Narrative:

Departed gate XA01. APU inoperative requiring air start cart. During the taxi, noted precipitation. First officer indicated light freezing drizzle in the sequence. Started remaining engine to comply with ground icing parameters. Upon reaching the next taxiway intersection, advised the first officer to inform ground control we needed to return to gate. During return, noted that no deicing was in progress at the air carrier a or air carrier B gates. Upon return to gate, deplaned and inspected aircraft. All top facing surfaces covered with ice. Advised dispatch of situation and indicated that the flight was deferred until conditions changed. No protest from the dispatcher. A SIGMET was in effect at that time for occasional severe mixed icing below 8000 ft. However, the radar unit in operations indicated a widespread area of precipitation moving from the wsw. Based on the color coding, the precipitation area was displayed as frozen precipitation. Over the next couple of hours, the freezing drizzle continued. Apparently, pressure was mounting from the dispatch supervisors, since the dispatcher began to question the flight deferral. I pointed out that freezing drizzle is outside certification criteria of the aircraft. Indicated that page 3 of the air carrier B winter operations guide provides information on the WX phenomena. The dispatcher felt that the aom was controling since there were holdover tables for this type of WX. I pointed out that once the deice/anti-ice fluid shears from the airfoil you are susceptible to the elements. Freezing drizzle and freezing rain regardless of intensity can cause severe icing. Dispatcher indicated that the flight was going to be turned over to the supervisor. Shortly thereafter, crew scheduling called indicating that they were assigning another captain to the flight. Prior to the conversation with the dispatcher, the first officer indicated that the lga ATIS was now broadcasting a SIGMET for severe mixed icing below 8000 ft. The 'occasional' was dropped. During the course of the evening, there were no PIREPS or other information conveyed regarding airborne conditions. Other air carrier flts operated. However, no information was forthcoming regarding conditions. During the entire time sitting in operations, the deice report for lga was never updated. Company radio traffic overhead during the situation, indicated that the deicing crews were not providing information to the pilots once they completed the process. Additionally, operations personnel were asking rampers sitting in the area if the type 4 was 100%. This captain removed from line status by flight management. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: events subsequent to the filed report included the removal of the reporter for the balance of the month (on paid status), a review by a company evaluation team (a joint review board of associated agents) and a disciplinary meeting with the company, the reporter, and union representatives. The evaluation team concluded the actions of the reporter were operationally acceptable and recommended no remedial action be taken. The meeting with the company resulted in a recommendation for additional training on winter operations and a special check ride. The reporter appealed this decision to the poi who then asked the company to justify the need for a check ride in writing. The company declined to do so and removed the demand for the check ride. The company placed a letter in the file of the reporter stating that his abuse of captain's authority/authorized was causing a financial hardship for the company. The reporter alleges a distinct and potentially hazardous difference of opinion regarding what are and are not acceptable icing conditions for operation of the E145 aircraft at this company. Further, that institutionalized pressure is used to coerce pilots to operate in icing conditions unless and until an 'actual' PIREP in excess of aircraft certification standards is received -- in direct contradiction to the far requirement to avoid 'forecast' icing. This interpretation requires at least 1 aircraft to be exposed to hazardous in-flight conditions before subsequent flts could be delayed or diverted in a manner financially acceptable to the company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF E145 ACFT WITHSTOOD PRESSURE FROM COMPANY DISPATCHER TO DISPATCH DURING PERIOD OF TIME THAT WINTER OPS CONDITIONS IN EXCESS OF ACFT CERTIFICATION LIMITATIONS EXISTED. CAPT REMOVED FROM FLT STATUS FOR REFUSING TO FLY.

