Narrative:

Ground control's taxi clearance was to taxi from the mat via taxiway aa with a right turn onto taxiway P to hold short of runway 22. I had the airport diagram chart out, and both the first officer and I reviewed the route because I had never been rted to runway 31 via that clearance before. After review, I noted that taxiway P was after taxiway G and before runway 13/31. As we were approximately abeam taxiway G, which was well marked, and still on taxiway aa, ground control cleared us to cross runway 22. The first officer acknowledged and checked his airfield diagram, while I was concentrating on finding the turn point to make the right turn onto taxiway P. As I reviewed in my mind the situation that night, the difficulty in finding the proper turn point was complicated very likely by the following factors: 1) it was my first taxi at night in that particular area of the airfield. Although we had reviewed the route, the lighting and signage in that area was complex and was confusing. Other txwys designed to cross runway 22 are marked with lighted signs, but taxiway P is marked only after the turn (in the area of the runway 22 hold line). 2) that particular area of the airport is poorly lit and I noted on the return trip from dca that the blue taxiway lights on taxiway aa at the north end were nonexistent. I am aware that there are many taxi rtes at lga that do not have complete blue taxiway lighting so assumed this area was one of those. 3) recent WX had apparently caused blowing sand which had nearly obliterated yellow taxi lines in that particular area of the airfield. I cannot remember seeing any hold lines, possibly for the same reason. Winds were complicating the sand problem that evening. The area needed to be swept. 4) the taxi light on our aircraft, though working satisfactorily, was extremely dim and less than desirable in a poorly lit area. This situation is known to most B737-800 pilots as a common aircraft problem. 5) the diagram of the area in question appears to be not to scale inasmuch as taxiway G and taxiway P seem in reality to be closer together than depicted. This may have been an unconscious factor in my missing the turn onto taxiway P. Out of corner of my eye, I spotted a taxiway P sign and because runway 13/31 lights were next, I started a right turn. I was reasonably sure that we had slightly overshot the taxiway P right turn, but was also confident that an immediate right turn would allow correction back to the taxiway. During the turn, lighting/markings were not what we anticipated, and when the taxiway markings (yellow line/blue taxiway lights/signage) could not be reacquired, I immediately stopped the aircraft. Simultaneously, the first officer said 'stop!' I directed the first officer to tell the tower that we had overshot our turn and to make sure we were not a factor with other traffic. Tower stated we were ok and cleared us again to cross runway 22 from our present position. Although the first officer expressed some concern, I do not recall ever seeing/crossing the runway 13/31 hold line and felt reassured by tower's answer to our communication that we had not encroached on that runway. I would approximate the heading at the point of stopping to be about 150-160 degrees. I noted concrete in front of us, no obstacles from my vantage point, and runway 22 clearly in front of us. I don't recall his stating any particular reason, but when I indicated my intention to resume the taxi, the first officer said 'stop' again. After a brief discussion and assessment of the situation, noting unobstructed clearway ahead. With tower's concurrence, we proceeded uneventfully across runway 22 and made an easy left turn on the east side of the runway back onto taxiway P. While continuing our taxi to runway 31 for takeoff, we agreed that because we were not absolutely positive of our position in the 'aa/P' area it would be prudent to have the aircraft look over (particularly the right side) by maintenance from the main terminal area. During this discussion, I believe the first officer stated that he thought he had seen a sign on the right side of the aircraft during the confusion. The right engine was shut down and the aircraft was inspected by maintenance and no abnormalities were noted, ie, a thumbs up and clearance to restart the engine was given. We restarted and proceeded to have an uneventful flight to dca. While in dca, I called lga tower to be assured that we had not caused any ground control problems during our earlier taxi out. I was told not to worry, it was not a problem. During the preflight in dca, the first officer called my attention to a small mark on the #2 engine cowl lip (about the 5 O'clock position looking from the rear). I went out to look and determined that we should write it up being not sure what caused it or when it happened. Maintenance at dca was advised, and indicated that the damage was minor in nature and we were cleared to continue. The rest of the trip was uneventful. Summary: although no major problems resulted from this occurrence, I feel that this event could have been a potentially serious incident/accident had runway incursion and/or significant aircraft damage resulted. Other pilots given the same circumstances may well inadvertently get into a much worse situation. Cause of problem: 1) pilot disorientation due to factors mentioned, ie, poor signage/markings, lack of/poor taxiway lighting, lack of swept taxiway, poor B737-800 taxiway light, airfield diagram not to scale. 2) not stopping the aircraft sooner when disoriented. 3) turning without total situational awareness. To prevent: 1) require nyc port authority/authorized to adequately provide standardized lighting on the airfield at lga. Blue taxi lights are sparse as are lighted taxiway ctrlines. 2) without proper lighting taxiway lines need to be swept during/after sanding operations. 3) airfield 'trouble spot' areas should be annotated at lga similar to those on the bos airfield diagram. 4) look at B737-800 taxi lights for marginal illumination. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated he was not familiar with the taxi route from the gate to runway 31. He said they very carefully reviewed the taxi chart, particularly the area on taxiway aa near txwys G and P. He does not think the taxi chart accurately depicts closeness of taxiway G and taxiway P where the problem started. He said they stopped just past taxiway P after seeing a poorly lit sig, otherwise they would have entered runway 13/31. He thinks the airport needs more electric lighting in that area.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 ON NIGHT TAXI OUT AT LGA NEARLY CROSSED AN ACTIVE RWY DUE TO BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THE TAXI AREA AND A LACK OF TXWY LIGHTS.

