDOM CAME TO MIND AS I REVIEWED THESE ISSUES. THE WISDOM ORIGINATED FROM MY FATHER, (A 40 YR AIRLINE VETERAN) AS THIS: IT'S THE HOLIDAYS, AND PEOPLE DON'T CONCENTRATE LIKE THEY DO AT OTHER TIMES. (THE COCKPIT TAPE RECORDER WAS RETAINED.)
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.