Narrative: DEPARTED GATE XA01. APU INOP REQUIRING AIR START CART. DURING THE TAXI, NOTED PRECIP. FO INDICATED LIGHT FREEZING DRIZZLE IN THE SEQUENCE. STARTED REMAINING ENG TO COMPLY WITH GND ICING PARAMETERS. UPON REACHING THE NEXT TXWY INTXN, ADVISED THE FO TO INFORM GND CTL WE NEEDED TO RETURN TO GATE. DURING RETURN, NOTED THAT NO DEICING WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE ACR A OR ACR B GATES. UPON RETURN TO GATE, DEPLANED AND INSPECTED ACFT. ALL TOP FACING SURFACES COVERED WITH ICE. ADVISED DISPATCH OF SIT AND INDICATED THAT THE FLT WAS DEFERRED UNTIL CONDITIONS CHANGED. NO PROTEST FROM THE DISPATCHER. A SIGMET WAS IN EFFECT AT THAT TIME FOR OCCASIONAL SEVERE MIXED ICING BELOW 8000 FT. HOWEVER, THE RADAR UNIT IN OPS INDICATED A WIDESPREAD AREA OF PRECIP MOVING FROM THE WSW. BASED ON THE COLOR CODING, THE PRECIP AREA WAS DISPLAYED AS FROZEN PRECIP. OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF HRS, THE FREEZING DRIZZLE CONTINUED. APPARENTLY, PRESSURE WAS MOUNTING FROM THE DISPATCH SUPVRS, SINCE THE DISPATCHER BEGAN TO QUESTION THE FLT DEFERRAL. I POINTED OUT THAT FREEZING DRIZZLE IS OUTSIDE CERTIFICATION CRITERIA OF THE ACFT. INDICATED THAT PAGE 3 OF THE ACR B WINTER OPS GUIDE PROVIDES INFO ON THE WX PHENOMENA. THE DISPATCHER FELT THAT THE AOM WAS CTLING SINCE THERE WERE HOLDOVER TABLES FOR THIS TYPE OF WX. I POINTED OUT THAT ONCE THE DEICE/ANTI-ICE FLUID SHEARS FROM THE AIRFOIL YOU ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE ELEMENTS. FREEZING DRIZZLE AND FREEZING RAIN REGARDLESS OF INTENSITY CAN CAUSE SEVERE ICING. DISPATCHER INDICATED THAT THE FLT WAS GOING TO BE TURNED OVER TO THE SUPVR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, CREW SCHEDULING CALLED INDICATING THAT THEY WERE ASSIGNING ANOTHER CAPT TO THE FLT. PRIOR TO THE CONVERSATION WITH THE DISPATCHER, THE FO INDICATED THAT THE LGA ATIS WAS NOW BROADCASTING A SIGMET FOR SEVERE MIXED ICING BELOW 8000 FT. THE 'OCCASIONAL' WAS DROPPED. DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVENING, THERE WERE NO PIREPS OR OTHER INFO CONVEYED REGARDING AIRBORNE CONDITIONS. OTHER ACR FLTS OPERATED. HOWEVER, NO INFO WAS FORTHCOMING REGARDING CONDITIONS. DURING THE ENTIRE TIME SITTING IN OPS, THE DEICE RPT FOR LGA WAS NEVER UPDATED. COMPANY RADIO TFC OVERHEAD DURING THE SIT, INDICATED THAT THE DEICING CREWS WERE NOT PROVIDING INFO TO THE PLTS ONCE THEY COMPLETED THE PROCESS. ADDITIONALLY, OPS PERSONNEL WERE ASKING RAMPERS SITTING IN THE AREA IF THE TYPE 4 WAS 100%. THIS CAPT REMOVED FROM LINE STATUS BY FLT MGMNT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILED RPT INCLUDED THE REMOVAL OF THE RPTR FOR THE BAL OF THE MONTH (ON PAID STATUS), A REVIEW BY A COMPANY EVALUATION TEAM (A JOINT REVIEW BOARD OF ASSOCIATED AGENTS) AND A DISCIPLINARY MEETING WITH THE COMPANY, THE RPTR, AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES. THE EVALUATION TEAM CONCLUDED THE ACTIONS OF THE RPTR WERE OPERATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE AND RECOMMENDED NO REMEDIAL ACTION BE TAKEN. THE MEETING WITH THE COMPANY RESULTED IN A RECOMMENDATION FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON WINTER OPS AND A SPECIAL CHK RIDE. THE RPTR APPEALED THIS DECISION TO THE POI WHO THEN ASKED THE COMPANY TO JUSTIFY THE NEED FOR A CHK RIDE IN WRITING. THE COMPANY DECLINED TO DO SO AND REMOVED THE DEMAND FOR THE CHK RIDE. THE COMPANY PLACED A LETTER IN THE FILE OF THE RPTR STATING THAT HIS ABUSE OF CAPT'S AUTH WAS CAUSING A FINANCIAL HARDSHIP FOR THE COMPANY. THE RPTR ALLEGES A DISTINCT AND POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION REGARDING WHAT ARE AND ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE ICING CONDITIONS FOR OP OF THE E145 ACFT AT THIS COMPANY. FURTHER, THAT INSTITUTIONALIZED PRESSURE IS USED TO COERCE PLTS TO OPERATE IN ICING CONDITIONS UNLESS AND UNTIL AN 'ACTUAL' PIREP IN EXCESS OF ACFT CERTIFICATION STANDARDS IS RECEIVED -- IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE FAR REQUIREMENT TO AVOID 'FORECAST' ICING. THIS INTERP REQUIRES AT LEAST 1 ACFT TO BE EXPOSED TO HAZARDOUS INFLT CONDITIONS BEFORE SUBSEQUENT FLTS COULD BE DELAYED OR DIVERTED IN A MANNER FINANCIALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMPANY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.