Narrative: GND CTL'S TAXI CLRNC WAS TO TAXI FROM THE MAT VIA TXWY AA WITH A R TURN ONTO TXWY P TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22. I HAD THE ARPT DIAGRAM CHART OUT, AND BOTH THE FO AND I REVIEWED THE RTE BECAUSE I HAD NEVER BEEN RTED TO RWY 31 VIA THAT CLRNC BEFORE. AFTER REVIEW, I NOTED THAT TXWY P WAS AFTER TXWY G AND BEFORE RWY 13/31. AS WE WERE APPROX ABEAM TXWY G, WHICH WAS WELL MARKED, AND STILL ON TXWY AA, GND CTL CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 22. THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED AND CHKED HIS AIRFIELD DIAGRAM, WHILE I WAS CONCENTRATING ON FINDING THE TURN POINT TO MAKE THE R TURN ONTO TXWY P. AS I REVIEWED IN MY MIND THE SIT THAT NIGHT, THE DIFFICULTY IN FINDING THE PROPER TURN POINT WAS COMPLICATED VERY LIKELY BY THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: 1) IT WAS MY FIRST TAXI AT NIGHT IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA OF THE AIRFIELD. ALTHOUGH WE HAD REVIEWED THE RTE, THE LIGHTING AND SIGNAGE IN THAT AREA WAS COMPLEX AND WAS CONFUSING. OTHER TXWYS DESIGNED TO CROSS RWY 22 ARE MARKED WITH LIGHTED SIGNS, BUT TXWY P IS MARKED ONLY AFTER THE TURN (IN THE AREA OF THE RWY 22 HOLD LINE). 2) THAT PARTICULAR AREA OF THE ARPT IS POORLY LIT AND I NOTED ON THE RETURN TRIP FROM DCA THAT THE BLUE TXWY LIGHTS ON TXWY AA AT THE N END WERE NONEXISTENT. I AM AWARE THAT THERE ARE MANY TAXI RTES AT LGA THAT DO NOT HAVE COMPLETE BLUE TXWY LIGHTING SO ASSUMED THIS AREA WAS ONE OF THOSE. 3) RECENT WX HAD APPARENTLY CAUSED BLOWING SAND WHICH HAD NEARLY OBLITERATED YELLOW TAXI LINES IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA OF THE AIRFIELD. I CANNOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY HOLD LINES, POSSIBLY FOR THE SAME REASON. WINDS WERE COMPLICATING THE SAND PROB THAT EVENING. THE AREA NEEDED TO BE SWEPT. 4) THE TAXI LIGHT ON OUR ACFT, THOUGH WORKING SATISFACTORILY, WAS EXTREMELY DIM AND LESS THAN DESIRABLE IN A POORLY LIT AREA. THIS SIT IS KNOWN TO MOST B737-800 PLTS AS A COMMON ACFT PROB. 5) THE DIAGRAM OF THE AREA IN QUESTION APPEARS TO BE NOT TO SCALE INASMUCH AS TXWY G AND TXWY P SEEM IN REALITY TO BE CLOSER TOGETHER THAN DEPICTED. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR IN MY MISSING THE TURN ONTO TXWY P. OUT OF CORNER OF MY EYE, I SPOTTED A TXWY P SIGN AND BECAUSE RWY 13/31 LIGHTS WERE NEXT, I STARTED A R TURN. I WAS REASONABLY SURE THAT WE HAD SLIGHTLY OVERSHOT THE TXWY P R TURN, BUT WAS ALSO CONFIDENT THAT AN IMMEDIATE R TURN WOULD ALLOW CORRECTION BACK TO THE TXWY. DURING THE TURN, LIGHTING/MARKINGS WERE NOT WHAT WE ANTICIPATED, AND WHEN THE TXWY MARKINGS (YELLOW LINE/BLUE TXWY LIGHTS/SIGNAGE) COULD NOT BE REACQUIRED, I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE ACFT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE FO SAID 'STOP!' I DIRECTED THE FO TO TELL THE TWR THAT WE HAD OVERSHOT OUR TURN AND TO MAKE SURE WE WERE NOT A FACTOR WITH OTHER TFC. TWR STATED WE WERE OK AND CLRED US AGAIN TO CROSS RWY 22 FROM OUR PRESENT POS. ALTHOUGH THE FO EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN, I DO NOT RECALL EVER SEEING/XING THE RWY 13/31 HOLD LINE AND FELT REASSURED BY TWR'S ANSWER TO OUR COM THAT WE HAD NOT ENCROACHED ON THAT RWY. I WOULD APPROXIMATE THE HDG AT THE POINT OF STOPPING TO BE ABOUT 150-160 DEGS. I NOTED CONCRETE IN FRONT OF US, NO OBSTACLES FROM MY VANTAGE POINT, AND RWY 22 CLRLY IN FRONT OF US. I DON'T RECALL HIS STATING ANY PARTICULAR REASON, BUT WHEN I INDICATED MY INTENTION TO RESUME THE TAXI, THE FO SAID 'STOP' AGAIN. