Narrative:

On jan/fri/03, I was the first officer (PNF) on a flight to san jose. I received the current WX from ATIS (visibility 1/4 mi fog). I checked the airport chart and noticed we had the WX for departure on runway 26R and only needed 600 ft RVR for runway 26L. As we taxied for takeoff, tower announced new RVR (I think it was 1000, 800, 1000). There was no reaction, and I didn't press the issue. Tower asked if we needed runway 26L and since there was no indication from the captain, I replied 'no.' I was thinking we were legal down to 600 RVR. After an uneventful takeoff and climb out by the captain, I reviewed the airport chart and reached our error. I then mentioned to the captain that we should have requested runway 26L due to the low RVR. He responded by asking what tower had called the visibility! Contributing factors -- this was my first trip with this captain and was still learning his idiosyncrasies and habit patterns. I have already learned that he relies heavily on the PNF for such things as: remembering to lock the cockpit door, using the computer for landing data (PNF's duty), navigation using the CDU, briefing the special procedure even when he's the PF, and recommending the type of approach to be briefed/flown for the anticipated WX. The captain is 6 months from retirement and appears pre-occupied at times. In retrospect, I don't think he even considered the takeoff visibility (was not part of his departure briefing), reviewed the airport chart or heard tower's visibility announcement. Corrective actions -- since I am flying with this captain for the remainder of the month, I will be more forceful (but still using good CRM) as the PNF to make sure he's aware of changes to WX, clearance, etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW TKOF WITHOUT SUFFICIENT VISIBILITY MINIMUMS AT ONT.

Narrative: ON JAN/FRI/03, I WAS THE FO (PNF) ON A FLT TO SAN JOSE. I RECEIVED THE CURRENT WX FROM ATIS (VISIBILITY 1/4 MI FOG). I CHKED THE ARPT CHART AND NOTICED WE HAD THE WX FOR DEP ON RWY 26R AND ONLY NEEDED 600 FT RVR FOR RWY 26L. AS WE TAXIED FOR TKOF, TWR ANNOUNCED NEW RVR (I THINK IT WAS 1000, 800, 1000). THERE WAS NO REACTION, AND I DIDN'T PRESS THE ISSUE. TWR ASKED IF WE NEEDED RWY 26L AND SINCE THERE WAS NO INDICATION FROM THE CAPT, I REPLIED 'NO.' I WAS THINKING WE WERE LEGAL DOWN TO 600 RVR. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL TKOF AND CLBOUT BY THE CAPT, I REVIEWED THE ARPT CHART AND REACHED OUR ERROR. I THEN MENTIONED TO THE CAPT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED RWY 26L DUE TO THE LOW RVR. HE RESPONDED BY ASKING WHAT TWR HAD CALLED THE VISIBILITY! CONTRIBUTING FACTORS -- THIS WAS MY FIRST TRIP WITH THIS CAPT AND WAS STILL LEARNING HIS IDIOSYNCRASIES AND HABIT PATTERNS. I HAVE ALREADY LEARNED THAT HE RELIES HEAVILY ON THE PNF FOR SUCH THINGS AS: REMEMBERING TO LOCK THE COCKPIT DOOR, USING THE COMPUTER FOR LNDG DATA (PNF'S DUTY), NAV USING THE CDU, BRIEFING THE SPECIAL PROC EVEN WHEN HE'S THE PF, AND RECOMMENDING THE TYPE OF APCH TO BE BRIEFED/FLOWN FOR THE ANTICIPATED WX. THE CAPT IS 6 MONTHS FROM RETIREMENT AND APPEARS PRE-OCCUPIED AT TIMES. IN RETROSPECT, I DON'T THINK HE EVEN CONSIDERED THE TKOF VISIBILITY (WAS NOT PART OF HIS DEP BRIEFING), REVIEWED THE ARPT CHART OR HEARD TWR'S VISIBILITY ANNOUNCEMENT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS -- SINCE I AM FLYING WITH THIS CAPT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MONTH, I WILL BE MORE FORCEFUL (BUT STILL USING GOOD CRM) AS THE PNF TO MAKE SURE HE'S AWARE OF CHANGES TO WX, CLRNC, ETC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.