Narrative:

The incident occurred during climb out in a falcon 50, after departing jac, on an IFR flight plan in VMC with the autoplt engaged. The ZLC controller cleared us to maintain our own terrain separation while in the climb allowing us a more direct routing to our first en route fix (bpy). He then cleared us to climb and maintain 13000 ft, and warned us of crossing traffic east of us level at 14000 ft. The PNF read back the altitude clearance and together we acknowledged the traffic at 14000 ft. I then set the aircraft altitude preselect on the autoplt to level us at 14000 ft (the last number that I heard and said), rather than 13000 ft (the clearance limit). Despite acknowledging the correct altitude verbally, I set the altitude preselect incorrectly. The aircraft then climbed to the selected (incorrect) altitude and was leveling off as the controller questioned us regarding our altitude. Immediately realizing our error, and identing the conflicting traffic both on TCASII (not yet a TA threat) and then visually, I informed the controller that we were not at the correct altitude, had visual contact with the traffic, and were turning right to avoid the conflicting traffic. In the turn the TCASII target did turn into a yellow TA threat, however, at no time was TCASII RA represented. He then cleared us to continue our climb and informed us of the loss of separation and requested that I call on the phone at the completion of the flight. The controller was very professional and courteous throughout the incident, and thanks to his quick notice of our mistake and his decision to have us continue our climb as the simplest and quickest solution to regain the lost separation, the incident did not result in an accident. From my perspective, his was a case of unconsciously disconnecting the aural/verbal altitude target (13000 ft), and the physical action of setting of the visual/preselect altitude target (14000 ft). In highlights for me the importance of attention to detail and conscience mental verification of all actions taken in the cockpit, especially relatively mundane and frequent actions. Supplemental information from acn 570305: we had departed jac on an IFR clearance and were climbing direct to pbi. We were told to level at 13000 ft and that there was traffic at 14000 ft. The captain asked me if we could get turned away from the traffic by getting a clearance to the next waypoint. I set my FMS to 'direct to' the next waypoint and found it was a fairly good turn to the right. At that point, the controller asked us our altitude and I glanced up at the captain's altimeter (about 13700 ft) and altitude preselect (13000 ft). The captain was hand flying and turning us away from the traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FA50 OFF SLC WERE ISSUED MAINTAIN 13000 FT, READ BACK 13000 FT, BUT SET THE ALT PRESELECT ON THE AUTOPLT TO LEVEL AT 14000 FT. FLT CONFLICTED WITH THE TFC AT 14000 FT.

Narrative: THE INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING CLBOUT IN A FALCON 50, AFTER DEPARTING JAC, ON AN IFR FLT PLAN IN VMC WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. THE ZLC CTLR CLRED US TO MAINTAIN OUR OWN TERRAIN SEPARATION WHILE IN THE CLB ALLOWING US A MORE DIRECT ROUTING TO OUR FIRST ENRTE FIX (BPY). HE THEN CLRED US TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT, AND WARNED US OF XING TFC E OF US LEVEL AT 14000 FT. THE PNF READ BACK THE ALT CLRNC AND TOGETHER WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE TFC AT 14000 FT. I THEN SET THE ACFT ALT PRESELECT ON THE AUTOPLT TO LEVEL US AT 14000 FT (THE LAST NUMBER THAT I HEARD AND SAID), RATHER THAN 13000 FT (THE CLRNC LIMIT). DESPITE ACKNOWLEDGING THE CORRECT ALT VERBALLY, I SET THE ALT PRESELECT INCORRECTLY. THE ACFT THEN CLBED TO THE SELECTED (INCORRECT) ALT AND WAS LEVELING OFF AS THE CTLR QUESTIONED US REGARDING OUR ALT. IMMEDIATELY REALIZING OUR ERROR, AND IDENTING THE CONFLICTING TFC BOTH ON TCASII (NOT YET A TA THREAT) AND THEN VISUALLY, I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE NOT AT THE CORRECT ALT, HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TFC, AND WERE TURNING R TO AVOID THE CONFLICTING TFC. IN THE TURN THE TCASII TARGET DID TURN INTO A YELLOW TA THREAT, HOWEVER, AT NO TIME WAS TCASII RA REPRESENTED. HE THEN CLRED US TO CONTINUE OUR CLB AND INFORMED US OF THE LOSS OF SEPARATION AND REQUESTED THAT I CALL ON THE PHONE AT THE COMPLETION OF THE FLT. THE CTLR WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL AND COURTEOUS THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT, AND THANKS TO HIS QUICK NOTICE OF OUR MISTAKE AND HIS DECISION TO HAVE US CONTINUE OUR CLB AS THE SIMPLEST AND QUICKEST SOLUTION TO REGAIN THE LOST SEPARATION, THE INCIDENT DID NOT RESULT IN AN ACCIDENT. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, HIS WAS A CASE OF UNCONSCIOUSLY DISCONNECTING THE AURAL/VERBAL ALT TARGET (13000 FT), AND THE PHYSICAL ACTION OF SETTING OF THE VISUAL/PRESELECT ALT TARGET (14000 FT). IN HIGHLIGHTS FOR ME THE IMPORTANCE OF ATTN TO DETAIL AND CONSCIENCE MENTAL VERIFICATION OF ALL ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE COCKPIT, ESPECIALLY RELATIVELY MUNDANE AND FREQUENT ACTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 570305: WE HAD DEPARTED JAC ON AN IFR CLRNC AND WERE CLBING DIRECT TO PBI. WE WERE TOLD TO LEVEL AT 13000 FT AND THAT THERE WAS TFC AT 14000 FT. THE CAPT ASKED ME IF WE COULD GET TURNED AWAY FROM THE TFC BY GETTING A CLRNC TO THE NEXT WAYPOINT. I SET MY FMS TO 'DIRECT TO' THE NEXT WAYPOINT AND FOUND IT WAS A FAIRLY GOOD TURN TO THE R. AT THAT POINT, THE CTLR ASKED US OUR ALT AND I GLANCED UP AT THE CAPT'S ALTIMETER (ABOUT 13700 FT) AND ALT PRESELECT (13000 FT). THE CAPT WAS HAND FLYING AND TURNING US AWAY FROM THE TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.