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SIT, NOTING UNOBSTRUCTED CLEARWAY AHEAD. WITH TWR'S CONCURRENCE, WE PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY ACROSS RWY 22 AND MADE AN EASY L TURN ON THE E SIDE OF THE RWY BACK ONTO TXWY P. WHILE CONTINUING OUR TAXI TO RWY 31 FOR TKOF, WE AGREED THAT BECAUSE WE WERE NOT ABSOLUTELY POSITIVE OF OUR POS IN THE 'AA/P' AREA IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO HAVE THE ACFT LOOK OVER (PARTICULARLY THE R SIDE) BY MAINT FROM THE MAIN TERMINAL AREA. DURING THIS DISCUSSION, I BELIEVE THE FO STATED THAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD SEEN A SIGN ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT DURING THE CONFUSION. THE R ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED BY MAINT AND NO ABNORMALITIES WERE NOTED, IE, A THUMBS UP AND CLRNC TO RESTART THE ENG WAS GIVEN. WE RESTARTED AND PROCEEDED TO HAVE AN UNEVENTFUL FLT TO DCA. WHILE IN DCA, I CALLED LGA TWR TO BE ASSURED THAT WE HAD NOT CAUSED ANY GND CTL PROBS DURING OUR EARLIER TAXI OUT. I WAS TOLD NOT TO WORRY, IT WAS NOT A PROB. DURING THE PREFLT IN DCA, THE FO CALLED MY ATTN TO A SMALL MARK ON THE #2 ENG COWL LIP (ABOUT THE 5 O'CLOCK POS LOOKING FROM THE REAR). I WENT OUT TO LOOK AND DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD WRITE IT UP BEING NOT SURE WHAT CAUSED IT OR WHEN IT HAPPENED. MAINT AT DCA WAS ADVISED, AND INDICATED THAT THE DAMAGE WAS MINOR IN NATURE AND WE WERE CLRED TO CONTINUE. THE REST OF THE TRIP WAS UNEVENTFUL. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH NO MAJOR PROBS RESULTED FROM THIS OCCURRENCE, I FEEL THAT THIS EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS INCIDENT/ACCIDENT HAD RWY INCURSION AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACFT DAMAGE RESULTED. OTHER PLTS GIVEN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES MAY WELL INADVERTENTLY GET INTO A MUCH WORSE SIT. CAUSE OF PROB: 1) PLT DISORIENTATION DUE TO FACTORS MENTIONED, IE, POOR SIGNAGE/MARKINGS, LACK OF/POOR TXWY LIGHTING, LACK OF SWEPT TXWY, POOR B737-800 TXWY LIGHT, AIRFIELD DIAGRAM NOT TO SCALE. 2) NOT STOPPING THE ACFT SOONER WHEN DISORIENTED. 3) TURNING WITHOUT TOTAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. TO PREVENT: 1) REQUIRE NYC PORT AUTH TO ADEQUATELY PROVIDE STANDARDIZED LIGHTING ON THE AIRFIELD AT LGA. BLUE TAXI LIGHTS ARE SPARSE AS ARE LIGHTED TXWY CTRLINES. 2) WITHOUT PROPER LIGHTING TXWY LINES NEED TO BE SWEPT DURING/AFTER SANDING OPS. 3) AIRFIELD 'TROUBLE SPOT' AREAS SHOULD BE ANNOTATED AT LGA SIMILAR TO THOSE ON THE BOS AIRFIELD DIAGRAM. 4) LOOK AT B737-800 TAXI LIGHTS FOR MARGINAL ILLUMINATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE TAXI RTE FROM THE GATE TO RWY 31. HE SAID THEY VERY CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE TAXI CHART, PARTICULARLY THE AREA ON TXWY AA NEAR TXWYS G AND P. HE DOES NOT THINK THE TAXI CHART ACCURATELY DEPICTS CLOSENESS OF TXWY G AND TXWY P WHERE THE PROB STARTED. HE SAID THEY STOPPED JUST PAST TXWY P AFTER SEEING A POORLY LIT SIG, OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE ENTERED RWY 13/31. HE THINKS THE ARPT NEEDS MORE ELECTRIC LIGHTING IN THAT AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.